FKIE_CVE-2024-41799
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-07-29 15:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 07:489.9 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| tgstation13 | tgstation-server | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "tgstation-server",
"vendor": "tgstation",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 4.0.0, \u003c 6.8.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
},
{
"affectedData": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:tgstation13:tgstation-server:4.0.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "tgstation-server",
"vendor": "tgstation13",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "6.8.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.0.0.0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:tgstation13:tgstation-server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D5027F60-9636-4DD0-AFC9-8B6A7A64E3B9",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.8.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "tgstation-server is a production scale tool for BYOND server management. Prior to 6.8.0, low permission users using the \"Set .dme Path\" privilege could potentially set malicious .dme files existing on the host machine to be compiled and executed. These .dme files could be uploaded via tgstation-server (requiring a separate, isolated privilege) or some other means. A server configured to execute in BYOND\u0027s trusted security level (requiring a third separate, isolated privilege OR being set by another user) could lead to this escalating into remote code execution via BYOND\u0027s shell() proc. The ability to execute this kind of attack is a known side effect of having privileged TGS users, but normally requires multiple privileges with known weaknesses. This vector is not intentional as it does not require control over the where deployment code is sourced from and _may_ not require remote write access to an instance\u0027s `Configuration` directory. This problem is fixed in versions 6.8.0 and above."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "tgstation-server es una herramienta a escala de producci\u00f3n para la gesti\u00f3n de servidores BYOND. Antes de 6.8.0, los usuarios con permisos bajos que usaban el privilegio \"Set .dme Path\" pod\u00edan configurar archivos .dme maliciosos existentes en la m\u00e1quina host para compilarlos y ejecutarlos. Estos archivos .dme se pueden cargar a trav\u00e9s del servidor tgstation (que requiere un privilegio aislado e independiente) o por alg\u00fan otro medio. Un servidor configurado para ejecutarse en el nivel de seguridad confiable de BYOND (que requiere un tercer privilegio separado y aislado O que lo establezca otro usuario) podr\u00eda llevar a que esto se convierta en una ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo a trav\u00e9s del proceso shell() de BYOND. La capacidad de ejecutar este tipo de ataque es un efecto secundario conocido de tener usuarios privilegiados de TGS, pero normalmente requiere m\u00faltiples privilegios con debilidades conocidas. Este vector no es intencional ya que no requiere control sobre el origen del c\u00f3digo de implementaci\u00f3n y _puede_ no requerir acceso de escritura remota al directorio \"Configuration\" de una instancia. Este problema se solucion\u00f3 en las versiones 6.8.0 y superiores."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-41799",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:48:15.367",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.4,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.9,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-41799",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-07-29T17:40:12.363650Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-07-29T15:15:16.267",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/commit/374852fe5ae306415eb5aafb2d16b06897d7afe4"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking"
],
"url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/pull/1835"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/security/advisories/GHSA-c3h4-9gc2-f7h4"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/commit/374852fe5ae306415eb5aafb2d16b06897d7afe4"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking"
],
"url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/pull/1835"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/security/advisories/GHSA-c3h4-9gc2-f7h4"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-22"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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