FKIE_CVE-2023-54200
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-30 13:16 - Updated: 2026-10-28 19:10
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: always release netdev hooks from notifier
This reverts "netfilter: nf_tables: skip netdev events generated on netns removal".
The problem is that when a veth device is released, the veth release
callback will also queue the peer netns device for removal.
Its possible that the peer netns is also slated for removal. In this
case, the device memory is already released before the pre_exit hook of
the peer netns runs:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_hook_entry_head+0x1b8/0x1d0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88812c0124f0 by task kworker/u8:1/45
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
nf_hook_entry_head+0x1b8/0x1d0
__nf_unregister_net_hook+0x76/0x510
nft_netdev_unregister_hooks+0xa0/0x220
__nft_release_hook+0x184/0x490
nf_tables_pre_exit_net+0x12f/0x1b0
..
Order is:
1. First netns is released, veth_dellink() queues peer netns device
for removal
2. peer netns is queued for removal
3. peer netns device is released, unreg event is triggered
4. unreg event is ignored because netns is going down
5. pre_exit hook calls nft_netdev_unregister_hooks but device memory
might be free'd already.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "8d56f00c61f67b450fbbdcb874855e60ad92c560",
"status": "affected",
"version": "68a3765c659f809dcaac20030853a054646eb739",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "30e4b13b1bfbdf3bf3b27036d8209ea1b9f0d880",
"status": "affected",
"version": "68a3765c659f809dcaac20030853a054646eb739",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "94032527efbac13be702c76afb9d872c0cca7a43",
"status": "affected",
"version": "68a3765c659f809dcaac20030853a054646eb739",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "dc1c9fd4a8bbe1e06add9053010b652449bfe411",
"status": "affected",
"version": "68a3765c659f809dcaac20030853a054646eb739",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "90c7c58aa2bd02c65a4c63b7dfe0b16eab12cf9f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.15",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.14.15",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.113",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.30",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.3.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.4",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nf_tables: always release netdev hooks from notifier\n\nThis reverts \"netfilter: nf_tables: skip netdev events generated on netns removal\".\n\nThe problem is that when a veth device is released, the veth release\ncallback will also queue the peer netns device for removal.\n\nIts possible that the peer netns is also slated for removal. In this\ncase, the device memory is already released before the pre_exit hook of\nthe peer netns runs:\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_hook_entry_head+0x1b8/0x1d0\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff88812c0124f0 by task kworker/u8:1/45\nWorkqueue: netns cleanup_net\nCall Trace:\n nf_hook_entry_head+0x1b8/0x1d0\n __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x76/0x510\n nft_netdev_unregister_hooks+0xa0/0x220\n __nft_release_hook+0x184/0x490\n nf_tables_pre_exit_net+0x12f/0x1b0\n ..\n\nOrder is:\n1. First netns is released, veth_dellink() queues peer netns device\n for removal\n2. peer netns is queued for removal\n3. peer netns device is released, unreg event is triggered\n4. unreg event is ignored because netns is going down\n5. pre_exit hook calls nft_netdev_unregister_hooks but device memory\n might be free\u0027d already."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nnetfilter: nf_tables: siempre liberar hooks de netdev desde el notificador\n\nEsto revierte \u2019netfilter: nf_tables: omitir eventos de netdev generados en la eliminaci\u00f3n de netns\u2019.\n\nEl problema es que cuando un dispositivo veth es liberado, la callback de liberaci\u00f3n de veth tambi\u00e9n pondr\u00e1 en cola el dispositivo netns par para su eliminaci\u00f3n.\n\nEs posible que el netns par tambi\u00e9n est\u00e9 programado para su eliminaci\u00f3n. En este caso, la memoria del dispositivo ya est\u00e1 liberada antes de que el hook pre_exit del netns par se ejecute:\n\nBUG: KASAN: uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n de slab en nf_hook_entry_head+0x1b8/0x1d0\nLectura de tama\u00f1o 8 en la direcci\u00f3n ffff88812c0124f0 por la tarea kworker/u8:1/45\nCola de trabajo: netns cleanup_net\nRastro de llamada:\n nf_hook_entry_head+0x1b8/0x1d0\n __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x76/0x510\n nft_netdev_unregister_hooks+0xa0/0x220\n __nft_release_hook+0x184/0x490\n nf_tables_pre_exit_net+0x12f/0x1b0\n ..\n\nEl orden es:\n1. El primer netns es liberado, veth_dellink() pone en cola el dispositivo netns par para su eliminaci\u00f3n\n2. El netns par es puesto en cola para su eliminaci\u00f3n\n3. El dispositivo netns par es liberado, se dispara el evento de desregistro\n4. El evento de desregistro es ignorado porque el netns se est\u00e1 cerrando\n5. El hook pre_exit llama a nft_netdev_unregister_hooks pero la memoria del dispositivo podr\u00eda haber sido liberada ya."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2023-54200",
"lastModified": "2026-10-28T19:10:00.193",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2023-54200",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-15T21:39:16.069317Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-12-30T13:16:08.100",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30e4b13b1bfbdf3bf3b27036d8209ea1b9f0d880"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d56f00c61f67b450fbbdcb874855e60ad92c560"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94032527efbac13be702c76afb9d872c0cca7a43"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc1c9fd4a8bbe1e06add9053010b652449bfe411"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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