CVE-2026-82617 (GCVE-0-2026-82617)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-11 17:50 – Updated: 2026-09-11 21:07- CWE-1333 - Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://lists.apache.org/thread/spzhcxxszqdpppg70… | vendor-advisory |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/0… |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache OpenNLP |
Affected:
3.0.0-M1 , < 3.0.0-M6
(semver)
|
guessed | |
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache OpenNLP |
Affected:
2.0.0 , < 2.5.12
(semver)
|
guessed |
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe two built-in name-finder patterns exposed by\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eopennlp.tools.namefind.RegexNameFinderFactory\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e - \u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eDEFAULT_REGEX_NAME_FINDER.EMAIL\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\nand \u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eDEFAULT_REGEX_NAME_FINDER.URL\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;- contain ambiguous nested quantifiers. An\napplication that obtains these finders through\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eRegexNameFinderFactory.getDefaultRegexNameFinders(...)\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e and then applies them to\nuntrusted text through \u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eRegexNameFinder.find(String[])\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e or \u003c/span\u003e\u003ccode\u003eRegexNameFinder.find(String)\u003c/code\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\ncan be driven into super-linear backtracking or into unbounded matcher recursion by a\nsmall crafted input.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eFor the EMAIL pattern, a long run of local-part characters that is never followed by an\n\u003ccode\u003e@\u003c/code\u003e forces the matcher to re-scan to end-of-input from every starting offset. Cost grows\nquadratically with input length: an input of approximately 32 KB consumes several seconds\nof CPU in a single \u003ccode\u003efind()\u003c/code\u003e call and returns no match, and each doubling of the input\nmultiplies the cost roughly four-fold.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eFor the URL pattern, the query-string sub-expression nests a capturing repetition inside\nan outer repetition. The JDK matcher recurses once per query token, so an input of\napproximately 4 KB containing many \u003ccode\u003e\u0026amp;\u003c/code\u003e-separated tokens exhausts the thread stack and\ncauses \u003ccode\u003ejava.lang.StackOverflowError\u003c/code\u003e to propagate out of \u003ccode\u003efind()\u003c/code\u003e, terminating the\ncalling thread. On a thread created with a smaller stack (for example \u003ccode\u003e-Xss512k\u003c/code\u003e, typical\nof server worker pools) approximately 1 KB is sufficient.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eIn both cases an attacker who can supply text for analysis can convert a single request\ninto seconds to minutes of pinned CPU, or into an abrupt thread death, denying service to\nthe embedding application. No authentication, special configuration, or model file is\nrequired beyond the application having selected one of the two built-in finders.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects Apache OpenNLP: from 2.0.0 through 2.5.11; from 3.0.0-M1 through\n3.0.0-M5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\n\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 2.5.12, or to 3.0.0-M6 for users tracking the\n3.0.0 milestone line, which fix the issue.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "The two built-in name-finder patterns exposed by\nopennlp.tools.namefind.RegexNameFinderFactory - DEFAULT_REGEX_NAME_FINDER.EMAIL\nand DEFAULT_REGEX_NAME_FINDER.URL\u00a0- contain ambiguous nested quantifiers. An\napplication that obtains these finders through\nRegexNameFinderFactory.getDefaultRegexNameFinders(...) and then applies them to\nuntrusted text through RegexNameFinder.find(String[]) or RegexNameFinder.find(String)\ncan be driven into super-linear backtracking or into unbounded matcher recursion by a\nsmall crafted input.\n\n\n\n\n\nFor the EMAIL pattern, a long run of local-part characters that is never followed by an\n@ forces the matcher to re-scan to end-of-input from every starting offset. Cost grows\nquadratically with input length: an input of approximately 32 KB consumes several seconds\nof CPU in a single find() call and returns no match, and each doubling of the input\nmultiplies the cost roughly four-fold.\n\n\n\n\n\nFor the URL pattern, the query-string sub-expression nests a capturing repetition inside\nan outer repetition. The JDK matcher recurses once per query token, so an input of\napproximately 4 KB containing many \u0026-separated tokens exhausts the thread stack and\ncauses java.lang.StackOverflowError to propagate out of find(), terminating the\ncalling thread. On a thread created with a smaller stack (for example -Xss512k, typical\nof server worker pools) approximately 1 KB is sufficient.\n\n\n\n\n\nIn both cases an attacker who can supply text for analysis can convert a single request\ninto seconds to minutes of pinned CPU, or into an abrupt thread death, denying service to\nthe embedding application. No authentication, special configuration, or model file is\nrequired beyond the application having selected one of the two built-in finders.\n\n\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache OpenNLP: from 2.0.0 through 2.5.11; from 3.0.0-M1 through\n3.0.0-M5.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 2.5.12, or to 3.0.0-M6 for users tracking the\n3.0.0 milestone line, which fix the issue."
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"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 10,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"version": "4.0",
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"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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"dateUpdated": "2026-09-11T17:50:53.639Z",
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"tags": [
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"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/spzhcxxszqdpppg70m1zz2l3mv29mhl3"
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"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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"title": "Apache OpenNLP, Apache OpenNLP: ReDoS / stack exhaustion in RegexNameFinderFactory built-in EMAIL and URL patterns",
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-82617",
"datePublished": "2026-09-11T17:50:53.639Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-30T07:51:33.177Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-11T21:07:10.400Z",
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.