CVE-2026-77454 (GCVE-0-2026-77454)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-30 12:01 – Updated: 2026-08-30 12:01
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
exists/2 predicate silently dropped on limited relationships with a parent() filter in AshSql
Summary
Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_sql allows a caller to bypass a scoping or authorization filter expressed as exists/2 over a relationship that declares both a limit (or from_many?) and a parent(...)-referencing filter or sort.
AshSql.Join.related_query/3 skips the caller-supplied exists predicate for such relationships and delegates it to limit_from_many/5. When the relationship's own filter or sort references parent(...), limit_from_many/5 takes a branch that drops both the limit and the predicate, emitting a bare correlated EXISTS with no predicate. The check then matches any record that has any related row. Most severely, when the expression backs a policy (for example authorize_if expr(exists(memberships, user_id == ^actor(:id)))), the actor-scoping condition disappears and the policy passes for any actor with any related row.
This issue affects ash_sql: from 0.4.1 before 0.7.1.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/ash-project/ash_sql/security/a… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-77454.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-77454 | related |
| https://github.com/ash-project/ash_sql/commit/865… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash_sql |
Affected:
0.4.1 , < 0.7.1
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_sql:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
||
| ash-project | ash_sql |
Affected:
e26a63b29bd7501505fafd726f14262cdc3b6629 , < 865fdd4e5e70724a23b19c048e6768c31d2209ab
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_sql:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eIncorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash_sql allows a caller to bypass a scoping or authorization filter expressed as \u003ccode\u003eexists/2\u003c/code\u003e over a relationship that declares both a limit (or \u003ccode\u003efrom_many?\u003c/code\u003e) and a \u003ccode\u003eparent(...)\u003c/code\u003e-referencing filter or sort.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eAshSql.Join.related_query/3\u003c/code\u003e skips the caller-supplied \u003ccode\u003eexists\u003c/code\u003e predicate for such relationships and delegates it to \u003ccode\u003elimit_from_many/5\u003c/code\u003e. When the relationship\u0027s own filter or sort references \u003ccode\u003eparent(...)\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003elimit_from_many/5\u003c/code\u003e takes a branch that drops both the limit and the predicate, emitting a bare correlated \u003ccode\u003eEXISTS\u003c/code\u003e with no predicate. The check then matches any record that has any related row. Most severely, when the expression backs a policy (for example \u003ccode\u003eauthorize_if expr(exists(memberships, user_id == ^actor(:id)))\u003c/code\u003e), the actor-scoping condition disappears and the policy passes for any actor with any related row.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects ash_sql: from 0.4.1 before 0.7.1.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"description": "CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization",
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"title": "exists/2 predicate silently dropped on limited relationships with a parent() filter in AshSql"
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}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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