CVE-2026-73040 (GCVE-0-2026-73040)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-20 20:29 – Updated: 2026-08-21 16:21
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Dockge Path Traversal via Unvalidated Stack Name Allows Arbitrary Compose and .env Disclosure and Arbitrary Directory Deletion
Summary
Dockge validates a stack name only on the write path. In backend/stack.ts the allow-list check in validate(), which requires the name to match ^[a-z0-9_-]+$, is reached from save() alone, while the path getter returns path.join(this.server.stacksDir, this.name) and Stack.getStack builds path.join(server.stacksDir, stackName) with no check. The socket handlers in backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts confirm the caller is logged in and that the name is a string, then pass it straight to Stack.getStack, so a name containing traversal sequences resolves outside the managed stacks directory. An authenticated user can therefore read the composeENV and composeYAML values of any directory the server process can reach, which discloses the secrets in that directory's .env or Compose file, and can invoke delete(), which runs docker compose down and then fsAsync.rm on the traversed path with recursive and force set, removing that directory. Disclosure is limited to files named .env or an accepted Compose filename, and deletion requires the target directory to hold a valid Compose file so that docker compose down exits successfully. Dockge commonly runs as root with access to the Docker socket, so the reachable set includes unrelated applications on the host. Instances configured with disableAuth, a supported option that logs the caller in as admin automatically, expose both operations without authentication.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-21 16:21 UTC
CWE
- CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Assigner
References
7 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/louislam/dockge/issues/994 | issue-tracking |
| https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/bac… | technical-description |
| https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/bac… | technical-description |
| https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/bac… | technical-description |
| https://github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/bac… | technical-description |
| https://github.com/louislam/dockge | product |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dockge-path-… | third-party-advisory |
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-08-14 00:00
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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