{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "vllm",
          "vendor": "vllm-project",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.26.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:vllm:vllm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "BB265B9E-EBAE-4833-8C3E-B203C8E9EC86",
              "versionEndExcluding": "0.26.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.26.0, the /v1/completions/derender and /v1/chat/completions/derender endpoints accept caller-supplied GenerateResponse objects whose generate_responses, choices, token_ids, prompt_logprobs, logprobs.content, top_logprobs, and routed_experts structures are processed by OnlineDerenderer and tokenizer.decode before max_model_len, max_tokens, max_num_seqs, or response-size limits are enforced, allowing an authenticated API client to consume excessive CPU and memory and produce oversized responses. This issue is fixed in version 0.26.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-71486",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-02T19:30:34.767",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 4.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-71486",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-18T12:34:35.419144Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-17T20:16:45.927",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/8e61b646e2d157f9b93451fa048f9c8530c8a67b"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Issue Tracking",
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/47260"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.26.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory",
        "Mitigation"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-8737-qx52-hjff"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-400"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-770"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "vllm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71486"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T21:32:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-17T20:16:45Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `/v1/completions/derender` and `/v1/chat/completions/derender` endpoints accept caller-supplied `GenerateResponse` objects and postprocess every nested `choices[*].token_ids` list directly. Unlike the normal render/generate path, derender does not enforce model context length, resolved `max_tokens`, `max_num_seqs`, choice-count, or response-size bounds before detokenizing and returning the supplied token IDs. An authenticated API client can therefore make the CPU-only render frontend, or any server exposing these `/v1` derender routes, spend CPU and memory proportional to attacker-chosen generated-output-shaped JSON rather than to a bounded generation result.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe render router registers `/v1/chat/completions/derender` and `/v1/completions/derender` in `vllm/entrypoints/serve/render/api_router.py`, and the OpenAI API server attaches this router whenever `\"generate\"` or `\"render\"` is in `supported_tasks` (`vllm/entrypoints/openai/api_server.py`). The routes are under `/v1`, so they are part of the OpenAI-compatible HTTP API surface and are protected by the API-key middleware when `--api-key` is configured.\n\nThe request types trust generated-output-shaped data from the client. In `vllm/entrypoints/serve/disagg/protocol.py`, `GenerateResponseChoice` accepts `token_ids: list[int] | None = None`, `GenerateResponse` accepts `choices: list[GenerateResponseChoice]`, and `DerenderCompletionRequest` accepts `generate_responses: list[GenerateResponse]`. These fields have no max length, max item count, or relationship to a prior `GenerateRequest`.\n\nThe sink is `OnlineDerenderer`. `derender_completion()` iterates every supplied `generate_responses` entry and every nested choice, calls `tokenizer.decode(choice.token_ids, skip_special_tokens=True)`, appends the decoded text to the response choices, and increments `total_completion_tokens` from the same supplied list length. `derender_chat()` has the same shape for a single supplied `generate_response`, and can also feed the decoded text into tool/reasoning parsers when a parser and `chat_request` are present. `ServingRender.derender_completion_response()` calls `online_derenderer.derender_completion(request.generate_responses, request.prompt_tokens)` before applying any completion-level validation beyond the model check.\n\nNormal render and generation paths derive output limits from `max_model_len`, the rendered prompt length, request `max_tokens` / `max_completion_tokens`, and scheduler limits. Derender bypasses that invariant because it accepts the already-generated output shape directly from the HTTP caller. The missing invariant is: derender should only postprocess bounded generated output, and client-supplied derender payloads must be rejected if their nested generated token/logprob structures exceed the same limits that generation would have enforced.\n\n## PoV\n\nThe following bounded PoV can be run from a current vLLM checkout containing PR `#43606`. It asserts the current source facts for the derender routes, unchecked request fields, and decode sink, then simulates the same derender loop with a counting tokenizer. The negative control is a one-choice, 32-token response. The amplified payload keeps the test bounded but demonstrates that all decoded work and returned text scale directly with caller-supplied `GenerateResponse` contents.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport subprocess\nfrom dataclasses import dataclass\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nSOURCE = Path(\".\")\n\ndef require_source_fact(path: str, needles: list[str]) -\u003e None:\n    text = (SOURCE / path).read_text()\n    missing = [needle for needle in needles if needle not in text]\n    if missing:\n        raise AssertionError(f\"{path} missing expected facts: {missing}\")\n\ndef source_head() -\u003e str:\n    return subprocess.check_output([\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"HEAD\"], cwd=SOURCE, text=True).strip()\n\n@dataclass\nclass Choice:\n    index: int\n    token_ids: list[int]\n\n@dataclass\nclass GenerateResponse:\n    request_id: str\n    choices: list[Choice]\n\nclass CountingTokenizer:\n    def __init__(self) -\u003e None:\n        self.decode_calls = 0\n        self.decoded_ids = 0\n    def decode(self, token_ids: list[int], *, skip_special_tokens: bool = True) -\u003e str:\n        self.decode_calls += 1\n        self.decoded_ids += len(token_ids)\n        return \"x\" * len(token_ids)\n\ndef derender_completion_like_current_head(generate_responses: list[GenerateResponse], tokenizer: CountingTokenizer) -\u003e tuple[int, int, int]:\n    output_chars = 0\n    choices = 0\n    total_completion_tokens = 0\n    for gen in generate_responses:\n        for choice in gen.choices:\n            if not choice.token_ids:\n                raise ValueError(\"choice has empty or null token_ids\")\n            decoded_text = tokenizer.decode(choice.token_ids, skip_special_tokens=True)\n            output_chars += len(decoded_text)\n            total_completion_tokens += len(choice.token_ids)\n            choices += 1\n    return choices, total_completion_tokens, output_chars\n\ndef make_payload(responses: int, choices_per_response: int, tokens_per_choice: int) -\u003e list[GenerateResponse]:\n    token_ids = [42] * tokens_per_choice\n    return [GenerateResponse(request_id=f\"gen-{r}\", choices=[Choice(index=c, token_ids=list(token_ids)) for c in range(choices_per_response)]) for r in range(responses)]\n\ndef run_case(name: str, payload: list[GenerateResponse]) -\u003e None:\n    tokenizer = CountingTokenizer()\n    choices, completion_tokens, output_chars = derender_completion_like_current_head(payload, tokenizer)\n    print(f\"{name}: responses={len(payload)} choices={choices} decode_calls={tokenizer.decode_calls} decoded_token_ids={tokenizer.decoded_ids} completion_tokens={completion_tokens} output_chars={output_chars}\")\n\nrequire_source_fact(\"vllm/entrypoints/serve/render/api_router.py\", [\u0027\"/v1/completions/derender\"\u0027, \u0027\"/v1/chat/completions/derender\"\u0027, \"app.include_router(router)\"])\nrequire_source_fact(\"vllm/entrypoints/serve/disagg/protocol.py\", [\"class GenerateResponseChoice(BaseModel):\", \"token_ids: list[int] | None = None\", \"class GenerateResponse(BaseModel):\", \"choices: list[GenerateResponseChoice]\", \"class DerenderCompletionRequest(BaseModel):\", \"generate_responses: list[GenerateResponse]\"])\nrequire_source_fact(\"vllm/renderers/online_derenderer.py\", [\"async def derender_completion(\", \"for gen, pt in zip(generate_responses, prompt_tokens_list):\", \"for choice in gen.choices:\", \"decoded_text = tokenizer.decode(\", \"total_completion_tokens += len(choice.token_ids)\"])\nprint(\"source_checks=ok\")\nprint(f\"source_head={source_head()}\")\nrun_case(\"negative_control\", make_payload(responses=1, choices_per_response=1, tokens_per_choice=32))\nrun_case(\"amplified_payload\", make_payload(responses=16, choices_per_response=4, tokens_per_choice=8192))\nprint(\"observation=derender decodes every caller-supplied token id before any max_model_len, max_tokens, max_num_seqs, or response-size check\")\n```\n\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with access to the `/v1` API can send derender requests that consume CPU and memory in the frontend/postprocessing process and can cause large responses unrelated to any bounded generation. In disaggregated deployments, this affects the CPU-only render frontend; in servers where the render router is attached alongside generation, it affects the same OpenAI-compatible server process that handles normal client traffic. This can degrade availability for other clients sharing the process.\n\nLikely CWE: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) / CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling). Conservative CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L` (4.3). This is not Low severity because a regular network API client can induce availability impact in a shared service without local access, invalid model artifacts, or special runtime privileges. If the server is deployed without API-key enforcement for `/v1`, the privileges component becomes `PR:N`.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nValidate derender payloads before any detokenization or parser invocation. Apply bounded limits to `generate_response(s)`, `choices`, `token_ids`, `prompt_logprobs`, `logprobs.content`, `top_logprobs`, and `routed_experts` that are at least as strict as the corresponding generation-side limits. For completions, reject `generate_responses` counts above the number of prompts that `/v1/completions/render` would have produced, and reject total nested choice counts above `max_num_seqs` / `n` limits. For each choice, reject `token_ids` longer than the resolved output-token budget, or require derender callers to submit the original bounded `GenerateRequest` / sampling metadata and validate the `GenerateResponse` against it before decoding.\n\nAdd regression tests for both derender endpoints. The tests should show that a normal bounded derender payload succeeds, while oversized `generate_responses`, oversized `choices`, oversized `token_ids`, and oversized logprob/top-logprob structures are rejected before `tokenizer.decode()` or parser execution.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nConfirmed affected: current main at `ddd3855a28a561a5bb54d380c6e6b8b1e883cc4a` and downstream/nightly builds that include the derender endpoints introduced by PR `#43606`. The derender router, request models, decode sink, render serving bridge, and OpenAI API router attachment have no relevant diff from `00e045b7c7b82599f626779e111233abd4d0a64e` to `ddd3855a28a561a5bb54d380c6e6b8b1e883cc4a`.\n\nLatest release checked: `v0.23.0`, published on `2026-06-15`. Its `vllm/entrypoints/serve/render/api_router.py` does not expose `/v1/completions/derender` or `/v1/chat/completions/derender`, so `v0.23.0` was not confirmed affected.\n\n## Advisory History\n\nPR `#43606` (\"[Render] Add `/derender` endpoints for disaggregated postprocessing\") introduced the derender endpoints on main. PR `#44285` later refactored the render serving code, and current head still contains the unchecked derender flow.\n\nPublic issue search for `derender GenerateResponse token_ids` returned no reports. Public search for `\"/v1/completions/derender\"` returned the derender feature RFC `#42729` and unrelated bugs, but no size-bound, DoS, or generated-output postprocessing issue.\n\nRelated public request-fanout and resource-bound advisories are distinct:\n\n- `GHSA-3mwp-wvh9-7528` covers an unbounded `n` parameter on the normal OpenAI completion/chat generation routes. Its root cause is missing upper-bound validation for generated sequence count, its sink is request fanout and request-object copying into the async engine path before scheduling, its precondition is a caller-controlled `n`, and its fix surface is a cap on generated sequence count. This report reaches `/v1/completions/derender` and `/v1/chat/completions/derender`, not the normal generate routes; its root cause is unchecked caller-supplied `GenerateResponse` / `choices` / `token_ids` structures, its sink is `OnlineDerenderer` detokenization and response construction after generation, its precondition is access to the derender API with generated-output-shaped JSON, and its fix surface is derender payload validation before decode.\n- PR `#45390` includes the `GHSA-83mh-6mwq-3hg9` batch-message fanout fix class: it bounds the outer `BatchChatCompletionRequest.messages` conversation list to prevent one request from creating many conversation/request objects before normal generation. This report has no batch conversation list and does not rely on `n`; one derender request can instead supply oversized nested `GenerateResponse` choices and token IDs that are detokenized and returned directly. A batch-message `max_length` limit would not bound derender `generate_response(s)` or per-choice token/logprob structures.\n\nThe completed local report titled \"Explicit truncation_side disables tokenizer-level prompt truncation\" is also distinct. That report used `/v1/completions` and `/v1/chat/completions` with ordinary prompt text plus `truncate_prompt_tokens` and explicit `truncation_side`; its root cause was the renderer omitting tokenizer-level `max_length` and the pre-tokenization character guard before post-token slicing; its sink was prompt tokenization; and its fix surface was preserving tokenizer-level truncation or rejecting over-budget prompts before tokenization. This derender report uses `/v1` derender routes, has no prompt text tokenization or truncation-side control, starts from caller-supplied generated-output token IDs, and needs aggregate bounds on derender `generate_response(s)`, choices, token IDs, logprobs, parser inputs, and response construction before detokenization.\n\nOther adjacent vLLM advisories for Rust/gRPC token-id and logprob bounds, structured-output grammar amplification, repetition-detection windows, and pooling/rerank batch fanout are distinct. Those issues affect Rust/gRPC request conversion, grammar compilation, scheduler loops, or engine fanout. This issue affects `/v1` derender postprocessing of caller-supplied generated-output objects and requires derender-specific request validation before detokenization.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `vllm/entrypoints/serve/render/api_router.py`\n- `vllm/entrypoints/serve/disagg/protocol.py`\n- `vllm/renderers/online_derenderer.py`\n- `vllm/entrypoints/serve/render/serving.py`\n- `vllm/entrypoints/openai/api_server.py`\n- PR `#43606`: `https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/43606`\n- PR `#44285`: `https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/44285`\n- `GHSA-3mwp-wvh9-7528`: `https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-3mwp-wvh9-7528`\n- PR `#45390`: `https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/45390`\n- Release `v0.23.0`: `https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.23.0`",
  "id": "GHSA-8737-qx52-hjff",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T21:32:08Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T21:32:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-8737-qx52-hjff"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71486"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/47260"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/8e61b646e2d157f9b93451fa048f9c8530c8a67b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.26.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vLLM: Derender endpoints decode caller-supplied GenerateResponse token IDs without output bounds"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "vllm",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/vllm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.0.1",
        "0.1.0",
        "0.1.1",
        "0.1.2",
        "0.1.3",
        "0.1.4",
        "0.1.5",
        "0.1.6",
        "0.1.7",
        "0.10.0",
        "0.10.1",
        "0.10.1.1",
        "0.10.2",
        "0.11.0",
        "0.11.1",
        "0.11.2",
        "0.12.0",
        "0.13.0",
        "0.14.0",
        "0.14.1",
        "0.15.0",
        "0.15.1",
        "0.16.0",
        "0.17.0",
        "0.17.1",
        "0.18.0",
        "0.18.1",
        "0.19.0",
        "0.19.1",
        "0.2.0",
        "0.2.1",
        "0.2.1.post1",
        "0.2.2",
        "0.2.3",
        "0.2.4",
        "0.2.5",
        "0.2.6",
        "0.2.7",
        "0.20.0",
        "0.20.1",
        "0.20.2",
        "0.21.0",
        "0.22.0",
        "0.22.1",
        "0.23.0",
        "0.24.0",
        "0.25.0",
        "0.25.1",
        "0.3.0",
        "0.3.1",
        "0.3.2",
        "0.3.3",
        "0.4.0",
        "0.4.0.post1",
        "0.4.1",
        "0.4.2",
        "0.4.3",
        "0.5.0",
        "0.5.0.post1",
        "0.5.1",
        "0.5.2",
        "0.5.3",
        "0.5.3.post1",
        "0.5.4",
        "0.5.5",
        "0.6.0",
        "0.6.1",
        "0.6.1.post1",
        "0.6.1.post2",
        "0.6.2",
        "0.6.3",
        "0.6.3.post1",
        "0.6.4",
        "0.6.4.post1",
        "0.6.5",
        "0.6.6",
        "0.6.6.post1",
        "0.7.0",
        "0.7.1",
        "0.7.2",
        "0.7.3",
        "0.8.0",
        "0.8.1",
        "0.8.2",
        "0.8.3",
        "0.8.4",
        "0.8.5",
        "0.8.5.post1",
        "0.9.0",
        "0.9.0.1",
        "0.9.1",
        "0.9.2"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71486",
    "GHSA-8737-qx52-hjff"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `/v1/completions/derender` and `/v1/chat/completions/derender` endpoints accept caller-supplied `GenerateResponse` objects and postprocess every nested `choices[*].token_ids` list directly. Unlike the normal render/generate path, derender does not enforce model context length, resolved `max_tokens`, `max_num_seqs`, choice-count, or response-size bounds before detokenizing and returning the supplied token IDs. An authenticated API client can therefore make the CPU-only render frontend, or any server exposing these `/v1` derender routes, spend CPU and memory proportional to attacker-chosen generated-output-shaped JSON rather than to a bounded generation result.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe render router registers `/v1/chat/completions/derender` and `/v1/completions/derender` in `vllm/entrypoints/serve/render/api_router.py`, and the OpenAI API server attaches this router whenever `\"generate\"` or `\"render\"` is in `supported_tasks` (`vllm/entrypoints/openai/api_server.py`). The routes are under `/v1`, so they are part of the OpenAI-compatible HTTP API surface and are protected by the API-key middleware when `--api-key` is configured.\n\nThe request types trust generated-output-shaped data from the client. In `vllm/entrypoints/serve/disagg/protocol.py`, `GenerateResponseChoice` accepts `token_ids: list[int] | None = None`, `GenerateResponse` accepts `choices: list[GenerateResponseChoice]`, and `DerenderCompletionRequest` accepts `generate_responses: list[GenerateResponse]`. These fields have no max length, max item count, or relationship to a prior `GenerateRequest`.\n\nThe sink is `OnlineDerenderer`. `derender_completion()` iterates every supplied `generate_responses` entry and every nested choice, calls `tokenizer.decode(choice.token_ids, skip_special_tokens=True)`, appends the decoded text to the response choices, and increments `total_completion_tokens` from the same supplied list length. `derender_chat()` has the same shape for a single supplied `generate_response`, and can also feed the decoded text into tool/reasoning parsers when a parser and `chat_request` are present. `ServingRender.derender_completion_response()` calls `online_derenderer.derender_completion(request.generate_responses, request.prompt_tokens)` before applying any completion-level validation beyond the model check.\n\nNormal render and generation paths derive output limits from `max_model_len`, the rendered prompt length, request `max_tokens` / `max_completion_tokens`, and scheduler limits. Derender bypasses that invariant because it accepts the already-generated output shape directly from the HTTP caller. The missing invariant is: derender should only postprocess bounded generated output, and client-supplied derender payloads must be rejected if their nested generated token/logprob structures exceed the same limits that generation would have enforced.\n\n## PoV\n\nThe following bounded PoV can be run from a current vLLM checkout containing PR `#43606`. It asserts the current source facts for the derender routes, unchecked request fields, and decode sink, then simulates the same derender loop with a counting tokenizer. The negative control is a one-choice, 32-token response. The amplified payload keeps the test bounded but demonstrates that all decoded work and returned text scale directly with caller-supplied `GenerateResponse` contents.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport subprocess\nfrom dataclasses import dataclass\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nSOURCE = Path(\".\")\n\ndef require_source_fact(path: str, needles: list[str]) -\u003e None:\n    text = (SOURCE / path).read_text()\n    missing = [needle for needle in needles if needle not in text]\n    if missing:\n        raise AssertionError(f\"{path} missing expected facts: {missing}\")\n\ndef source_head() -\u003e str:\n    return subprocess.check_output([\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"HEAD\"], cwd=SOURCE, text=True).strip()\n\n@dataclass\nclass Choice:\n    index: int\n    token_ids: list[int]\n\n@dataclass\nclass GenerateResponse:\n    request_id: str\n    choices: list[Choice]\n\nclass CountingTokenizer:\n    def __init__(self) -\u003e None:\n        self.decode_calls = 0\n        self.decoded_ids = 0\n    def decode(self, token_ids: list[int], *, skip_special_tokens: bool = True) -\u003e str:\n        self.decode_calls += 1\n        self.decoded_ids += len(token_ids)\n        return \"x\" * len(token_ids)\n\ndef derender_completion_like_current_head(generate_responses: list[GenerateResponse], tokenizer: CountingTokenizer) -\u003e tuple[int, int, int]:\n    output_chars = 0\n    choices = 0\n    total_completion_tokens = 0\n    for gen in generate_responses:\n        for choice in gen.choices:\n            if not choice.token_ids:\n                raise ValueError(\"choice has empty or null token_ids\")\n            decoded_text = tokenizer.decode(choice.token_ids, skip_special_tokens=True)\n            output_chars += len(decoded_text)\n            total_completion_tokens += len(choice.token_ids)\n            choices += 1\n    return choices, total_completion_tokens, output_chars\n\ndef make_payload(responses: int, choices_per_response: int, tokens_per_choice: int) -\u003e list[GenerateResponse]:\n    token_ids = [42] * tokens_per_choice\n    return [GenerateResponse(request_id=f\"gen-{r}\", choices=[Choice(index=c, token_ids=list(token_ids)) for c in range(choices_per_response)]) for r in range(responses)]\n\ndef run_case(name: str, payload: list[GenerateResponse]) -\u003e None:\n    tokenizer = CountingTokenizer()\n    choices, completion_tokens, output_chars = derender_completion_like_current_head(payload, tokenizer)\n    print(f\"{name}: responses={len(payload)} choices={choices} decode_calls={tokenizer.decode_calls} decoded_token_ids={tokenizer.decoded_ids} completion_tokens={completion_tokens} output_chars={output_chars}\")\n\nrequire_source_fact(\"vllm/entrypoints/serve/render/api_router.py\", [\u0027\"/v1/completions/derender\"\u0027, \u0027\"/v1/chat/completions/derender\"\u0027, \"app.include_router(router)\"])\nrequire_source_fact(\"vllm/entrypoints/serve/disagg/protocol.py\", [\"class GenerateResponseChoice(BaseModel):\", \"token_ids: list[int] | None = None\", \"class GenerateResponse(BaseModel):\", \"choices: list[GenerateResponseChoice]\", \"class DerenderCompletionRequest(BaseModel):\", \"generate_responses: list[GenerateResponse]\"])\nrequire_source_fact(\"vllm/renderers/online_derenderer.py\", [\"async def derender_completion(\", \"for gen, pt in zip(generate_responses, prompt_tokens_list):\", \"for choice in gen.choices:\", \"decoded_text = tokenizer.decode(\", \"total_completion_tokens += len(choice.token_ids)\"])\nprint(\"source_checks=ok\")\nprint(f\"source_head={source_head()}\")\nrun_case(\"negative_control\", make_payload(responses=1, choices_per_response=1, tokens_per_choice=32))\nrun_case(\"amplified_payload\", make_payload(responses=16, choices_per_response=4, tokens_per_choice=8192))\nprint(\"observation=derender decodes every caller-supplied token id before any max_model_len, max_tokens, max_num_seqs, or response-size check\")\n```\n\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with access to the `/v1` API can send derender requests that consume CPU and memory in the frontend/postprocessing process and can cause large responses unrelated to any bounded generation. In disaggregated deployments, this affects the CPU-only render frontend; in servers where the render router is attached alongside generation, it affects the same OpenAI-compatible server process that handles normal client traffic. This can degrade availability for other clients sharing the process.\n\nLikely CWE: CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) / CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling). Conservative CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L` (4.3). This is not Low severity because a regular network API client can induce availability impact in a shared service without local access, invalid model artifacts, or special runtime privileges. If the server is deployed without API-key enforcement for `/v1`, the privileges component becomes `PR:N`.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nValidate derender payloads before any detokenization or parser invocation. Apply bounded limits to `generate_response(s)`, `choices`, `token_ids`, `prompt_logprobs`, `logprobs.content`, `top_logprobs`, and `routed_experts` that are at least as strict as the corresponding generation-side limits. For completions, reject `generate_responses` counts above the number of prompts that `/v1/completions/render` would have produced, and reject total nested choice counts above `max_num_seqs` / `n` limits. For each choice, reject `token_ids` longer than the resolved output-token budget, or require derender callers to submit the original bounded `GenerateRequest` / sampling metadata and validate the `GenerateResponse` against it before decoding.\n\nAdd regression tests for both derender endpoints. The tests should show that a normal bounded derender payload succeeds, while oversized `generate_responses`, oversized `choices`, oversized `token_ids`, and oversized logprob/top-logprob structures are rejected before `tokenizer.decode()` or parser execution.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nConfirmed affected: current main at `ddd3855a28a561a5bb54d380c6e6b8b1e883cc4a` and downstream/nightly builds that include the derender endpoints introduced by PR `#43606`. The derender router, request models, decode sink, render serving bridge, and OpenAI API router attachment have no relevant diff from `00e045b7c7b82599f626779e111233abd4d0a64e` to `ddd3855a28a561a5bb54d380c6e6b8b1e883cc4a`.\n\nLatest release checked: `v0.23.0`, published on `2026-06-15`. Its `vllm/entrypoints/serve/render/api_router.py` does not expose `/v1/completions/derender` or `/v1/chat/completions/derender`, so `v0.23.0` was not confirmed affected.\n\n## Advisory History\n\nPR `#43606` (\"[Render] Add `/derender` endpoints for disaggregated postprocessing\") introduced the derender endpoints on main. PR `#44285` later refactored the render serving code, and current head still contains the unchecked derender flow.\n\nPublic issue search for `derender GenerateResponse token_ids` returned no reports. Public search for `\"/v1/completions/derender\"` returned the derender feature RFC `#42729` and unrelated bugs, but no size-bound, DoS, or generated-output postprocessing issue.\n\nRelated public request-fanout and resource-bound advisories are distinct:\n\n- `GHSA-3mwp-wvh9-7528` covers an unbounded `n` parameter on the normal OpenAI completion/chat generation routes. Its root cause is missing upper-bound validation for generated sequence count, its sink is request fanout and request-object copying into the async engine path before scheduling, its precondition is a caller-controlled `n`, and its fix surface is a cap on generated sequence count. This report reaches `/v1/completions/derender` and `/v1/chat/completions/derender`, not the normal generate routes; its root cause is unchecked caller-supplied `GenerateResponse` / `choices` / `token_ids` structures, its sink is `OnlineDerenderer` detokenization and response construction after generation, its precondition is access to the derender API with generated-output-shaped JSON, and its fix surface is derender payload validation before decode.\n- PR `#45390` includes the `GHSA-83mh-6mwq-3hg9` batch-message fanout fix class: it bounds the outer `BatchChatCompletionRequest.messages` conversation list to prevent one request from creating many conversation/request objects before normal generation. This report has no batch conversation list and does not rely on `n`; one derender request can instead supply oversized nested `GenerateResponse` choices and token IDs that are detokenized and returned directly. A batch-message `max_length` limit would not bound derender `generate_response(s)` or per-choice token/logprob structures.\n\nThe completed local report titled \"Explicit truncation_side disables tokenizer-level prompt truncation\" is also distinct. That report used `/v1/completions` and `/v1/chat/completions` with ordinary prompt text plus `truncate_prompt_tokens` and explicit `truncation_side`; its root cause was the renderer omitting tokenizer-level `max_length` and the pre-tokenization character guard before post-token slicing; its sink was prompt tokenization; and its fix surface was preserving tokenizer-level truncation or rejecting over-budget prompts before tokenization. This derender report uses `/v1` derender routes, has no prompt text tokenization or truncation-side control, starts from caller-supplied generated-output token IDs, and needs aggregate bounds on derender `generate_response(s)`, choices, token IDs, logprobs, parser inputs, and response construction before detokenization.\n\nOther adjacent vLLM advisories for Rust/gRPC token-id and logprob bounds, structured-output grammar amplification, repetition-detection windows, and pooling/rerank batch fanout are distinct. Those issues affect Rust/gRPC request conversion, grammar compilation, scheduler loops, or engine fanout. This issue affects `/v1` derender postprocessing of caller-supplied generated-output objects and requires derender-specific request validation before detokenization.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `vllm/entrypoints/serve/render/api_router.py`\n- `vllm/entrypoints/serve/disagg/protocol.py`\n- `vllm/renderers/online_derenderer.py`\n- `vllm/entrypoints/serve/render/serving.py`\n- `vllm/entrypoints/openai/api_server.py`\n- PR `#43606`: `https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/43606`\n- PR `#44285`: `https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/44285`\n- `GHSA-3mwp-wvh9-7528`: `https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-3mwp-wvh9-7528`\n- PR `#45390`: `https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/45390`\n- Release `v0.23.0`: `https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.23.0`",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3936",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T11:02:35.699357Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T09:45:00.060622Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-8737-qx52-hjff"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71486"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/47260"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/8e61b646e2d157f9b93451fa048f9c8530c8a67b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.26.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/vllm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8737-qx52-hjff"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vLLM: Derender endpoints decode caller-supplied GenerateResponse token IDs without output bounds"
}