CVE-2026-63075 (GCVE-0-2026-63075)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-25 13:00 – Updated: 2026-08-25 14:36
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
QUIC ACK-only Packet Retention Can Cause Memory Exhaustion
Summary
Issue summary: When OpenSSL processes QUIC traffic from a peer that repeatedly
sends ack-eliciting packets while not acknowledging ACK-only responses, the
QUIC stack can retain ACK-only packet metadata for the lifetime of the
connection.
Impact summary: A remote peer that can complete a QUIC handshake can
cause connection-scoped memory growth which may lead to Denial of Service
through memory exhaustion, especially with sustained traffic or many concurrent
QUIC connections.
CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Description: When the OpenSSL QUIC stack sends an ACK-only packet,
there is no requirement by the QUIC protocol that the peer will acknowledge
that ACK-only packet (i.e. it is itself not ack-eliciting). However, the OpenSSL
implementation stores the metadata about the ACK frames regardless.
In and of itself that's ok, but if a malicious peer establishes a connection, and
then drives the connection such that ACK-only packets are forced from the
OpenSSL implementation peer (i.e., by sending numerous PING frames),
and then withholding any subsequent acks for ack-eliciting data, like
legitimate data, said malicious peer can force inappropriate memory growth
on the OpenSSL peer, potentially leading to a Denial of Service.
The fix is to ensure that we account for the transmission of the ACK-only
packet in the packet histories high and low watermark without actually storing
the ACK-only packet metadata itself.
FIPS impact: no
The OpenSSL FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC code is
outside the FIPS module boundary.
Severity
7.5 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-25 14:36 UTC
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
References
5 references
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-08-25 11:36
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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