CVE-2026-31607 (GCVE-0-2026-31607)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-24 14:42 – Updated: 2026-04-24 14:42
VLAI?
Title
usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response, usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the *original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT. A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region. KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40) The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits c6688ef9f297 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input") and b78d830f0049 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point. On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets. This mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against transfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the response value against the original allocation size. Kelvin Mbogo's series ("usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves; this patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its source -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and using the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit. Fix this by checking rpdu->number_of_packets against urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() safely return early.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 8d155e2d1c4102f74f82a2bf9c016164bb0f7384 (git)
Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 906f16a836de13fe61f49cdce2f66f2dbd14caf4 (git)
Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < ef8ebb1c637b4cfb61a9dd2e013376774ee2033b (git)
Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 5e1c4ece08ccdc197177631f111845a2c68eede3 (git)
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    Linux Linux Unaffected: 6.12.83 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.18.24 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.19.14 , ≤ 6.19.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.0.1 , ≤ 7.0.* (semver)
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "8d155e2d1c4102f74f82a2bf9c016164bb0f7384",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "906f16a836de13fe61f49cdce2f66f2dbd14caf4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ef8ebb1c637b4cfb61a9dd2e013376774ee2033b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5e1c4ece08ccdc197177631f111845a2c68eede3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.83",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.24",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.19.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.19.14",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.0.1",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.83",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.24",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.19.14",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.0.1",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()\n\nWhen a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response,\nusbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites\nurb-\u003enumber_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is\nsubsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and\nusbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb-\u003eiso_frame_desc[], a flexible\narray whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the\n*original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT.\n\nA malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response\nto a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap\nout-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to\nurb-\u003eiso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region.\n\nKASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640\n  Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69\n\n  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of\n   allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40)\n\nThe server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already\nvalidate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits\nc6688ef9f297 (\"usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle\nmalicious input\") and b78d830f0049 (\"usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden\nCMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input\"). The server side validates\nagainst USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point.\nOn the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter\nbound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets.\n\nThis mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against\ntransfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the\nresponse value against the original allocation size.\n\nKelvin Mbogo\u0027s series (\"usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in\nusbip_recv_iso()\", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves;\nthis patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its\nsource -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and\nusing the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global\nUSBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit.\n\nFix this by checking rpdu-\u003enumber_of_packets against\nurb-\u003enumber_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the\noverwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and\nusbip_pad_iso() safely return early."
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-04-24T14:42:29.468Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d155e2d1c4102f74f82a2bf9c016164bb0f7384"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/906f16a836de13fe61f49cdce2f66f2dbd14caf4"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef8ebb1c637b4cfb61a9dd2e013376774ee2033b"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e1c4ece08ccdc197177631f111845a2c68eede3"
        }
      ],
      "title": "usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-31607",
    "datePublished": "2026-04-24T14:42:29.468Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-09T15:48:24.122Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-04-24T14:42:29.468Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-31607",
      "date": "2026-04-25",
      "epss": "0.00018",
      "percentile": "0.04621"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-31607\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-04-24T15:16:39.940\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-04-24T17:51:40.810\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Awaiting Analysis\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nusbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()\\n\\nWhen a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response,\\nusbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites\\nurb-\u003enumber_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is\\nsubsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and\\nusbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb-\u003eiso_frame_desc[], a flexible\\narray whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the\\n*original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT.\\n\\nA malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response\\nto a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap\\nout-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to\\nurb-\u003eiso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region.\\n\\nKASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5:\\n\\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640\\n  Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69\\n\\n  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of\\n   allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40)\\n\\nThe server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already\\nvalidate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits\\nc6688ef9f297 (\\\"usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle\\nmalicious input\\\") and b78d830f0049 (\\\"usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden\\nCMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input\\\"). The server side validates\\nagainst USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point.\\nOn the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter\\nbound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets.\\n\\nThis mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against\\ntransfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the\\nresponse value against the original allocation size.\\n\\nKelvin Mbogo\u0027s series (\\\"usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in\\nusbip_recv_iso()\\\", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves;\\nthis patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its\\nsource -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and\\nusing the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global\\nUSBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit.\\n\\nFix this by checking rpdu-\u003enumber_of_packets against\\nurb-\u003enumber_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the\\noverwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and\\nusbip_pad_iso() safely return early.\"}],\"metrics\":{},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e1c4ece08ccdc197177631f111845a2c68eede3\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d155e2d1c4102f74f82a2bf9c016164bb0f7384\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/906f16a836de13fe61f49cdce2f66f2dbd14caf4\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef8ebb1c637b4cfb61a9dd2e013376774ee2033b\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}"
  }
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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