CVE-2026-128910 (GCVE-0-2026-128910)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-13 14:31 – Updated: 2026-11-13 14:31 Unsupported When Assigned| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://cyber-defence-campus.github.io/projects/v… | third-party-advisory |
| https://www.dji.com/aeroscope | product |
| https://github.com/llorencroma/dji-aeroscope-root | technical-description |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DJI | AeroScope Mobile (TP703) |
Affected:
03.00.00.26
(custom)
|
guessed | |
| DJI | AeroScope Mobile (TP703) 1300 communications board firmware |
Affected:
02.00.07.12 , ≤ 02.00.08.40
(custom)
|
guessed |
{
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"affected": [
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"collectionURL": "https://www.dji.com",
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"modules": [
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"credits": [
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"type": "finder",
"value": "Lloren\u00e7 Rom\u00e1 Alvarez, Security Researcher, Cyber Defence Campus, Switzerland"
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eUse of hard-coded credentials (CWE-798) on the 1300 communications board in DJI AeroScope Mobile (TP703) firmware 03.00.00.26, with 1300 communications board firmware 02.00.07.12 through 02.00.08.40, allows an attacker with physical access to the board\u0027s serial console to log in as root. The same password hash is present on every unit and uses DES crypt, so the password can be recovered offline from the distributed firmware. No network login service accepts this password by default. Confirmed on a physical device.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. DJI has discontinued AeroScope Mobile and no fixed firmware is available.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Use of hard-coded credentials (CWE-798) on the 1300 communications board in DJI AeroScope Mobile (TP703) firmware 03.00.00.26, with 1300 communications board firmware 02.00.07.12 through 02.00.08.40, allows an attacker with physical access to the board\u0027s serial console to log in as root. The same password hash is present on every unit and uses DES crypt, so the password can be recovered offline from the distributed firmware. No network login service accepts this password by default. Confirmed on a physical device.\n\n\n\nNOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. DJI has discontinued AeroScope Mobile and no fixed firmware is available."
}
],
"metrics": [
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}
]
}
],
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eDJI AeroScope Mobile has been discontinued and is no longer supported by DJI. No fixed firmware is available. Operators should plan to replace affected units with a supported product and, until then, apply the workarounds.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
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"time": "2026-09-25T00:00:00.000Z",
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"time": "2026-09-25T00:00:00.000Z",
"value": "Reported to DJI"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-11-04T00:00:00.000Z",
"value": "DJI acknowledged the vulnerability and provided its assessment"
}
],
"title": "DJI AeroScope Mobile: Hard-coded root password on the serial console",
"workarounds": [
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eRestrict physical access to deployed units and their serial console, and treat any unit that has left controlled custody as having a known root password. Network isolation does not mitigate this issue.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Restrict physical access to deployed units and their serial console, and treat any unit that has left controlled custody as having a known root password. Network isolation does not mitigate this issue."
}
],
"x_generator": {
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"datePublished": "2026-11-13T14:31:31.193Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-13T12:42:56.446Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T14:31:31.193Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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"modules": [
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],
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"value": "Use of hard-coded credentials (CWE-798) on the 1300 communications board in DJI AeroScope Mobile (TP703) firmware 03.00.00.26, with 1300 communications board firmware 02.00.07.12 through 02.00.08.40, allows an attacker with physical access to the board\u0027s serial console to log in as root. The same password hash is present on every unit and uses DES crypt, so the password can be recovered offline from the distributed firmware. No network login service accepts this password by default. Confirmed on a physical device.\n\n\n\nNOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. DJI has discontinued AeroScope Mobile and no fixed firmware is available."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-128910",
"lastModified": "2026-11-13T15:17:44.900",
"metrics": {
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"url": "https://github.com/llorencroma/dji-aeroscope-root"
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}
Solutions
Workarounds
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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