CVE-2026-12047 (GCVE-0-2026-12047)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-18 23:37 – Updated: 2026-06-22 19:14
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
pgAdmin 4: HTML injection in cloud verify_credentials / deploy endpoints via unsanitised SDK exception text
Summary
HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text — and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text — into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard's DOM.
The reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an <iframe/src=...> payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard's FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe's src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim's pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin's own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim's browser context.
The same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints — Azure's check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit — all of which are now covered.
Fix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-06-22 19:13 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10069 | issue-tracking |
| https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/60… | patch |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| pgadmin.org | pgAdmin 4 |
Affected:
6.6 , < 9.16
(custom)
|
guessed |
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{
"lang": "en",
"value": "HTML injection in pgAdmin 4\u0027s cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text \u2014 and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text \u2014 into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard\u0027s DOM.\n\nThe reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an \u003ciframe/src=...\u003e payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard\u0027s FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe\u0027s src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim\u0027s pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin\u0027s own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim\u0027s browser context.\n\nThe same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints \u2014 Azure\u0027s check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit \u2014 all of which are now covered.\n\nFix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 3.5,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Self-XSS only. The same authenticated pgAdmin user that submits the crafted cloud credential is the one whose browser renders the echoed error -- there is no third-party attacker driving a distinct victim, so the confused-deputy elements (S:C / C:H confidentiality uplift) do not apply. The frontend DOMPurify layer added by #10068 already neutralises the in-browser exploit; this fix is defence in depth that ensures non-browser JSON consumers (audit logs, scripted API clients) never see the raw markup either. Scored as I:L for that residual escape only; S:U because no authority is crossed.\n\nCross-user escalation would require an independent CSRF primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim\u0027s browser context. That is not part of this defect."
}
]
},
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"baseScore": 4.8,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Same reasoning as CVSS 3.1 -- self-XSS, no third-party attacker, no scope change. VI:L for the defence-in-depth backend escape that prevents the raw markup from reaching non-browser API consumers; no other impact."
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-79",
"description": "CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-116",
"description": "CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-18T23:37:39.657Z",
"orgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
"shortName": "PostgreSQL"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"issue-tracking"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10069"
},
{
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/60d149864b5fdd99675754c7996637737a24fce3"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "pgAdmin 4: HTML injection in cloud verify_credentials / deploy endpoints via unsanitised SDK exception text"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
"assignerShortName": "PostgreSQL",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-12047",
"datePublished": "2026-06-18T23:37:39.657Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-11T20:40:07.824Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-22T19:14:24.816Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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