CVE-2026-115932 (GCVE-0-2026-115932)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-24 12:28 – Updated: 2026-10-24 14:18
VLAI
Title
Path traversal in post media lets any registered user read server files
Summary
When a post is published, Postiz treats a media path that is not a web address as a file on the server's disk, but it does not check that the file lies inside the upload directory. A registered user can store a crafted media path with a post, get it past the checks that normally restrict it, and have the publishing worker read an arbitrary file and send it as an attachment to a Discord server the user controls. The same unconfined reads can be reached through two further routes. One tells the caller whether a file exists and can exhaust the backend's memory, the other delivers the file the same way as the main route. Self-registration is open by default, so the attacker needs no existing account.
Severity
9.6 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
CWE
Assigner
postiz CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard – unranked: 8 records in the last 180 days, 10 needed details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
GitroomHQ postiz-app Affected: 2.23.0 , < 2.25.3 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-10-24 12:28
Credits
Anthropic, PBC Enno Gelhaus Nevo David
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "postiz-app",
          "product": "postiz-app",
          "repo": "https://github.com/gitroomhq/postiz-app",
          "vendor": "GitroomHQ",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2.25.3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.23.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "configurations": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "The main route requires the Discord provider to be enabled, that is DISCORD_CLIENT_ID, DISCORD_CLIENT_SECRET and DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN_ID set. These are empty in the shipped docker-compose.yaml. The storage provider does not matter."
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "The validation-time route requires a Dribbble, TikTok or Pinterest provider to be configured."
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "The shipped container runs the worker as root, so every file root can read is exposed. Self-registration is open unless DISABLE_REGISTRATION is set to true."
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Anthropic, PBC"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "coordinator",
          "value": "Enno Gelhaus"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Nevo David"
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2026-10-24T12:28:19.768Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "When a post is published, Postiz treats a media path that is not a web address as a file on the server\u0027s disk, but it does not check that the file lies inside the upload directory. A registered user can store a crafted media path with a post, get it past the checks that normally restrict it, and have the publishing worker read an arbitrary file and send it as an attachment to a Discord server the user controls.\n\nThe same unconfined reads can be reached through two further routes. One tells the caller whether a file exists and can exhaust the backend\u0027s memory, the other delivers the file the same way as the main route. Self-registration is open by default, so the attacker needs no existing account."
        }
      ],
      "exploits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Exploitation was demonstrated end to end against unmodified builds of the backend and the orchestrator at commit 3a7d28b7ad96, using only a self-registered account: a file outside the upload directory arrived byte for byte as an attachment in the attacker\u0027s Discord channel. The validation-time route and the stored media route were also exercised separately against the same builds."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "Where the Discord provider is configured, any registered user can read any regular file the publishing worker can read and have it delivered byte for byte to a Discord server they control."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "Files within reach include those that hold the JWT signing secret, the database address and provider client secrets, such as the instance\u0027s environment file, mounted secret files and application logs, and the worker\u0027s process environment."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "A second route lets a user with a connected Dribbble, TikTok or Pinterest channel learn whether a path exists and whether it is a file or a directory, and exhaust the backend\u0027s memory with one request by pointing at a device file, which stops the backend from answering any organization until it is killed."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "A third route, on instances using local storage with an empty cloud bucket URL, reaches the same file read without needing a WordPress site."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 9.6,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-74",
              "description": "CWE-74",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:18:20.861Z",
        "orgId": "4cdc9741-f887-419a-a2fd-acbbd2729276",
        "shortName": "postiz"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "Postiz",
          "tags": [
            "product"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gitroomhq/postiz-app"
        },
        {
          "name": "v2.25.3",
          "tags": [
            "release-notes"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gitroomhq/postiz-app/releases/tag/v2.25.3"
        },
        {
          "name": "12db9bd",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gitroomhq/postiz-app/commit/12db9bd2f428b628a62809669c3d76297e07750a"
        },
        {
          "name": "GAdvisory",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://gadvisory.org/advisories/PSA-2026-E9AHFV"
        }
      ],
      "timeline": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "time": "2026-10-23T17:45:00.000Z",
          "value": "Anthropic has disclosed a thorough report of this vulnerability including a working PoC to Postiz"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "time": "2026-10-23T18:00:00.000Z",
          "value": "Postiz has reproduced the vulnerability and is working on a fix"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "time": "2026-10-24T12:26:00.000Z",
          "value": "Postiz has pushed a fix for this vulnerability and verified it"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "time": "2026-10-24T14:18:00.000Z",
          "value": "Postiz has created a release and published the advisory"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Path traversal in post media lets any registered user read server files",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Set DISABLE_REGISTRATION=true. The attacker needs an ordinary account, so closing self-registration limits exposure to people who already hold one. This reduces reach, it does not close the issue."
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "If you do not need the Discord provider, leave its client id, client secret and bot token unset. This removes the main route only; the other routes remain."
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4cdc9741-f887-419a-a2fd-acbbd2729276",
    "assignerShortName": "postiz",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-115932",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-24T12:28:36.033Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-23T21:19:56.682Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:18:20.861Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-115932",
      "date": "2026-10-25",
      "epss": "0.00428",
      "percentile": "0.36744"
    },
    "nvd": {
      "cve": {
        "affected": [
          {
            "affectedData": [
              {
                "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                "packageName": "postiz-app",
                "product": "postiz-app",
                "repo": "https://github.com/gitroomhq/postiz-app",
                "vendor": "GitroomHQ",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "lessThan": "2.25.3",
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "2.23.0",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  }
                ]
              }
            ],
            "source": "4cdc9741-f887-419a-a2fd-acbbd2729276"
          }
        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "When a post is published, Postiz treats a media path that is not a web address as a file on the server\u0027s disk, but it does not check that the file lies inside the upload directory. A registered user can store a crafted media path with a post, get it past the checks that normally restrict it, and have the publishing worker read an arbitrary file and send it as an attachment to a Discord server the user controls.\n\nThe same unconfined reads can be reached through two further routes. One tells the caller whether a file exists and can exhaust the backend\u0027s memory, the other delivers the file the same way as the main route. Self-registration is open by default, so the attacker needs no existing account."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-115932",
        "lastModified": "2026-10-24T13:16:37.217",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV31": [
            {
              "cvssData": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "baseScore": 9.6,
                "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
                "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                "scope": "CHANGED",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
                "version": "3.1"
              },
              "exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
              "impactScore": 5.8,
              "source": "4cdc9741-f887-419a-a2fd-acbbd2729276",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-10-24T13:16:37.217",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "4cdc9741-f887-419a-a2fd-acbbd2729276",
            "url": "https://gadvisory.org/advisories/PSA-2026-E9AHFV"
          },
          {
            "source": "4cdc9741-f887-419a-a2fd-acbbd2729276",
            "url": "https://github.com/gitroomhq/postiz-app"
          },
          {
            "source": "4cdc9741-f887-419a-a2fd-acbbd2729276",
            "url": "https://github.com/gitroomhq/postiz-app/commit/12db9bd2f428b628a62809669c3d76297e07750a"
          },
          {
            "source": "4cdc9741-f887-419a-a2fd-acbbd2729276",
            "url": "https://github.com/gitroomhq/postiz-app/releases/tag/v2.25.3"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "4cdc9741-f887-419a-a2fd-acbbd2729276",
        "vulnStatus": "Received",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-22"
              },
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-74"
              }
            ],
            "source": "4cdc9741-f887-419a-a2fd-acbbd2729276",
            "type": "Secondary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.