CERTFR-2026-ALE-017
Vulnerability from certfr_alerte - Published: 2026-11-18 - Updated: 2026-11-18
Le 18 novembre 2026, F5 a publié deux avis de sécurité concernant les vulnérabilités CVE-2026-123633 et CVE-2026-123007. Celles-ci affectent NGINX Open Source et NGINX Plus permettent à un attaquant non authentifié d'exécuter du code à distance, en utilisant le protocole HTTP en version 2.
Le CERT-FR a connaissance d'une preuve de concept publique pour la vulnérabilité CVE-2026-123007.
Contournement provisoire
Dans l'attente de l'application des correctifs de sécurité, le CERT-FR recommande de désactiver HTTP/2.
Pour désactiver HTTP/2, le billet blogue nginx2root [1] fournit les directives suivantes : * pour NGINX versions 1.25.0 et antérieures :
listen 443 ssl; http2 off;
- pour NGINX versions 1.25.1 et postérieures :
listen 443 ssl;
Pour tester et recharger la configuration NGINX, les commandes suivantes peuvent être lancées :
sudo nginx -t && sudo nginx -s reload openssl s_client -connect HOST:443 -servername HOST -alpn h2 &1 | grep -F 'ALPN protocol: h2'
Solutions
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F5 | NGINX Plus | NGINX Plus versions 3.7.x antérieures à 37.0.8.1 | ||
| F5 | NGINX Plus | NGINX Plus versions 3.1.x à 3.2.x antérieures à 3.7.3.0.1 | ||
| F5 | NGINX Open Source | NGINX Open Source versions 1.31.x antérieures à 1.31.9 | ||
| F5 | NGINX Open Source | NGINX Open Source versions antérieures à 1.30.7 |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "NGINX Plus versions 3.7.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 37.0.8.1",
"product": {
"name": "NGINX Plus",
"vendor": {
"name": "F5",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "NGINX Plus versions 3.1.x \u00e0 3.2.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 3.7.3.0.1",
"product": {
"name": "NGINX Plus",
"vendor": {
"name": "F5",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "NGINX Open Source versions 1.31.x ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.31.9",
"product": {
"name": "NGINX Open Source",
"vendor": {
"name": "F5",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "NGINX Open Source versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.30.7",
"product": {
"name": "NGINX Open Source",
"vendor": {
"name": "F5",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": "",
"closed_at": null,
"content": "## Solutions\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2026-123007",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123007"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-123633",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123633"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2026-11-18T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2026-11-18T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "[1] nginx2root",
"url": "https://nginx2root.com/"
},
{
"title": "Billet de blogue Wiz",
"url": "https://www.wiz.io/blog/nginx-http2-rce-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"title": "Avis CERT-FR CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567 du 18 novembre 2026",
"url": "/avis/CERTFR-2026-AVI-1567/"
}
],
"reference": "CERTFR-2026-ALE-017",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "Version initiale",
"revision_date": "2026-11-18T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "Le 18 novembre 2026, F5 a publi\u00e9 deux avis de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 concernant les vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s CVE-2026-123633 et CVE-2026-123007. Celles-ci affectent NGINX Open Source et NGINX Plus permettent \u00e0 un attaquant non authentifi\u00e9 d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code \u00e0 distance, en utilisant le protocole HTTP en version 2.\n\nLe CERT-FR a connaissance d\u0027une preuve de concept publique pour la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 CVE-2026-123007.\n\n## Contournement provisoire\n\nDans l\u0027attente de l\u0027application des correctifs de s\u00e9curit\u00e9, le CERT-FR recommande de d\u00e9sactiver HTTP/2.\n\nPour d\u00e9sactiver HTTP/2, le billet blogue nginx2root [1] fournit les directives suivantes :\n* pour NGINX versions 1.25.0 et ant\u00e9rieures :\n\u003cpre\u003e\nlisten 443 ssl;\nhttp2 off;\n\u003c/pre\u003e\n\n* pour NGINX versions 1.25.1 et post\u00e9rieures :\n\u003cpre\u003e\nlisten 443 ssl;\n\u003c/pre\u003e\n\nPour tester et recharger la configuration NGINX, les commandes suivantes peuvent \u00eatre lanc\u00e9es :\n\u003cpre\u003e\nsudo nginx -t \u0026\u0026 sudo nginx -s reload\nopenssl s_client -connect HOST:443 -servername HOST -alpn h2 \u003c/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 | grep -F \u0027ALPN protocol: h2\u0027\n\u003c/pre\u003e",
"title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans F5 NGINX",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": "2026-11-18",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 F5 K000163928",
"url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000163928"
},
{
"published_at": "2026-11-18",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 F5 K000163926",
"url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000163926"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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