BREW-YT-DLP-CVE-2024-38519 (CVE-2024-38519)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:55 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:46 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
yt-dlp and youtube-dl vulnerable to file system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization
Details

yt-dlp and youtube-dl are command-line audio/video downloaders. Prior to the fixed versions, yt-dlp and youtube-dl do not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp and youtube-dl also read config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp or youtube-dl directory), this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.

yt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions. youtube-dl fixes this issue in commit d42a222 on the master branch and in nightly builds tagged 2024-07-03 or later. This might mean some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded, however it will also limit the possible exploitation surface. In addition to upgrading, have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template and make sure the user trusts the websites that they are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like one's user directory, system32, or other binaries locations. For users who are not able to upgrade, keep the default output template (-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s); make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one; try to avoid the generic extractor; and/or use --ignore-config --config-location ... to not load config from common locations.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2024.07.01"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "yt-dlp",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/yt-dlp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.7.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "git",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "GIT",
        "key": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp",
        "name": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp",
        "strategy": "git",
        "subject_version": "2026.10.26"
      },
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.10.26",
        "name": "yt-dlp",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.10.26"
      },
      {
        "ecosystem": "Debian",
        "key": "Debian/yt-dlp",
        "name": "yt-dlp",
        "strategy": "distro"
      },
      {
        "ecosystem": "GIT",
        "key": "upstream:https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp",
        "name": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp",
        "strategy": "distro",
        "subject_version": "2026.10.26"
      },
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "upstream:pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.10.26",
        "name": "yt-dlp",
        "strategy": "distro",
        "subject_version": "2026.10.26"
      },
      {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu",
        "key": "Ubuntu/yt-dlp",
        "name": "yt-dlp",
        "strategy": "distro"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "`yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` are command-line audio/video downloaders. Prior to the fixed versions,\u00a0`yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` do not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since `yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` also read config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the `yt-dlp` or `youtube-dl` directory), this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.\n\n\n\n\n`yt-dlp` version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions. `youtube-dl` fixes this issue in commit `d42a222` on the `master` branch and in nightly builds tagged 2024-07-03 or later. This might mean some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded, however it will also limit the possible exploitation surface. In addition to upgrading, have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template and make sure the user trusts the websites that they are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like one\u0027s user directory, `system32`, or other binaries locations. For users who are not able to upgrade, keep the default output template (`-o \"%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s`); make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one; try to avoid the generic extractor; and/or use `--ignore-config --config-location ...` to not load config from common locations.",
  "id": "BREW-yt-dlp-CVE-2024-38519",
  "modified": "2026-10-29T21:46:26Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:55:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2024/38xxx/CVE-2024-38519.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/dirkf/youtube-dl/security/advisories/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-089_youtube-dl/"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/commit/d42a222ed541b96649396ef00e19552aef0f09ec"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "yt-dlp and youtube-dl vulnerable to file system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-38519",
    "GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j",
    "PYSEC-2026-2065"
  ]
}



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