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GHSA-79W7-VH3H-8G4J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-02 15:58 – Updated: 2024-07-05 17:54Summary
yt-dlp does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.
Patches
yt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.
This means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.
Workarounds
It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, always have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, system32, or other binaries locations.
For users not able to upgrade:
- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one
- Try to avoid the generic extractor (--ies default,-generic)
- Keep the default output template (-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s)
- Omit any of the subtitle options (--write-subs, --write-auto-subs, --all-subs, --write-srt)
- Use --ignore-config --config-location ... to not load config from common locations
Details
One potential exploitation might look like this:
From a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains
<script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "VideoObject",
"name": "ffmpeg",
"encodingFormat": "video/exe",
"contentUrl": "https://example.com/video.mp4"
}
</script>
this will try and download a file called ffmpeg.exe (-o "%(title)s.%(ext)s).
ffmpeg.exe will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.
Alternatively, when engineering a file called yt-dlp.conf to be created, the config file could contain --exec ... and so would also execute arbitrary code.
Acknowledgement
A big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue. More can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)
References
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a
- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "yt-dlp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2024.07.01"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-38519"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434",
"CWE-669"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-02T15:58:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-02T14:15:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`yt-dlp` does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since `yt-dlp` also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.\n\n### Patches\n`yt-dlp` version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.\nThis means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.\n\n### Workarounds\nIt is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, **always** have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, `system32`, or other binaries locations.\n\nFor users not able to upgrade:\n- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one\n- Try to avoid the generic extractor (`--ies default,-generic`)\n- Keep the default output template (`-o \"%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s`)\n- Omit any of the subtitle options (`--write-subs`, `--write-auto-subs`, `--all-subs`, `--write-srt`)\n- Use `--ignore-config --config-location ...` to not load config from common locations\n\n### Details\nOne potential exploitation might look like this:\n\nFrom a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains\n```html\n\u003cscript type=\"application/ld+json\"\u003e\n{\n \"@context\": \"https://schema.org\",\n \"@type\": \"VideoObject\",\n \"name\": \"ffmpeg\",\n \"encodingFormat\": \"video/exe\",\n \"contentUrl\": \"https://example.com/video.mp4\"\n}\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\nthis will try and download a file called `ffmpeg.exe` (`-o \"%(title)s.%(ext)s`).\n`ffmpeg.exe` will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.\n\nAlternatively, when engineering a file called `yt-dlp.conf` to be created, the config file could contain `--exec ...` and so would also execute arbitrary code.\n\n### Acknowledgement\nA big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue.\nMore can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: [Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)](\u003chttps://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\u003e)\n\n### References\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a\n- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\n",
"id": "GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j",
"modified": "2024-07-05T17:54:51Z",
"published": "2024-07-02T15:58:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dirkf/youtube-dl/security/advisories/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/commit/d42a222ed541b96649396ef00e19552aef0f09ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-089_youtube-dl"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "yt-dlp File system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization"
}
BREW-GAMDL-CVE-2024-38519 (GHSA-79W7-VH3H-8G4J)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:49 – Updated: 2026-09-09 23:59 – Source websiteSummary
yt-dlp does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.
Patches
yt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.
This means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.
Workarounds
It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, always have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, system32, or other binaries locations.
For users not able to upgrade:
- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one
- Try to avoid the generic extractor (--ies default,-generic)
- Keep the default output template (-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s)
- Omit any of the subtitle options (--write-subs, --write-auto-subs, --all-subs, --write-srt)
- Use --ignore-config --config-location ... to not load config from common locations
Details
One potential exploitation might look like this:
From a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains
<script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "VideoObject",
"name": "ffmpeg",
"encodingFormat": "video/exe",
"contentUrl": "https://example.com/video.mp4"
}
</script>
this will try and download a file called ffmpeg.exe (-o "%(title)s.%(ext)s).
ffmpeg.exe will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.
Alternatively, when engineering a file called yt-dlp.conf to be created, the config file could contain --exec ... and so would also execute arbitrary code.
Acknowledgement
A big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue. More can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)
References
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a
- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "yt-dlp",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.7.4",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2024.07.01"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "gamdl",
"purl": "pkg:brew/gamdl"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.8.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.7.4",
"name": "yt-dlp",
"resource": "yt-dlp",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.7.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`yt-dlp` does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since `yt-dlp` also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.\n\n### Patches\n`yt-dlp` version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.\nThis means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.\n\n### Workarounds\nIt is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, **always** have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, `system32`, or other binaries locations.\n\nFor users not able to upgrade:\n- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one\n- Try to avoid the generic extractor (`--ies default,-generic`)\n- Keep the default output template (`-o \"%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s`)\n- Omit any of the subtitle options (`--write-subs`, `--write-auto-subs`, `--all-subs`, `--write-srt`)\n- Use `--ignore-config --config-location ...` to not load config from common locations\n\n### Details\nOne potential exploitation might look like this:\n\nFrom a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains\n```html\n\u003cscript type=\"application/ld+json\"\u003e\n{\n \"@context\": \"https://schema.org\",\n \"@type\": \"VideoObject\",\n \"name\": \"ffmpeg\",\n \"encodingFormat\": \"video/exe\",\n \"contentUrl\": \"https://example.com/video.mp4\"\n}\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\nthis will try and download a file called `ffmpeg.exe` (`-o \"%(title)s.%(ext)s`).\n`ffmpeg.exe` will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.\n\nAlternatively, when engineering a file called `yt-dlp.conf` to be created, the config file could contain `--exec ...` and so would also execute arbitrary code.\n\n### Acknowledgement\nA big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue.\nMore can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: [Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)](\u003chttps://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\u003e)\n\n### References\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a\n- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\n",
"id": "BREW-gamdl-CVE-2024-38519",
"modified": "2026-09-09T23:59:22Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T16:49:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dirkf/youtube-dl/security/advisories/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/commit/d42a222ed541b96649396ef00e19552aef0f09ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-089_youtube-dl"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "yt-dlp File system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j",
"CVE-2024-38519",
"PYSEC-2026-2065"
]
}
BREW-MOODLE-DL-CVE-2024-38519 (GHSA-79W7-VH3H-8G4J)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:14 – Updated: 2026-09-10 00:32 – Source websiteSummary
yt-dlp does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.
Patches
yt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.
This means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.
Workarounds
It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, always have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, system32, or other binaries locations.
For users not able to upgrade:
- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one
- Try to avoid the generic extractor (--ies default,-generic)
- Keep the default output template (-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s)
- Omit any of the subtitle options (--write-subs, --write-auto-subs, --all-subs, --write-srt)
- Use --ignore-config --config-location ... to not load config from common locations
Details
One potential exploitation might look like this:
From a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains
<script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "VideoObject",
"name": "ffmpeg",
"encodingFormat": "video/exe",
"contentUrl": "https://example.com/video.mp4"
}
</script>
this will try and download a file called ffmpeg.exe (-o "%(title)s.%(ext)s).
ffmpeg.exe will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.
Alternatively, when engineering a file called yt-dlp.conf to be created, the config file could contain --exec ... and so would also execute arbitrary code.
Acknowledgement
A big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue. More can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)
References
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a
- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "yt-dlp",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.7.4",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2024.07.01"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "moodle-dl",
"purl": "pkg:brew/moodle-dl"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.13_12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.7.4",
"name": "yt-dlp",
"resource": "yt-dlp",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.7.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`yt-dlp` does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since `yt-dlp` also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.\n\n### Patches\n`yt-dlp` version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.\nThis means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.\n\n### Workarounds\nIt is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, **always** have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, `system32`, or other binaries locations.\n\nFor users not able to upgrade:\n- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one\n- Try to avoid the generic extractor (`--ies default,-generic`)\n- Keep the default output template (`-o \"%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s`)\n- Omit any of the subtitle options (`--write-subs`, `--write-auto-subs`, `--all-subs`, `--write-srt`)\n- Use `--ignore-config --config-location ...` to not load config from common locations\n\n### Details\nOne potential exploitation might look like this:\n\nFrom a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains\n```html\n\u003cscript type=\"application/ld+json\"\u003e\n{\n \"@context\": \"https://schema.org\",\n \"@type\": \"VideoObject\",\n \"name\": \"ffmpeg\",\n \"encodingFormat\": \"video/exe\",\n \"contentUrl\": \"https://example.com/video.mp4\"\n}\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\nthis will try and download a file called `ffmpeg.exe` (`-o \"%(title)s.%(ext)s`).\n`ffmpeg.exe` will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.\n\nAlternatively, when engineering a file called `yt-dlp.conf` to be created, the config file could contain `--exec ...` and so would also execute arbitrary code.\n\n### Acknowledgement\nA big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue.\nMore can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: [Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)](\u003chttps://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\u003e)\n\n### References\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a\n- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\n",
"id": "BREW-moodle-dl-CVE-2024-38519",
"modified": "2026-09-10T00:32:32Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:14:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dirkf/youtube-dl/security/advisories/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/commit/d42a222ed541b96649396ef00e19552aef0f09ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-089_youtube-dl"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "yt-dlp File system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j",
"CVE-2024-38519",
"PYSEC-2026-2065"
]
}
BREW-SCDL-CVE-2024-38519 (GHSA-79W7-VH3H-8G4J)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:34 – Updated: 2026-09-10 01:11 – Source websiteSummary
yt-dlp does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.
Patches
yt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.
This means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.
Workarounds
It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, always have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, system32, or other binaries locations.
For users not able to upgrade:
- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one
- Try to avoid the generic extractor (--ies default,-generic)
- Keep the default output template (-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s)
- Omit any of the subtitle options (--write-subs, --write-auto-subs, --all-subs, --write-srt)
- Use --ignore-config --config-location ... to not load config from common locations
Details
One potential exploitation might look like this:
From a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains
<script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "VideoObject",
"name": "ffmpeg",
"encodingFormat": "video/exe",
"contentUrl": "https://example.com/video.mp4"
}
</script>
this will try and download a file called ffmpeg.exe (-o "%(title)s.%(ext)s).
ffmpeg.exe will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.
Alternatively, when engineering a file called yt-dlp.conf to be created, the config file could contain --exec ... and so would also execute arbitrary code.
Acknowledgement
A big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue. More can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)
References
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a
- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "yt-dlp",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.8.19",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2024.07.01"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "scdl",
"purl": "pkg:brew/scdl"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.8.19",
"name": "yt-dlp",
"resource": "yt-dlp",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.8.19"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`yt-dlp` does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since `yt-dlp` also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.\n\n### Patches\n`yt-dlp` version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.\nThis means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.\n\n### Workarounds\nIt is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, **always** have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, `system32`, or other binaries locations.\n\nFor users not able to upgrade:\n- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one\n- Try to avoid the generic extractor (`--ies default,-generic`)\n- Keep the default output template (`-o \"%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s`)\n- Omit any of the subtitle options (`--write-subs`, `--write-auto-subs`, `--all-subs`, `--write-srt`)\n- Use `--ignore-config --config-location ...` to not load config from common locations\n\n### Details\nOne potential exploitation might look like this:\n\nFrom a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains\n```html\n\u003cscript type=\"application/ld+json\"\u003e\n{\n \"@context\": \"https://schema.org\",\n \"@type\": \"VideoObject\",\n \"name\": \"ffmpeg\",\n \"encodingFormat\": \"video/exe\",\n \"contentUrl\": \"https://example.com/video.mp4\"\n}\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\nthis will try and download a file called `ffmpeg.exe` (`-o \"%(title)s.%(ext)s`).\n`ffmpeg.exe` will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.\n\nAlternatively, when engineering a file called `yt-dlp.conf` to be created, the config file could contain `--exec ...` and so would also execute arbitrary code.\n\n### Acknowledgement\nA big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue.\nMore can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: [Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)](\u003chttps://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\u003e)\n\n### References\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a\n- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\n",
"id": "BREW-scdl-CVE-2024-38519",
"modified": "2026-09-10T01:11:31Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:34:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dirkf/youtube-dl/security/advisories/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/commit/d42a222ed541b96649396ef00e19552aef0f09ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-089_youtube-dl"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "yt-dlp File system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j",
"CVE-2024-38519",
"PYSEC-2026-2065"
]
}
BREW-TUBEUP-CVE-2024-38519 (GHSA-79W7-VH3H-8G4J)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:44 – Updated: 2026-09-10 01:31 – Source websiteSummary
yt-dlp does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.
Patches
yt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.
This means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.
Workarounds
It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, always have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, system32, or other binaries locations.
For users not able to upgrade:
- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one
- Try to avoid the generic extractor (--ies default,-generic)
- Keep the default output template (-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s)
- Omit any of the subtitle options (--write-subs, --write-auto-subs, --all-subs, --write-srt)
- Use --ignore-config --config-location ... to not load config from common locations
Details
One potential exploitation might look like this:
From a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains
<script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "VideoObject",
"name": "ffmpeg",
"encodingFormat": "video/exe",
"contentUrl": "https://example.com/video.mp4"
}
</script>
this will try and download a file called ffmpeg.exe (-o "%(title)s.%(ext)s).
ffmpeg.exe will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.
Alternatively, when engineering a file called yt-dlp.conf to be created, the config file could contain --exec ... and so would also execute arbitrary code.
Acknowledgement
A big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue. More can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)
References
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a
- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "yt-dlp",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.7.4",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2024.07.01"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "tubeup",
"purl": "pkg:brew/tubeup"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.5.8_1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.7.4",
"name": "yt-dlp",
"resource": "yt-dlp",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.7.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`yt-dlp` does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since `yt-dlp` also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.\n\n### Patches\n`yt-dlp` version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.\nThis means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.\n\n### Workarounds\nIt is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, **always** have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, `system32`, or other binaries locations.\n\nFor users not able to upgrade:\n- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one\n- Try to avoid the generic extractor (`--ies default,-generic`)\n- Keep the default output template (`-o \"%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s`)\n- Omit any of the subtitle options (`--write-subs`, `--write-auto-subs`, `--all-subs`, `--write-srt`)\n- Use `--ignore-config --config-location ...` to not load config from common locations\n\n### Details\nOne potential exploitation might look like this:\n\nFrom a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains\n```html\n\u003cscript type=\"application/ld+json\"\u003e\n{\n \"@context\": \"https://schema.org\",\n \"@type\": \"VideoObject\",\n \"name\": \"ffmpeg\",\n \"encodingFormat\": \"video/exe\",\n \"contentUrl\": \"https://example.com/video.mp4\"\n}\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\nthis will try and download a file called `ffmpeg.exe` (`-o \"%(title)s.%(ext)s`).\n`ffmpeg.exe` will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.\n\nAlternatively, when engineering a file called `yt-dlp.conf` to be created, the config file could contain `--exec ...` and so would also execute arbitrary code.\n\n### Acknowledgement\nA big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue.\nMore can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: [Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)](\u003chttps://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\u003e)\n\n### References\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a\n- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\n",
"id": "BREW-tubeup-CVE-2024-38519",
"modified": "2026-09-10T01:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:44:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dirkf/youtube-dl/security/advisories/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/commit/d42a222ed541b96649396ef00e19552aef0f09ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-089_youtube-dl"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "yt-dlp File system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j",
"CVE-2024-38519",
"PYSEC-2026-2065"
]
}
BREW-YEWTUBE-CVE-2024-38519 (GHSA-79W7-VH3H-8G4J)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:55 – Updated: 2026-09-17 19:26 – Source websiteSummary
yt-dlp does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.
Patches
yt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.
This means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.
Workarounds
It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, always have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, system32, or other binaries locations.
For users not able to upgrade:
- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one
- Try to avoid the generic extractor (--ies default,-generic)
- Keep the default output template (-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s)
- Omit any of the subtitle options (--write-subs, --write-auto-subs, --all-subs, --write-srt)
- Use --ignore-config --config-location ... to not load config from common locations
Details
One potential exploitation might look like this:
From a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains
<script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "VideoObject",
"name": "ffmpeg",
"encodingFormat": "video/exe",
"contentUrl": "https://example.com/video.mp4"
}
</script>
this will try and download a file called ffmpeg.exe (-o "%(title)s.%(ext)s).
ffmpeg.exe will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.
Alternatively, when engineering a file called yt-dlp.conf to be created, the config file could contain --exec ... and so would also execute arbitrary code.
Acknowledgement
A big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue. More can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)
References
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a
- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp
| URL | Type | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "yt-dlp",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.8.19",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2024.07.01"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "yewtube",
"purl": "pkg:brew/yewtube"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.10.5"
},
{
"fixed": "2.10.5_5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.8.19",
"name": "yt-dlp",
"resource": "yt-dlp",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.8.19"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n`yt-dlp` does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since `yt-dlp` also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.\n\n### Patches\n`yt-dlp` version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.\nThis means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.\n\n### Workarounds\nIt is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, **always** have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, `system32`, or other binaries locations.\n\nFor users not able to upgrade:\n- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one\n- Try to avoid the generic extractor (`--ies default,-generic`)\n- Keep the default output template (`-o \"%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s`)\n- Omit any of the subtitle options (`--write-subs`, `--write-auto-subs`, `--all-subs`, `--write-srt`)\n- Use `--ignore-config --config-location ...` to not load config from common locations\n\n### Details\nOne potential exploitation might look like this:\n\nFrom a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains\n```html\n\u003cscript type=\"application/ld+json\"\u003e\n{\n \"@context\": \"https://schema.org\",\n \"@type\": \"VideoObject\",\n \"name\": \"ffmpeg\",\n \"encodingFormat\": \"video/exe\",\n \"contentUrl\": \"https://example.com/video.mp4\"\n}\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\nthis will try and download a file called `ffmpeg.exe` (`-o \"%(title)s.%(ext)s`).\n`ffmpeg.exe` will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.\n\nAlternatively, when engineering a file called `yt-dlp.conf` to be created, the config file could contain `--exec ...` and so would also execute arbitrary code.\n\n### Acknowledgement\nA big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue.\nMore can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: [Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)](\u003chttps://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\u003e)\n\n### References\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a\n- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\n",
"id": "BREW-yewtube-CVE-2024-38519",
"modified": "2026-09-17T19:26:57Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:55:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dirkf/youtube-dl/security/advisories/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/commit/d42a222ed541b96649396ef00e19552aef0f09ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-089_youtube-dl"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "yt-dlp File system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j",
"CVE-2024-38519",
"PYSEC-2026-2065"
]
}
BREW-YT-DLP-CVE-2024-38519 (CVE-2024-38519)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:55 – Updated: 2026-09-10 21:31 – Source websiteyt-dlp and youtube-dl are command-line audio/video downloaders. Prior to the fixed versions, yt-dlp and youtube-dl do not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp and youtube-dl also read config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp or youtube-dl directory), this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.
yt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions. youtube-dl fixes this issue in commit d42a222 on the master branch and in nightly builds tagged 2024-07-03 or later. This might mean some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded, however it will also limit the possible exploitation surface. In addition to upgrading, have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template and make sure the user trusts the websites that they are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like one's user directory, system32, or other binaries locations. For users who are not able to upgrade, keep the default output template (-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s); make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one; try to avoid the generic extractor; and/or use --ignore-config --config-location ... to not load config from common locations.
| URL | Type | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2024.07.01"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "yt-dlp",
"purl": "pkg:brew/yt-dlp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.7.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "git",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "GIT",
"key": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp",
"name": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp",
"strategy": "git",
"subject_version": "2026.8.19"
},
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.8.19",
"name": "yt-dlp",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.8.19"
},
{
"ecosystem": "Debian",
"key": "Debian/yt-dlp",
"name": "yt-dlp",
"strategy": "distro"
},
{
"ecosystem": "GIT",
"key": "upstream:https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp",
"name": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp",
"strategy": "distro",
"subject_version": "2026.8.19"
},
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "upstream:pkg:pypi/yt-dlp@2026.8.19",
"name": "yt-dlp",
"strategy": "distro",
"subject_version": "2026.8.19"
},
{
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu",
"key": "Ubuntu/yt-dlp",
"name": "yt-dlp",
"strategy": "distro"
}
]
},
"details": "`yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` are command-line audio/video downloaders. Prior to the fixed versions,\u00a0`yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` do not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since `yt-dlp` and `youtube-dl` also read config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the `yt-dlp` or `youtube-dl` directory), this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.\n\n\n\n\n`yt-dlp` version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions. `youtube-dl` fixes this issue in commit `d42a222` on the `master` branch and in nightly builds tagged 2024-07-03 or later. This might mean some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded, however it will also limit the possible exploitation surface. In addition to upgrading, have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template and make sure the user trusts the websites that they are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like one\u0027s user directory, `system32`, or other binaries locations. For users who are not able to upgrade, keep the default output template (`-o \"%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s`); make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one; try to avoid the generic extractor; and/or use `--ignore-config --config-location ...` to not load config from common locations.",
"id": "BREW-yt-dlp-CVE-2024-38519",
"modified": "2026-09-10T21:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:55:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2024/38xxx/CVE-2024-38519.json"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/dirkf/youtube-dl/security/advisories/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-089_youtube-dl/"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/commit/d42a222ed541b96649396ef00e19552aef0f09ec"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "yt-dlp and youtube-dl vulnerable to file system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-38519",
"GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j",
"PYSEC-2026-2065"
]
}
CVE-2024-38519 (GCVE-0-2024-38519)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2024-07-02 13:47 – Updated: 2024-08-02 04:12- CWE-669 - Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisor… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/202… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-20… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/dirkf/youtube-dl/security/advi… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-20… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/commit/d42… | x_refsource_MISC |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| yt-dlp | yt-dlp |
Affected:
< 2024.07.01 , < 2024.07.01
(date)
|
|
| ytdl-org | youtube-dl |
Affected:
>= 2015.01.25 , ≤ 2021.12.17
(date)
Affected: nightly , < 2024-07-03 (date) |
|
| yt-dlp_project | yt-dlp |
Affected:
0 , < 2024.07.01
(custom)
cpe:2.3:a:yt-dlp_project:yt-dlp:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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},
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},
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}
],
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}
],
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"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
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]
}
],
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}
]
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"tags": [
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},
{
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],
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},
{
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],
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],
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"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "yt-dlp and youtube-dl vulnerable to file system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization"
}
},
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"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2024-38519",
"datePublished": "2024-07-02T13:47:36.399Z",
"dateReserved": "2024-06-18T16:37:02.728Z",
"dateUpdated": "2024-08-02T04:12:25.618Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.1"
}
PYSEC-2026-2065
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-07 14:34 - Updated: 2026-07-07 17:25Summary
yt-dlp does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.
Patches
yt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.
This means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.
Workarounds
It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, always have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, system32, or other binaries locations.
For users not able to upgrade:
- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one
- Try to avoid the generic extractor (--ies default,-generic)
- Keep the default output template (-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s)
- Omit any of the subtitle options (--write-subs, --write-auto-subs, --all-subs, --write-srt)
- Use --ignore-config --config-location ... to not load config from common locations
Details
One potential exploitation might look like this:
From a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains
<script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "VideoObject",
"name": "ffmpeg",
"encodingFormat": "video/exe",
"contentUrl": "https://example.com/video.mp4"
}
</script>
this will try and download a file called ffmpeg.exe (-o "%(title)s.%(ext)s).
ffmpeg.exe will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.
Alternatively, when engineering a file called yt-dlp.conf to be created, the config file could contain --exec ... and so would also execute arbitrary code.
Acknowledgement
A big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue. More can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)
References
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01
- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a
- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp
| Name | purl | yt-dlp | pkg:pypi/yt-dlp |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "yt-dlp",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/yt-dlp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2024.07.01"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2021.1.15",
"2021.1.15.post1",
"2021.1.16",
"2021.1.20",
"2021.1.24",
"2021.1.24.post1",
"2021.1.29",
"2021.10.10",
"2021.10.22",
"2021.10.9",
"2021.11.10",
"2021.11.10.1",
"2021.12.1",
"2021.12.25",
"2021.12.27",
"2021.2.15",
"2021.2.19",
"2021.2.24",
"2021.2.4",
"2021.2.9",
"2021.3.1",
"2021.3.15",
"2021.3.21",
"2021.3.24",
"2021.3.24.1",
"2021.3.3",
"2021.3.3.1",
"2021.3.3.2",
"2021.3.7",
"2021.4.11",
"2021.4.22",
"2021.4.3",
"2021.5.11",
"2021.5.20",
"2021.6.1",
"2021.6.23",
"2021.6.8",
"2021.6.9",
"2021.7.21",
"2021.7.24",
"2021.7.7",
"2021.8.10",
"2021.8.2",
"2021.9.1",
"2021.9.2",
"2021.9.25",
"2022.1.21",
"2022.10.4",
"2022.11.11",
"2022.2.3",
"2022.2.4",
"2022.3.8",
"2022.3.8.1",
"2022.3.8.2",
"2022.4.8",
"2022.5.18",
"2022.6.22",
"2022.6.22.1",
"2022.6.29",
"2022.7.17",
"2022.7.18",
"2022.8.14",
"2022.8.19",
"2022.8.8",
"2022.9.1",
"2023.1.2",
"2023.1.6",
"2023.10.13",
"2023.10.7",
"2023.11.13.232715.dev0",
"2023.11.13.5826.dev0",
"2023.11.14",
"2023.11.15.232826.dev0",
"2023.11.16",
"2023.11.16.232727.dev0",
"2023.11.18.232705.dev0",
"2023.11.19.232719.dev0",
"2023.11.20.232729.dev0",
"2023.11.26.232703.dev0",
"2023.11.28.232715.dev0",
"2023.11.29.232714.dev0",
"2023.12.12.232727.dev0",
"2023.12.13.232710.dev0",
"2023.12.17.232710.dev0",
"2023.12.18.232711.dev0",
"2023.12.19.232701.dev0",
"2023.12.20.232717.dev0",
"2023.12.21.232720.dev0",
"2023.12.22.232735.dev0",
"2023.12.24.232657.dev0",
"2023.12.26.232752.dev0",
"2023.12.30",
"2023.12.30.232719.dev0",
"2023.12.31.232713.dev0",
"2023.12.5.232702.dev0",
"2023.12.6.232721.dev0",
"2023.2.17",
"2023.3.3",
"2023.3.4",
"2023.6.21",
"2023.6.22",
"2023.7.6",
"2023.9.24",
"2024.1.14.232710.dev0",
"2024.1.18.232658.dev0",
"2024.1.19.232708.dev0",
"2024.1.2.232714.dev0",
"2024.1.20.232722.dev0",
"2024.1.21.232719.dev0",
"2024.1.22.232713.dev0",
"2024.1.23.232723.dev0",
"2024.1.28.232706.dev0",
"2024.1.29.232706.dev0",
"2024.1.31.232703.dev0",
"2024.1.5.232702.dev0",
"2024.1.8.232709.dev0",
"2024.1.9.232723.dev0",
"2024.2.13.232701.dev0",
"2024.2.14.232704.dev0",
"2024.2.15.232705.dev0",
"2024.2.16.232705.dev0",
"2024.2.17.232706.dev0",
"2024.2.18.232707.dev0",
"2024.2.19.232703.dev0",
"2024.2.2.232707.dev0",
"2024.2.20.232712.dev0",
"2024.2.21.232721.dev0",
"2024.2.22.232849.dev0",
"2024.2.23.232656.dev0",
"2024.2.24.232815.dev0",
"2024.2.25.232703.dev0",
"2024.2.28.232744.dev0",
"2024.2.29.232658.dev0",
"2024.2.3.232712.dev0",
"2024.2.4.232659.dev0",
"2024.2.5.232712.dev0",
"2024.2.9.232659.dev0",
"2024.3.10",
"2024.3.10.232703.dev0",
"2024.3.14.232657.dev0",
"2024.3.17.232657.dev0",
"2024.3.18.232707.dev0",
"2024.3.19.232701.dev0",
"2024.3.2.232720.dev0",
"2024.3.20.232704.dev0",
"2024.3.22.232703.dev0",
"2024.3.29.232706.dev0",
"2024.3.3.232706.dev0",
"2024.3.30.232704.dev0",
"2024.3.31.232706.dev0",
"2024.3.4.232716.dev0",
"2024.3.6.232659.dev0",
"2024.3.7.232716.dev0",
"2024.3.8.232718.dev0",
"2024.3.9.232714.dev0",
"2024.4.1.232704.dev0",
"2024.4.13.232802.dev0",
"2024.4.18.232703.dev0",
"2024.4.20.232659.dev0",
"2024.4.21.232710.dev0",
"2024.4.28.232723.dev0",
"2024.4.3.233315.dev0",
"2024.4.4.232729.dev0",
"2024.4.6.232655.dev0",
"2024.4.7.232657.dev0",
"2024.4.8.232708.dev0",
"2024.4.9",
"2024.4.9.232723.dev0",
"2024.5.10.232705.dev0",
"2024.5.11.232654.dev0",
"2024.5.12.232709.dev0",
"2024.5.13.232704.dev0",
"2024.5.16.232713.dev0",
"2024.5.17.232726.dev0",
"2024.5.18.232655.dev0",
"2024.5.20.232721.dev0",
"2024.5.22.232749.dev0",
"2024.5.23.232707.dev0",
"2024.5.25.232709.dev0",
"2024.5.26",
"2024.5.26.232731.dev0",
"2024.5.27",
"2024.5.27.232744.dev0",
"2024.5.29.232700.dev0",
"2024.5.30.232720.dev0",
"2024.5.4.232706.dev0",
"2024.5.5.232701.dev0",
"2024.5.8.232715.dev0",
"2024.6.1.232725.dev0",
"2024.6.11.232712.dev0",
"2024.6.13.232720.dev0",
"2024.6.15.232712.dev0",
"2024.6.16.232832.dev0",
"2024.6.17.232743.dev0",
"2024.6.20.232815.dev0",
"2024.6.21.232706.dev0",
"2024.6.22.232706.dev0",
"2024.6.24.232830.dev0",
"2024.6.27.232805.dev0",
"2024.6.29.232730.dev0",
"2024.6.30.232744.dev0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-38519",
"GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j"
],
"details": "### Summary\n`yt-dlp` does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since `yt-dlp` also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.\n\n### Patches\n`yt-dlp` version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.\nThis means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.\n\n### Workarounds\nIt is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, **always** have `.%(ext)s` at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, `system32`, or other binaries locations.\n\nFor users not able to upgrade:\n- Make sure the extension of the media to download is a common video/audio/sub/... one\n- Try to avoid the generic extractor (`--ies default,-generic`)\n- Keep the default output template (`-o \"%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s`)\n- Omit any of the subtitle options (`--write-subs`, `--write-auto-subs`, `--all-subs`, `--write-srt`)\n- Use `--ignore-config --config-location ...` to not load config from common locations\n\n### Details\nOne potential exploitation might look like this:\n\nFrom a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains\n```html\n\u003cscript type=\"application/ld+json\"\u003e\n{\n \"@context\": \"https://schema.org\",\n \"@type\": \"VideoObject\",\n \"name\": \"ffmpeg\",\n \"encodingFormat\": \"video/exe\",\n \"contentUrl\": \"https://example.com/video.mp4\"\n}\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\nthis will try and download a file called `ffmpeg.exe` (`-o \"%(title)s.%(ext)s`).\n`ffmpeg.exe` will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.\n\nAlternatively, when engineering a file called `yt-dlp.conf` to be created, the config file could contain `--exec ...` and so would also execute arbitrary code.\n\n### Acknowledgement\nA big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue.\nMore can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: [Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)](\u003chttps://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\u003e)\n\n### References\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01\n- https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a\n- https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp\n",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-2065",
"modified": "2026-07-07T17:25:52.761207Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T14:34:36.149029Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dirkf/youtube-dl/security/advisories/GHSA-22fp-mf44-f2mq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/security/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/pull/32830"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/5ce582448ececb8d9c30c8c31f58330090ced03a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/commit/d42a222ed541b96649396ef00e19552aef0f09ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2024.07.01"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-089_youtube-dl"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/yt-dlp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "yt-dlp File system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.