BREW-VITE-CVE-2026-53571 (GHSA-FX2H-PF6J-XCFF)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:48 – Updated: 2026-11-13 11:40 – Source websiteSummary
The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser on Windows.
Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using
--hostorserver.hostconfig option) - the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by
server.fs.allow - either of:
- the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume
- the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes)
Details
Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through server.fs.deny, including entries such as .env, .env.*, and *.{crt,pem}. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied.
Because of this, requests such as /.env::$DATA?raw are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream.
Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.
PoC
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Access via browser at http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw
Example expected result:
- /.env::$DATA?raw returns the contents of .env
- /tls.pem::$DATA?raw returns the contents of tls.pem
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "8.0.16"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "vite",
"purl": "pkg:brew/vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.5.1"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/vite@8.3.8",
"name": "vite",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "8.3.8"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe contents of files that are specified by [`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny) can be returned to the browser on Windows.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps that match the following conditions are affected:\n\n- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host))\n- the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by [`server.fs.allow`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-allow)\n- either of:\n - the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume\n - the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes)\n\n### Details\n\nVite\u2019s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through `server.fs.deny`, including entries such as `.env`, `.env.*`, and `*.{crt,pem}`. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied.\nBecause of this, requests such as `/.env::$DATA?raw` are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file\u0027s default data stream.\n\nSimilar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.\n\n### PoC\n```bash\n$ npm create vite@latest\n$ cd vite-project/\n$ npm install\n$ npm run dev\n```\nAccess via browser at `http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw`\n\u003cimg width=\"388\" height=\"129\" alt=\"deecc1315123883cfd0f9c26a002845a\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/895c6012-4e2e-4a35-babb-69bbf3ee7170\" /\u003e\n\nExample expected result:\n- `/.env::$DATA?raw` returns the contents of `.env`\n- `/tls.pem::$DATA?raw` returns the contents of `tls.pem`",
"id": "BREW-vite-CVE-2026-53571",
"modified": "2026-11-13T11:40:17Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:48:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53571"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "vite: `server.fs.deny` bypass on Windows alternate paths",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff",
"CVE-2026-53571"
]
}
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