BREW-PGCLI-CVE-2026-71491 (GHSA-F2FF-P2WW-7P4P)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-17 17:42 – Updated: 2026-10-07 23:21 – Source websiteSummary
A comment-only statement (-- c\n*n) may cause a Denial of Service (DoS).
Details
Location: sqlparse/engine/grouping.py:331-341 (group_comments), invoked first in group() at grouping.py:439. Reachable via sqlparse.parse() and sqlparse.format(sql, strip_comments=True).
A statement made of many single-line comments ('-- c\n' repeated) lexes in O(n) but group_comments is O(n²):
def group_comments(tlist):
tidx, token = tlist.token_next_by(t=T.Comment)
while token:
eidx, end = tlist.token_not_matching(
lambda tk: imt(tk, t=T.Comment) or tk.is_newline, idx=tidx)
...
tidx, token = tlist.token_next_by(t=T.Comment, idx=tidx)
The while loop runs n times and each token_next_by / token_not_matching rescans the O(n) remaining tokens. When all tokens are comments/newlines nothing ever groups, yet the full scan is repeated per token.
Two following factors increase the severity:
group_commentsruns first ingroup()(grouping.py:439), before the_group_matchingtoken-count guard (grouping.py:34-39). So the entire quadratic cost is paid even on oversized input.MAX_GROUPING_TOKENSdoes not provide protection on this vector.- It sits on the primary sanitizer path:
format(sql, strip_comments=True), used by query loggers, SQL firewalls, ORMs, and migration tools.
PoC
Tested using Python 3.14:
import time, sqlparse
for n in (1000, 2000, 4000):
s = "-- c\n" * n
t = time.perf_counter()
sqlparse.format(s, strip_comments=True)
print(f"n={n:5d} format(strip_comments)={1000*(time.perf_counter()-t):7.1f} ms")
Output:
n= 1000 format(strip_comments)= 106.0 ms
n= 2000 format(strip_comments)= 403.3 ms
n= 4000 format(strip_comments)= 1602.8 ms
Time increase of ~4× per 2× input (quadratic). parse() shows the identical curve. Instrumented scan counts are exactly 1.0M / 4.0M / 16.0M tokens for n=1000/2000/4000. A ~250 KB comment-only payload forces minutes of CPU regardless of the 10000 token cap.
Impact
Denial of Service
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "sqlparse",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/sqlparse@0.6.0",
"upstream_fixed_in": "0.6.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "pgcli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/pgcli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.10.2"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/sqlparse@0.6.0",
"name": "sqlparse",
"resource": "sqlparse",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "0.6.0"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\nA comment-only statement (`-- c\\n`*n) may cause a Denial of Service (DoS).\n\n### Details\nLocation: [sqlparse/engine/grouping.py:331-341](https://github.com/andialbrecht/sqlparse/blob/f80af6a4007f11ada847218df8c29dc859238290/sqlparse/engine/grouping.py#L332) (`group_comments`), invoked first in `group()` at `grouping.py:439`. Reachable via `sqlparse.parse()` and `sqlparse.format(sql, strip_comments=True)`.\n\nA statement made of many single-line comments (`\u0027-- c\\n\u0027` repeated) lexes in O(n) but `group_comments` is O(n\u00b2):\n\n```python\ndef group_comments(tlist):\n tidx, token = tlist.token_next_by(t=T.Comment)\n while token:\n eidx, end = tlist.token_not_matching(\n lambda tk: imt(tk, t=T.Comment) or tk.is_newline, idx=tidx)\n ...\n tidx, token = tlist.token_next_by(t=T.Comment, idx=tidx)\n```\n\nThe `while` loop runs n times and each `token_next_by` / `token_not_matching` rescans the O(n) remaining tokens. When all tokens are comments/newlines nothing ever groups, yet the full scan is repeated per token.\n\nTwo following factors increase the severity:\n\n1. `group_comments` runs first in `group()` (`grouping.py:439`), before the `_group_matching` token-count guard (`grouping.py:34-39`). So the entire quadratic cost is paid even on oversized input. `MAX_GROUPING_TOKENS` does not provide protection on this vector.\n2. It sits on the primary sanitizer path: `format(sql, strip_comments=True)`, used by query loggers, SQL firewalls, ORMs, and migration tools.\n\n### PoC\nTested using Python 3.14:\n\n```python\nimport time, sqlparse\nfor n in (1000, 2000, 4000):\n s = \"-- c\\n\" * n\n t = time.perf_counter()\n sqlparse.format(s, strip_comments=True)\n print(f\"n={n:5d} format(strip_comments)={1000*(time.perf_counter()-t):7.1f} ms\")\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nn= 1000 format(strip_comments)= 106.0 ms\nn= 2000 format(strip_comments)= 403.3 ms\nn= 4000 format(strip_comments)= 1602.8 ms\n```\n\nTime increase of ~4\u00d7 per 2\u00d7 input (quadratic). `parse()` shows the identical curve. Instrumented scan counts are exactly 1.0M / 4.0M / 16.0M tokens for n=1000/2000/4000. A ~250 KB comment-only payload forces minutes of CPU regardless of the 10000 token cap.\n\n### Impact\nDenial of Service",
"id": "BREW-pgcli-CVE-2026-71491",
"modified": "2026-10-07T23:21:50Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T17:42:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/andialbrecht/sqlparse/security/advisories/GHSA-f2ff-p2ww-7p4p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/andialbrecht/sqlparse/commit/ef2012a5eeb491e604dea2b00d516904a3830c87"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/andialbrecht/sqlparse"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "sqlparse: Quadratic O(n\u00b2) DoS in group_comments",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-f2ff-p2ww-7p4p",
"CVE-2026-71491",
"PYSEC-2026-3697"
]
}
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