BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-MR34-9552-QR95)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-10 09:00 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Webchat media embedding enforces local-root containment for tool-result files
Details

Summary

Webchat tool-result media normalization could pass local and UNC-style file paths into the host-side media embedding path without applying the configured local-root containment policy.

Impact

A crafted tool-result media reference could cause the host to attempt local file reads or Windows UNC/network path access while preparing webchat media blocks. This could disclose allowed host files or trigger network credential exposure on affected Windows deployments. Severity remains medium because exploitation depends on a tool-result media path reaching the webchat embedding path, but the sink is a host-side file read before the user sees the rendered result.

Affected versions

  • Affected: >= 2026.4.7, < 2026.4.15
  • Patched: 2026.4.15

Fix

OpenClaw 2026.4.15 hardens the webchat media path and the shared media resolver. Remote-host file:// URLs and Windows network paths are rejected before filesystem access, and audio embedding now enforces configured localRoots containment before stat or read operations.

Verified in v2026.4.15:

  • src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.ts uses safe file-URL parsing, rejects Windows network paths, and calls assertLocalMediaAllowed before probing local audio files.
  • src/media/web-media.ts rejects remote-host file:// URLs, Windows network paths, and local-root bypasses on the shared media path.
  • src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.test.ts covers both remote-host file:// rejection and local-root denial before filesystem access.

Fix commits included in v2026.4.15 and absent from v2026.4.14:

  • 1470de5d3e0970856d86cd99336bb8ada3fe87da via PR #67293
  • 6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268ec0ee4c01a2af03dde via PR #67298
  • 52ef42302ead9e183e6c8810e0a04ee4ef8ae9fc via PR #67303 as defense-in-depth for trusted media passthrough anchoring

Thanks to @Kherrisan for reporting this issue.

Severity
5.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.4.15"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.4.7"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.2",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.11.2"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWebchat tool-result media normalization could pass local and UNC-style file paths into the host-side media embedding path without applying the configured local-root containment policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nA crafted tool-result media reference could cause the host to attempt local file reads or Windows UNC/network path access while preparing webchat media blocks. This could disclose allowed host files or trigger network credential exposure on affected Windows deployments. Severity remains medium because exploitation depends on a tool-result media path reaching the webchat embedding path, but the sink is a host-side file read before the user sees the rendered result.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- Affected: `\u003e= 2026.4.7, \u003c 2026.4.15`\n- Patched: `2026.4.15`\n\n## Fix\n\nOpenClaw `2026.4.15` hardens the webchat media path and the shared media resolver. Remote-host `file://` URLs and Windows network paths are rejected before filesystem access, and audio embedding now enforces configured `localRoots` containment before `stat` or read operations.\n\nVerified in `v2026.4.15`:\n\n- `src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.ts` uses safe file-URL parsing, rejects Windows network paths, and calls `assertLocalMediaAllowed` before probing local audio files.\n- `src/media/web-media.ts` rejects remote-host `file://` URLs, Windows network paths, and local-root bypasses on the shared media path.\n- `src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.test.ts` covers both remote-host `file://` rejection and local-root denial before filesystem access.\n\nFix commits included in `v2026.4.15` and absent from `v2026.4.14`:\n\n- `1470de5d3e0970856d86cd99336bb8ada3fe87da` via PR #67293\n- `6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268ec0ee4c01a2af03dde` via PR #67298\n- `52ef42302ead9e183e6c8810e0a04ee4ef8ae9fc` via PR #67303 as defense-in-depth for trusted media passthrough anchoring\n\nThanks to @Kherrisan for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-41389",
  "modified": "2026-11-10T09:00:02Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-mr34-9552-qr95"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41389"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/67293"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/67298"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/67303"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/1470de5d3e0970856d86cd99336bb8ada3fe87da"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/52ef42302ead9e183e6c8810e0a04ee4ef8ae9fc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268ec0ee4c01a2af03dde"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-file-read-via-unvalidated-tool-result-media-paths"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Webchat media embedding enforces local-root containment for tool-result files",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-mr34-9552-qr95",
    "CVE-2026-41389"
  ]
}



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