GHSA-MR34-9552-QR95

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 22:33 – Updated: 2026-04-17 22:33
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw: Webchat media embedding enforces local-root containment for tool-result files
Details

Summary

Webchat tool-result media normalization could pass local and UNC-style file paths into the host-side media embedding path without applying the configured local-root containment policy.

Impact

A crafted tool-result media reference could cause the host to attempt local file reads or Windows UNC/network path access while preparing webchat media blocks. This could disclose allowed host files or trigger network credential exposure on affected Windows deployments. Severity remains medium because exploitation depends on a tool-result media path reaching the webchat embedding path, but the sink is a host-side file read before the user sees the rendered result.

Affected versions

  • Affected: >= 2026.4.7, < 2026.4.15
  • Patched: 2026.4.15

Fix

OpenClaw 2026.4.15 hardens the webchat media path and the shared media resolver. Remote-host file:// URLs and Windows network paths are rejected before filesystem access, and audio embedding now enforces configured localRoots containment before stat or read operations.

Verified in v2026.4.15:

  • src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.ts uses safe file-URL parsing, rejects Windows network paths, and calls assertLocalMediaAllowed before probing local audio files.
  • src/media/web-media.ts rejects remote-host file:// URLs, Windows network paths, and local-root bypasses on the shared media path.
  • src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.test.ts covers both remote-host file:// rejection and local-root denial before filesystem access.

Fix commits included in v2026.4.15 and absent from v2026.4.14:

  • 1470de5d3e0970856d86cd99336bb8ada3fe87da via PR #67293
  • 6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268ec0ee4c01a2af03dde via PR #67298
  • 52ef42302ead9e183e6c8810e0a04ee4ef8ae9fc via PR #67303 as defense-in-depth for trusted media passthrough anchoring

Thanks to @Kherrisan for reporting this issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.4.7"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-17T22:33:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWebchat tool-result media normalization could pass local and UNC-style file paths into the host-side media embedding path without applying the configured local-root containment policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nA crafted tool-result media reference could cause the host to attempt local file reads or Windows UNC/network path access while preparing webchat media blocks. This could disclose allowed host files or trigger network credential exposure on affected Windows deployments. Severity remains medium because exploitation depends on a tool-result media path reaching the webchat embedding path, but the sink is a host-side file read before the user sees the rendered result.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- Affected: `\u003e= 2026.4.7, \u003c 2026.4.15`\n- Patched: `2026.4.15`\n\n## Fix\n\nOpenClaw `2026.4.15` hardens the webchat media path and the shared media resolver. Remote-host `file://` URLs and Windows network paths are rejected before filesystem access, and audio embedding now enforces configured `localRoots` containment before `stat` or read operations.\n\nVerified in `v2026.4.15`:\n\n- `src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.ts` uses safe file-URL parsing, rejects Windows network paths, and calls `assertLocalMediaAllowed` before probing local audio files.\n- `src/media/web-media.ts` rejects remote-host `file://` URLs, Windows network paths, and local-root bypasses on the shared media path.\n- `src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.test.ts` covers both remote-host `file://` rejection and local-root denial before filesystem access.\n\nFix commits included in `v2026.4.15` and absent from `v2026.4.14`:\n\n- `1470de5d3e0970856d86cd99336bb8ada3fe87da` via PR #67293\n- `6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268ec0ee4c01a2af03dde` via PR #67298\n- `52ef42302ead9e183e6c8810e0a04ee4ef8ae9fc` via PR #67303 as defense-in-depth for trusted media passthrough anchoring\n\nThanks to @Kherrisan for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-mr34-9552-qr95",
  "modified": "2026-04-17T22:33:09Z",
  "published": "2026-04-17T22:33:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-mr34-9552-qr95"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/67293"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/67298"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/67303"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/1470de5d3e0970856d86cd99336bb8ada3fe87da"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/52ef42302ead9e183e6c8810e0a04ee4ef8ae9fc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268ec0ee4c01a2af03dde"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Webchat media embedding enforces local-root containment for tool-result files"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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