BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-J27P-HQ53-9WGC)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-25 08:57 – Source websiteSummary
URL-backed media fetch handling allocated the entire response payload in memory (arrayBuffer) before enforcing maxBytes, allowing oversized responses to cause memory exhaustion.
Affected Versions
openclaw(npm): <2026.2.14clawdbot(npm): <=2026.1.24-3
Patched Versions
openclaw(npm):2026.2.14
Fix Commit
openclaw/openclawmain:00a08908892d1743d1fc52e5cbd9499dd5da2fe0
Details
Affected component:
- src/media/input-files.ts (fetchWithGuard)
When content-length is missing or incorrect, reading the body via response.arrayBuffer() buffers the full payload before a size check can run.
Proof of Concept
- Configure URL-based media input.
- Serve a response larger than
maxBytes(chunked transfer / nocontent-length). - Trigger the
fetchWithGuardURL fetch path.
Example local server (large response):
node -e 'require("http").createServer((_,res)=>{res.writeHead(200,{"content-type":"application/octet-stream"});for(let i=0;i<1024;i++)res.write(Buffer.alloc(1024*64));res.end();}).listen(18888)'
Impact
Availability loss via memory pressure from attacker-controlled remote media responses.
Mitigation
Until a patched release is available, disable URL-backed media inputs (or restrict to a tight hostname allowlist) and use conservative maxBytes limits.
Credits
Reported by @vincentkoc.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.14"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.6",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.9.6"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\nURL-backed media fetch handling allocated the entire response payload in memory (`arrayBuffer`) before enforcing `maxBytes`, allowing oversized responses to cause memory exhaustion.\n\n### Affected Versions\n- `openclaw` (npm): \u003c `2026.2.14`\n- `clawdbot` (npm): \u003c= `2026.1.24-3`\n\n### Patched Versions\n- `openclaw` (npm): `2026.2.14`\n\n### Fix Commit\n- `openclaw/openclaw` `main`: `00a08908892d1743d1fc52e5cbd9499dd5da2fe0`\n\n### Details\nAffected component:\n- `src/media/input-files.ts` (`fetchWithGuard`)\n\nWhen `content-length` is missing or incorrect, reading the body via `response.arrayBuffer()` buffers the full payload before a size check can run.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n1. Configure URL-based media input.\n2. Serve a response larger than `maxBytes` (chunked transfer / no `content-length`).\n3. Trigger the `fetchWithGuard` URL fetch path.\n\nExample local server (large response):\n```bash\nnode -e \u0027require(\"http\").createServer((_,res)=\u003e{res.writeHead(200,{\"content-type\":\"application/octet-stream\"});for(let i=0;i\u003c1024;i++)res.write(Buffer.alloc(1024*64));res.end();}).listen(18888)\u0027\n```\n\n### Impact\nAvailability loss via memory pressure from attacker-controlled remote media responses.\n\n### Mitigation\nUntil a patched release is available, disable URL-backed media inputs (or restrict to a tight hostname allowlist) and use conservative `maxBytes` limits.\n\n### Credits\nReported by @vincentkoc.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-29609",
"modified": "2026-09-25T08:57:16Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-j27p-hq53-9wgc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/00a08908892d1743d1fc52e5cbd9499dd5da2fe0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw affected by denial of service via unbounded URL-backed media fetch",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-j27p-hq53-9wgc",
"CVE-2026-29609"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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