BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-7XHJ-55Q9-PC3M)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-13 09:11 – Source websiteSummary
OpenClaw hook mapping transforms could be loaded via absolute paths or .. traversal, allowing arbitrary JavaScript module loading/execution in the gateway process when an attacker can modify hooks configuration.
Affected Versions
- Affected: >= 2.0.0-beta3 and <= 2026.2.13
- Fixed: 2026.2.14
Details
hooks.mappings[].transform.module is dynamically imported and executed during webhook processing. Path resolution previously accepted absolute paths and did not enforce containment for relative paths, so a config-controlled transform could resolve outside the intended transforms directory.
Impact
If an attacker can write the OpenClaw config (or otherwise update hooks config through authenticated configuration mechanisms), they could point a hook mapping transform at an arbitrary module on disk and execute code with the gateway process privileges.
Reproduction (config-controlled module load)
- Configure a hook mapping that points to a transform path that escapes the transforms directory (for example via
..traversal). - Place a malicious ESM module at the resolved location that executes arbitrary code in the gateway process.
- Trigger the hook endpoint with the correct hook token.
Fix
Transform loading is now constrained to the OpenClaw transforms root directory:
- Root:
~/.openclaw/hooks/transforms hooks.transformsDirmust be within that directorytransform.modulemust be within the selected transforms directory
Attempts to escape the root (absolute paths outside, .. traversal) are rejected.
Fix commit(s):
- a0361b8ba959e8506dc79d638b6e6a00d12887e4
- 18e8bd68c5015a894f999c6d5e6e32468965bfb5
Credits
OpenClaw thanks @akhmittra for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.14"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.3",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.11.3"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOpenClaw hook mapping transforms could be loaded via absolute paths or `..` traversal, allowing arbitrary JavaScript module loading/execution in the gateway process when an attacker can modify hooks configuration.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- Affected: \u003e= 2.0.0-beta3 and \u003c= 2026.2.13\n- Fixed: 2026.2.14\n\n## Details\n\n`hooks.mappings[].transform.module` is dynamically imported and executed during webhook processing. Path resolution previously accepted absolute paths and did not enforce containment for relative paths, so a config-controlled transform could resolve outside the intended transforms directory.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker can write the OpenClaw config (or otherwise update hooks config through authenticated configuration mechanisms), they could point a hook mapping transform at an arbitrary module on disk and execute code with the gateway process privileges.\n\n## Reproduction (config-controlled module load)\n\n1. Configure a hook mapping that points to a transform path that escapes the transforms directory (for example via `..` traversal).\n2. Place a malicious ESM module at the resolved location that executes arbitrary code in the gateway process.\n3. Trigger the hook endpoint with the correct hook token.\n\n## Fix\n\nTransform loading is now constrained to the OpenClaw transforms root directory:\n\n- Root: `~/.openclaw/hooks/transforms`\n- `hooks.transformsDir` must be within that directory\n- `transform.module` must be within the selected transforms directory\n\nAttempts to escape the root (absolute paths outside, `..` traversal) are rejected.\n\nFix commit(s):\n\n- a0361b8ba959e8506dc79d638b6e6a00d12887e4\n- 18e8bd68c5015a894f999c6d5e6e32468965bfb5\n\n## Credits\n\nOpenClaw thanks @akhmittra for reporting.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-28393",
"modified": "2026-11-13T09:11:44Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-7xhj-55q9-pc3m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28393"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/18e8bd68c5015a894f999c6d5e6e32468965bfb5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/a0361b8ba959e8506dc79d638b6e6a00d12887e4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-beta-arbitrary-javascript-module-loading-via-hook-transform-path-traversal"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s hook transform module path allows traversal and arbitrary JavaScript module loading",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-7xhj-55q9-pc3m",
"CVE-2026-28393"
]
}
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