BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-M8V2-6WWH-R4GC)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-19 09:06 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw's sandbox bind validation could bypass allowed-root and blocked-path checks via symlink-parent missing-leaf paths
Details

Summary

In openclaw up to and including 2026.2.23 (latest npm release as of February 24, 2026), sandbox bind-source validation could be bypassed when a bind source used a symlinked parent plus a non-existent leaf path.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: <= 2026.2.23
  • Patched: >= 2026.2.24 (planned next release)

Root Cause

validateBindMounts previously relied on full-path realpath only when the full source path already existed. For missing-leaf paths, parent symlink traversal was not fully canonicalized before allowed-root and blocked-path checks.

Security Impact

A source path that looked inside an allowed root could resolve outside that root (including blocked runtime paths) once the missing leaf was created, weakening sandbox bind-source boundary enforcement.

Fix

The validation path now canonicalizes through the nearest existing ancestor, then always re-checks the canonical path against both: - allowed source roots - blocked runtime paths

Verification

  • pnpm check
  • pnpm exec vitest run --config vitest.gateway.config.ts
  • pnpm test:fast
  • Added regression tests for symlink-parent + missing-leaf bypass patterns.

Fix Commit(s)

  • b5787e4abba0dcc6baf09051099f6773c1679ec1

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.24) so after npm publish the advisory can be published without further field edits.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Publication Update (2026-02-25)

openclaw@2026.2.24 is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks >= 2026.2.24 as patched.

Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Homebrew openclaw-cli
pkg:brew/openclaw-cli
Affected: ≥ 2026.1.29, < 2026.2.24 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.24"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.5",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.11.5"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nIn `openclaw` up to and including **2026.2.23** (latest npm release as of **February 24, 2026**), sandbox bind-source validation could be bypassed when a bind source used a symlinked parent plus a non-existent leaf path.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.23`\n- Patched: `\u003e= 2026.2.24` (planned next release)\n\n### Root Cause\n`validateBindMounts` previously relied on full-path realpath only when the full source path already existed. For missing-leaf paths, parent symlink traversal was not fully canonicalized before allowed-root and blocked-path checks.\n\n### Security Impact\nA source path that looked inside an allowed root could resolve outside that root (including blocked runtime paths) once the missing leaf was created, weakening sandbox bind-source boundary enforcement.\n\n### Fix\nThe validation path now canonicalizes through the nearest existing ancestor, then always re-checks the canonical path against both:\n- allowed source roots\n- blocked runtime paths\n\n### Verification\n- `pnpm check`\n- `pnpm exec vitest run --config vitest.gateway.config.ts`\n- `pnpm test:fast`\n- Added regression tests for symlink-parent + missing-leaf bypass patterns.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `b5787e4abba0dcc6baf09051099f6773c1679ec1`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.24`) so after npm publish the advisory can be published without further field edits.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.\n\n\n### Publication Update (2026-02-25)\n`openclaw@2026.2.24` is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks `\u003e= 2026.2.24` as patched.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-27523",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T09:06:25Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-m8v2-6wwh-r4gc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27523"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/b5787e4abba0dcc6baf09051099f6773c1679ec1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-sandbox-bind-validation-bypass-via-symlink-parent-missing-leaf-paths"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s sandbox bind validation could bypass allowed-root and blocked-path checks via symlink-parent missing-leaf paths",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-m8v2-6wwh-r4gc",
    "CVE-2026-27523"
  ]
}



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