BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-R8G4-86FX-92MQ)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-17 09:11 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw Vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via MEDIA: Path Extraction
Details

Summary

The isValidMedia() function in src/media/parse.ts allows arbitrary file paths including absolute paths, home directory paths, and directory traversal sequences. An agent can read any file on the system by outputting MEDIA:/path/to/file, exfiltrating sensitive data to the user/channel.

Details

Location: src/media/parse.ts:17-27

The path validation accepts dangerous patterns:

function isValidMedia(candidate: string, opts?: { allowSpaces?: boolean }) {
  if (candidate.startsWith("/")) return true;      // ALLOWS /etc/passwd
  if (candidate.startsWith("./")) return true;
  if (candidate.startsWith("../")) return true;    // ALLOWS ../../etc/passwd
  if (candidate.startsWith("~")) return true;      // ALLOWS ~/secrets
  return false;
}

No validation ensures the path is within a safe directory or is actually a media file.

PoC

Agent outputs any of:

MEDIA:/etc/passwd
MEDIA:~/.ssh/id_rsa
MEDIA:~/.aws/credentials
MEDIA:../../../etc/passwd

The file contents are rendered/sent to the requesting user or channel.

Impact

  • Read ANY file accessible to the agent user
  • Exfiltrate SSH keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa)
  • Steal cloud credentials (~/.aws/credentials)
  • Access API keys (.env, config.json)
  • Read system files (/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow)

Note: PR #4930 contains a fix but is NOT MERGED - production is vulnerable.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.1.30"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.1.30"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.4",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.11.4"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `isValidMedia()` function in `src/media/parse.ts` allows arbitrary file paths including absolute paths, home directory paths, and directory traversal sequences. An agent can read any file on the system by outputting `MEDIA:/path/to/file`, exfiltrating sensitive data to the user/channel.\n\n### Details\n**Location:** `src/media/parse.ts:17-27`\n\nThe path validation accepts dangerous patterns:\n\n```typescript\nfunction isValidMedia(candidate: string, opts?: { allowSpaces?: boolean }) {\n  if (candidate.startsWith(\"/\")) return true;      // ALLOWS /etc/passwd\n  if (candidate.startsWith(\"./\")) return true;\n  if (candidate.startsWith(\"../\")) return true;    // ALLOWS ../../etc/passwd\n  if (candidate.startsWith(\"~\")) return true;      // ALLOWS ~/secrets\n  return false;\n}\n```\n\nNo validation ensures the path is within a safe directory or is actually a media file.\n\n### PoC\n\nAgent outputs any of:\n```\nMEDIA:/etc/passwd\nMEDIA:~/.ssh/id_rsa\nMEDIA:~/.aws/credentials\nMEDIA:../../../etc/passwd\n```\n\nThe file contents are rendered/sent to the requesting user or channel.\n\n### Impact\n- Read ANY file accessible to the agent user\n- Exfiltrate SSH keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`)\n- Steal cloud credentials (`~/.aws/credentials`)\n- Access API keys (`.env`, `config.json`)\n- Read system files (`/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`)\n\n**Note:** PR #4930 contains a fix but is NOT MERGED - production is vulnerable.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-25475",
  "modified": "2026-11-17T09:11:56Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-r8g4-86fx-92mq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25475"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw Vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via MEDIA: Path Extraction",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-r8g4-86fx-92mq",
    "CVE-2026-25475"
  ]
}



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