Vulnerability-Lookup

BREW-NBDIME-CVE-2026-110856 (GHSA-M64X-33Q8-M5H7)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-28 09:23 – Updated: 2026-10-28 09:23 – Source website

Summary

GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines

Details

Summary

This is a residual of GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx / CVE-2026-87819. The 3.1.60 fix made Actor._from_string regex-free, but parse_actor_and_date still runs _re_actor_epoch on the same author/committer/tagger line one step earlier. That pattern backtracks quadratically when the trailing epoch or timezone is missing or malformed, so the same class of slow parse is still reachable in 3.1.62.

Details

git/objects/util.py:322:

_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")

.+? and (.*) can both absorb the same run of spaces, and the required (\d+) ([+-]\d+) tail is only checked after them. On a long line with no valid tail, the search retries every split point.

It is called from parse_actor_and_date (git/objects/util.py:335), which runs on the author and committer lines in Commit._deserialize (git/objects/commit.py:917, :931) and on the tagger line in git/objects/tag.py:129.

The published payload (letters plus an unterminated <) is fast on 3.1.62. Replacing the letters with spaces is not:

author line (after `author`)	2 KB	8 KB	32 KB
`'a'*n + ' <'` (advisory payload)	0.0 ms	0.1 ms	0.4 ms
`' '*n`	28 ms	453 ms	7,700 ms
valid line, long name (control)	0.0 ms	0.0 ms	0.0 ms

Cost grows about 16x for each 4x increase in length.

PoC

import time
from git.objects.util import parse_actor_and_date

line = "author " + " " * 32000
t = time.perf_counter()
parse_actor_and_date(line)
print(f"{time.perf_counter() - t:.1f} s")   # ~7 s on 3.1.62

End to end, reading Commit.author on a commit object whose author line is 32 KB of spaces followed by any malformed tail (no epoch, no timezone, non-numeric epoch, or bad timezone) takes about 7.2 s per access. The same line with a valid 1191999972 -0700 tail takes 1.3 ms.

Note for reproducing: git hash-object -t commit -w refuses such an object (missingEmail), so the test object was written with --literally. A remote can still serve one, because fetch.fsckObjects and transfer.fsckObjects default to false. This is the same delivery model as CVE-2026-87819 ("craft a commit object with a malformed author field").

Impact

CPU exhaustion (CWE-1333) in any application that uses GitPython to read commits or tags from an untrusted repository: CI tooling, repository scanners, code-hosting integrations. Each access to Commit.author, Commit.committer or TagObject.tagger on a crafted object costs seconds, and a repository can contain many such objects.

Suggested fix

Match the leading field name with .[^ ]* instead of .+?. Both stop at the first space after the first character, but .[^ ]* cannot overlap the following (.*), so the backtracking disappears:

_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*)$")

Verification on current main (73a72c9):

Differential over 368 actor lines (real-world shapes plus edge cases): 0 differences in match groups for either regex.
' '*n at 64 KB: 32,170 ms before, 0.98 ms after. Valid lines are unchanged (0.01 ms).
The existing test suite gives the same pass/fail set with and without the change
The new regression test, test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear, fails on the old pattern (8.4 s) and passes with the fix (0.5 s).

The full patch (fix plus regression test) is attached below.

diff --git a/git/objects/util.py b/git/objects/util.py
index a68d701f..d8c0594d 100644
--- a/git/objects/util.py
+++ b/git/objects/util.py
@@ -319,8 +319,11 @@ def parse_date(string_date: Union[str, datetime]) -> Tuple[int, int]:


 # Precompiled regexes
-_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
-_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*)$")
+# The leading field name ("author", "committer", "tagger") is matched with ``.[^ ]*`` rather than
+# ``.+?``: both stop at the first space after the first character, but ``.[^ ]*`` cannot overlap the
+# following ``(.*)``, so a line with no valid trailing epoch/offset no longer backtracks quadratically.
+_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
+_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*)$")


 def parse_actor_and_date(line: str) -> Tuple[Actor, int, int]:
diff --git a/test/test_util.py b/test/test_util.py
index cf4299d5..e1631420 100644
--- a/test/test_util.py
+++ b/test/test_util.py
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from git.cmd import dashify
 from git.objects.util import (
     altz_to_utctz_str,
     from_timestamp,
+    parse_actor_and_date,
     parse_date,
     tzoffset,
     utctz_to_altz,
@@ -571,6 +572,30 @@ class TestUtils(TestBase):
             Actor("name last another", "some-very-long-email@example.com"),
         )

+    def test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear(self):
+        # A long author line whose trailing epoch/offset is missing or malformed used to make
+        # _re_actor_epoch backtrack quadratically: ~7 s per Commit.author access for a 32 KB line.
+        # The parse result must be unchanged; only the time spent reaching it should move.
+        for tail in ("", " notanumber -0700", " 1191999972", " -0700", " 1191999972 xx"):
+            line = "author " + " " * 32000 + tail
+            start = time.perf_counter()
+            actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(line)
+            self.assertLess(time.perf_counter() - start, 1.0)
+            self.assertEqual(epoch, 0)
+            self.assertEqual(offset, 0)
+
+        # Well-formed lines, including one with a long name, still parse exactly as before.
+        actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(
+            "author Tom Preston-Werner <tom@mojombo.com> 1191999972 -0700"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(actor, Actor("Tom Preston-Werner", "tom@mojombo.com"))
+        self.assertEqual(epoch, 1191999972)
+        self.assertEqual(offset, 25200)
+
+        actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date("author " + "a " * 16000 + "<a@b> 1 -0700")
+        self.assertEqual(actor.email, "a@b")
+        self.assertEqual(epoch, 1)
+
     @ddt.data(
         ("name", ""),
         ("name", "prefix_"),

Found with AI assistance (Claude) and verified by hand.

Brian Willows

Severity

8.7 (High)


                    
                      CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython…	WEB
	https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython…	WEB
	https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython…	WEB
	https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython…	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "gitpython",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "nbdime",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/nbdime"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.4_9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.2.1",
        "name": "gitpython",
        "resource": "gitpython",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "3.2.1"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThis is a residual of GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx / CVE-2026-87819. The 3.1.60 fix made `Actor._from_string` regex-free, but `parse_actor_and_date` still runs `_re_actor_epoch` on the same author/committer/tagger line one step earlier. That pattern backtracks quadratically when the trailing epoch or timezone is missing or malformed, so the same class of slow parse is still reachable in 3.1.62.\n\n### Details\n\n`git/objects/util.py:322`:\n\n```python\n_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.+? (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n```\n\n`.+?` and `(.*)` can both absorb the same run of spaces, and the required ` (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+)` tail is only checked after them. On a long line with no valid tail, the search retries every split point.\n\nIt is called from `parse_actor_and_date` (`git/objects/util.py:335`), which runs on the author and committer lines in `Commit._deserialize` (`git/objects/commit.py:917`, `:931`) and on the tagger line in `git/objects/tag.py:129`.\n\nThe published payload (letters plus an unterminated `\u003c`) is fast on 3.1.62. Replacing the letters with spaces is not:\n\n| author line (after `author `) | 2 KB | 8 KB | 32 KB |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `\u0027a\u0027*n + \u0027 \u003c\u0027` (advisory payload) | 0.0 ms | 0.1 ms | 0.4 ms |\n| `\u0027 \u0027*n` | 28 ms | 453 ms | 7,700 ms |\n| valid line, long name (control) | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms |\n\nCost grows about 16x for each 4x increase in length.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\nimport time\nfrom git.objects.util import parse_actor_and_date\n\nline = \"author \" + \" \" * 32000\nt = time.perf_counter()\nparse_actor_and_date(line)\nprint(f\"{time.perf_counter() - t:.1f} s\")   # ~7 s on 3.1.62\n```\n\nEnd to end, reading `Commit.author` on a commit object whose author line is 32 KB of spaces followed by any malformed tail (no epoch, no timezone, non-numeric epoch, or bad timezone) takes about 7.2 s per access. The same line with a valid `1191999972 -0700` tail takes 1.3 ms.\n\nNote for reproducing: `git hash-object -t commit -w` refuses such an object (`missingEmail`), so the test object was written with `--literally`. A remote can still serve one, because `fetch.fsckObjects` and `transfer.fsckObjects` default to false. This is the same delivery model as CVE-2026-87819 (\"craft a commit object with a malformed author field\").\n\n### Impact\n\nCPU exhaustion (CWE-1333) in any application that uses GitPython to read commits or tags from an untrusted repository: CI tooling, repository scanners, code-hosting integrations. Each access to `Commit.author`, `Commit.committer` or `TagObject.tagger` on a crafted object costs seconds, and a repository can contain many such objects.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nMatch the leading field name with `.[^ ]*` instead of `.+?`. Both stop at the first space after the first character, but `.[^ ]*` cannot overlap the following `(.*)`, so the backtracking disappears:\n\n```python\n_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n_re_only_actor = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*)$\")\n```\n\nVerification on current main (73a72c9):\n\n- Differential over 368 actor lines (real-world shapes plus edge cases): 0 differences in match groups for either regex.\n- `\u0027 \u0027*n` at 64 KB: 32,170 ms before, 0.98 ms after. Valid lines are unchanged (0.01 ms).\n- The existing test suite gives the same pass/fail set with and without the change\n- The new regression test, `test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear`, fails on the old pattern (8.4 s) and passes with the fix (0.5 s).\n\nThe full patch (fix plus regression test) is attached below.\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/git/objects/util.py b/git/objects/util.py\nindex a68d701f..d8c0594d 100644\n--- a/git/objects/util.py\n+++ b/git/objects/util.py\n@@ -319,8 +319,11 @@ def parse_date(string_date: Union[str, datetime]) -\u003e Tuple[int, int]:\n \n \n # Precompiled regexes\n-_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.+? (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n-_re_only_actor = re.compile(r\"^.+? (.*)$\")\n+# The leading field name (\"author\", \"committer\", \"tagger\") is matched with ``.[^ ]*`` rather than\n+# ``.+?``: both stop at the first space after the first character, but ``.[^ ]*`` cannot overlap the\n+# following ``(.*)``, so a line with no valid trailing epoch/offset no longer backtracks quadratically.\n+_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n+_re_only_actor = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*)$\")\n \n \n def parse_actor_and_date(line: str) -\u003e Tuple[Actor, int, int]:\ndiff --git a/test/test_util.py b/test/test_util.py\nindex cf4299d5..e1631420 100644\n--- a/test/test_util.py\n+++ b/test/test_util.py\n@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from git.cmd import dashify\n from git.objects.util import (\n     altz_to_utctz_str,\n     from_timestamp,\n+    parse_actor_and_date,\n     parse_date,\n     tzoffset,\n     utctz_to_altz,\n@@ -571,6 +572,30 @@ class TestUtils(TestBase):\n             Actor(\"name last another\", \"some-very-long-email@example.com\"),\n         )\n \n+    def test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear(self):\n+        # A long author line whose trailing epoch/offset is missing or malformed used to make\n+        # _re_actor_epoch backtrack quadratically: ~7 s per Commit.author access for a 32 KB line.\n+        # The parse result must be unchanged; only the time spent reaching it should move.\n+        for tail in (\"\", \" notanumber -0700\", \" 1191999972\", \" -0700\", \" 1191999972 xx\"):\n+            line = \"author \" + \" \" * 32000 + tail\n+            start = time.perf_counter()\n+            actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(line)\n+            self.assertLess(time.perf_counter() - start, 1.0)\n+            self.assertEqual(epoch, 0)\n+            self.assertEqual(offset, 0)\n+\n+        # Well-formed lines, including one with a long name, still parse exactly as before.\n+        actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(\n+            \"author Tom Preston-Werner \u003ctom@mojombo.com\u003e 1191999972 -0700\"\n+        )\n+        self.assertEqual(actor, Actor(\"Tom Preston-Werner\", \"tom@mojombo.com\"))\n+        self.assertEqual(epoch, 1191999972)\n+        self.assertEqual(offset, 25200)\n+\n+        actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(\"author \" + \"a \" * 16000 + \"\u003ca@b\u003e 1 -0700\")\n+        self.assertEqual(actor.email, \"a@b\")\n+        self.assertEqual(epoch, 1)\n+\n     @ddt.data(\n         (\"name\", \"\"),\n         (\"name\", \"prefix_\"),\n```\n\nFound with AI assistance (Claude) and verified by hand.\n\nBrian Willows",
  "id": "BREW-nbdime-CVE-2026-110856",
  "modified": "2026-10-28T09:23:24Z",
  "published": "2026-10-28T09:23:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2253"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8290c98d35465a38090cdcc1b17be69967092a15"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7",
    "CVE-2026-110856"
  ]
}

CVE-2026-110856 (GCVE-0-2026-110856)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-14 22:52 – Updated: 2026-10-20 02:25

Title

GitPython before 3.2.0 ReDoS via _re_actor_epoch in parse_actor_and_date

Summary

GitPython before 3.2.0 contains a regular expression denial of service vulnerability in the _re_actor_epoch pattern used by parse_actor_and_date on author, committer, and tagger lines. Attackers can serve repositories with commit or tag objects containing long space-filled lines lacking a valid epoch or timezone, causing quadratic backtracking and CPU exhaustion.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-20 02:25 UTC

CWE

CWE-1333 - Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity

Assigner

VulnCheck CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 84/100 over 6966 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython…	vendor-advisory
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-be…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
gitpython-developers	GitPython	Affected: 0 , < 3.2.0 (semver) Unaffected: 3.2.0 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:gitpython_project:gitpython::::::::

Date Public

2026-09-30 00:00

Credits

BrianWillows

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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        }
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      "metrics": [
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            "baseScore": 8.7,
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    "datePublished": "2026-10-14T22:52:38.541Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-14T22:16:22.734Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-20T02:25:27.631Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GHSA-M64X-33Q8-M5H7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-27 15:26 – Updated: 2026-10-27 15:26

Summary

GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines

Details

Summary

Details

git/objects/util.py:322:

_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")

.+? and (.*) can both absorb the same run of spaces, and the required (\d+) ([+-]\d+) tail is only checked after them. On a long line with no valid tail, the search retries every split point.

The published payload (letters plus an unterminated <) is fast on 3.1.62. Replacing the letters with spaces is not:

author line (after `author`)	2 KB	8 KB	32 KB
`'a'*n + ' <'` (advisory payload)	0.0 ms	0.1 ms	0.4 ms
`' '*n`	28 ms	453 ms	7,700 ms
valid line, long name (control)	0.0 ms	0.0 ms	0.0 ms

Cost grows about 16x for each 4x increase in length.

PoC

import time
from git.objects.util import parse_actor_and_date

line = "author " + " " * 32000
t = time.perf_counter()
parse_actor_and_date(line)
print(f"{time.perf_counter() - t:.1f} s")   # ~7 s on 3.1.62

Impact

Suggested fix

Match the leading field name with .[^ ]* instead of .+?. Both stop at the first space after the first character, but .[^ ]* cannot overlap the following (.*), so the backtracking disappears:

_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*)$")

Verification on current main (73a72c9):

Differential over 368 actor lines (real-world shapes plus edge cases): 0 differences in match groups for either regex.
' '*n at 64 KB: 32,170 ms before, 0.98 ms after. Valid lines are unchanged (0.01 ms).
The existing test suite gives the same pass/fail set with and without the change
The new regression test, test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear, fails on the old pattern (8.4 s) and passes with the fix (0.5 s).

The full patch (fix plus regression test) is attached below.

diff --git a/git/objects/util.py b/git/objects/util.py
index a68d701f..d8c0594d 100644
--- a/git/objects/util.py
+++ b/git/objects/util.py
@@ -319,8 +319,11 @@ def parse_date(string_date: Union[str, datetime]) -> Tuple[int, int]:


 # Precompiled regexes
-_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
-_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.+? (.*)$")
+# The leading field name ("author", "committer", "tagger") is matched with ``.[^ ]*`` rather than
+# ``.+?``: both stop at the first space after the first character, but ``.[^ ]*`` cannot overlap the
+# following ``(.*)``, so a line with no valid trailing epoch/offset no longer backtracks quadratically.
+_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\d+) ([+-]\d+).*$")
+_re_only_actor = re.compile(r"^.[^ ]* (.*)$")


 def parse_actor_and_date(line: str) -> Tuple[Actor, int, int]:
diff --git a/test/test_util.py b/test/test_util.py
index cf4299d5..e1631420 100644
--- a/test/test_util.py
+++ b/test/test_util.py
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from git.cmd import dashify
 from git.objects.util import (
     altz_to_utctz_str,
     from_timestamp,
+    parse_actor_and_date,
     parse_date,
     tzoffset,
     utctz_to_altz,
@@ -571,6 +572,30 @@ class TestUtils(TestBase):
             Actor("name last another", "some-very-long-email@example.com"),
         )

+    def test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear(self):
+        # A long author line whose trailing epoch/offset is missing or malformed used to make
+        # _re_actor_epoch backtrack quadratically: ~7 s per Commit.author access for a 32 KB line.
+        # The parse result must be unchanged; only the time spent reaching it should move.
+        for tail in ("", " notanumber -0700", " 1191999972", " -0700", " 1191999972 xx"):
+            line = "author " + " " * 32000 + tail
+            start = time.perf_counter()
+            actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(line)
+            self.assertLess(time.perf_counter() - start, 1.0)
+            self.assertEqual(epoch, 0)
+            self.assertEqual(offset, 0)
+
+        # Well-formed lines, including one with a long name, still parse exactly as before.
+        actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(
+            "author Tom Preston-Werner <tom@mojombo.com> 1191999972 -0700"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(actor, Actor("Tom Preston-Werner", "tom@mojombo.com"))
+        self.assertEqual(epoch, 1191999972)
+        self.assertEqual(offset, 25200)
+
+        actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date("author " + "a " * 16000 + "<a@b> 1 -0700")
+        self.assertEqual(actor.email, "a@b")
+        self.assertEqual(epoch, 1)
+
     @ddt.data(
         ("name", ""),
         ("name", "prefix_"),

Found with AI assistance (Claude) and verified by hand.

Brian Willows

Severity

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.62"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "GitPython"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-27T15:26:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThis is a residual of GHSA-g5vv-9gxw-82hx / CVE-2026-87819. The 3.1.60 fix made `Actor._from_string` regex-free, but `parse_actor_and_date` still runs `_re_actor_epoch` on the same author/committer/tagger line one step earlier. That pattern backtracks quadratically when the trailing epoch or timezone is missing or malformed, so the same class of slow parse is still reachable in 3.1.62.\n\n### Details\n\n`git/objects/util.py:322`:\n\n```python\n_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.+? (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n```\n\n`.+?` and `(.*)` can both absorb the same run of spaces, and the required ` (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+)` tail is only checked after them. On a long line with no valid tail, the search retries every split point.\n\nIt is called from `parse_actor_and_date` (`git/objects/util.py:335`), which runs on the author and committer lines in `Commit._deserialize` (`git/objects/commit.py:917`, `:931`) and on the tagger line in `git/objects/tag.py:129`.\n\nThe published payload (letters plus an unterminated `\u003c`) is fast on 3.1.62. Replacing the letters with spaces is not:\n\n| author line (after `author `) | 2 KB | 8 KB | 32 KB |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `\u0027a\u0027*n + \u0027 \u003c\u0027` (advisory payload) | 0.0 ms | 0.1 ms | 0.4 ms |\n| `\u0027 \u0027*n` | 28 ms | 453 ms | 7,700 ms |\n| valid line, long name (control) | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms | 0.0 ms |\n\nCost grows about 16x for each 4x increase in length.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\nimport time\nfrom git.objects.util import parse_actor_and_date\n\nline = \"author \" + \" \" * 32000\nt = time.perf_counter()\nparse_actor_and_date(line)\nprint(f\"{time.perf_counter() - t:.1f} s\")   # ~7 s on 3.1.62\n```\n\nEnd to end, reading `Commit.author` on a commit object whose author line is 32 KB of spaces followed by any malformed tail (no epoch, no timezone, non-numeric epoch, or bad timezone) takes about 7.2 s per access. The same line with a valid `1191999972 -0700` tail takes 1.3 ms.\n\nNote for reproducing: `git hash-object -t commit -w` refuses such an object (`missingEmail`), so the test object was written with `--literally`. A remote can still serve one, because `fetch.fsckObjects` and `transfer.fsckObjects` default to false. This is the same delivery model as CVE-2026-87819 (\"craft a commit object with a malformed author field\").\n\n### Impact\n\nCPU exhaustion (CWE-1333) in any application that uses GitPython to read commits or tags from an untrusted repository: CI tooling, repository scanners, code-hosting integrations. Each access to `Commit.author`, `Commit.committer` or `TagObject.tagger` on a crafted object costs seconds, and a repository can contain many such objects.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nMatch the leading field name with `.[^ ]*` instead of `.+?`. Both stop at the first space after the first character, but `.[^ ]*` cannot overlap the following `(.*)`, so the backtracking disappears:\n\n```python\n_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n_re_only_actor = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*)$\")\n```\n\nVerification on current main (73a72c9):\n\n- Differential over 368 actor lines (real-world shapes plus edge cases): 0 differences in match groups for either regex.\n- `\u0027 \u0027*n` at 64 KB: 32,170 ms before, 0.98 ms after. Valid lines are unchanged (0.01 ms).\n- The existing test suite gives the same pass/fail set with and without the change\n- The new regression test, `test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear`, fails on the old pattern (8.4 s) and passes with the fix (0.5 s).\n\nThe full patch (fix plus regression test) is attached below.\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/git/objects/util.py b/git/objects/util.py\nindex a68d701f..d8c0594d 100644\n--- a/git/objects/util.py\n+++ b/git/objects/util.py\n@@ -319,8 +319,11 @@ def parse_date(string_date: Union[str, datetime]) -\u003e Tuple[int, int]:\n \n \n # Precompiled regexes\n-_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.+? (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n-_re_only_actor = re.compile(r\"^.+? (.*)$\")\n+# The leading field name (\"author\", \"committer\", \"tagger\") is matched with ``.[^ ]*`` rather than\n+# ``.+?``: both stop at the first space after the first character, but ``.[^ ]*`` cannot overlap the\n+# following ``(.*)``, so a line with no valid trailing epoch/offset no longer backtracks quadratically.\n+_re_actor_epoch = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*) (\\d+) ([+-]\\d+).*$\")\n+_re_only_actor = re.compile(r\"^.[^ ]* (.*)$\")\n \n \n def parse_actor_and_date(line: str) -\u003e Tuple[Actor, int, int]:\ndiff --git a/test/test_util.py b/test/test_util.py\nindex cf4299d5..e1631420 100644\n--- a/test/test_util.py\n+++ b/test/test_util.py\n@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from git.cmd import dashify\n from git.objects.util import (\n     altz_to_utctz_str,\n     from_timestamp,\n+    parse_actor_and_date,\n     parse_date,\n     tzoffset,\n     utctz_to_altz,\n@@ -571,6 +572,30 @@ class TestUtils(TestBase):\n             Actor(\"name last another\", \"some-very-long-email@example.com\"),\n         )\n \n+    def test_parse_actor_and_date_malformed_line_is_linear(self):\n+        # A long author line whose trailing epoch/offset is missing or malformed used to make\n+        # _re_actor_epoch backtrack quadratically: ~7 s per Commit.author access for a 32 KB line.\n+        # The parse result must be unchanged; only the time spent reaching it should move.\n+        for tail in (\"\", \" notanumber -0700\", \" 1191999972\", \" -0700\", \" 1191999972 xx\"):\n+            line = \"author \" + \" \" * 32000 + tail\n+            start = time.perf_counter()\n+            actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(line)\n+            self.assertLess(time.perf_counter() - start, 1.0)\n+            self.assertEqual(epoch, 0)\n+            self.assertEqual(offset, 0)\n+\n+        # Well-formed lines, including one with a long name, still parse exactly as before.\n+        actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(\n+            \"author Tom Preston-Werner \u003ctom@mojombo.com\u003e 1191999972 -0700\"\n+        )\n+        self.assertEqual(actor, Actor(\"Tom Preston-Werner\", \"tom@mojombo.com\"))\n+        self.assertEqual(epoch, 1191999972)\n+        self.assertEqual(offset, 25200)\n+\n+        actor, epoch, offset = parse_actor_and_date(\"author \" + \"a \" * 16000 + \"\u003ca@b\u003e 1 -0700\")\n+        self.assertEqual(actor.email, \"a@b\")\n+        self.assertEqual(epoch, 1)\n+\n     @ddt.data(\n         (\"name\", \"\"),\n         (\"name\", \"prefix_\"),\n```\n\nFound with AI assistance (Claude) and verified by hand.\n\nBrian Willows",
  "id": "GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7",
  "modified": "2026-10-27T15:26:25Z",
  "published": "2026-10-27T15:26:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2253"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8290c98d35465a38090cdcc1b17be69967092a15"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.2.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitPython parse_actor_and_date() is vulnerable to quadratic backtracking on malformed identity lines"
}

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BREW-NBDIME-CVE-2026-110856 (GHSA-M64X-33Q8-M5H7)

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CVE-2026-110856 (GCVE-0-2026-110856)

GHSA-M64X-33Q8-M5H7

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