BREW-JUPYTERLAB-CVE-2026-73626 (GHSA-WHVH-WF3X-G77J)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-14 09:11 – Updated: 2026-11-10 09:47 – Source websiteThe extension allowlist/blocklist check inside PyPIExtensionManager.install() was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: install() was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a RuntimeWarning: coroutine 'is_install_allowed' was never awaited.
This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following:
- a custom extension or downstream integration that imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling install());
- an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install;
- the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and
- kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension's install() call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check)
Impact
Low. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream integrations that called the public install() method directly and relied on it to self-enforce.
Patches
JupyterLab v4.6.2 and v4.5.10 contain the patch.
Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update jupyterlab package too.
Workarounds
No action is required for deployments that only expose extension management through the JupyterLab HTTP API / Extension Manager UI, as that path was already enforcing the listing via the handler's own check. Deployments wanting to disable programmatic extension installation entirely can switch to the read-only extension manager:
--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly
or the following traitlet:
c.LabApp.extension_manager = 'readonly'
You can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "4.6.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "jupyterlab",
"purl": "pkg:brew/jupyterlab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/jupyterlab@4.6.6",
"name": "jupyterlab",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "4.6.6"
},
{
"ecosystem": "Debian",
"key": "Debian/jupyterlab",
"name": "jupyterlab",
"strategy": "distro"
},
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "upstream:pkg:pypi/jupyterlab@4.6.6",
"name": "jupyterlab",
"strategy": "distro",
"subject_version": "4.6.6"
},
{
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu",
"key": "Ubuntu/jupyterlab",
"name": "jupyterlab",
"strategy": "distro"
}
]
},
"details": "The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: `install()` was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a `RuntimeWarning: coroutine \u0027is_install_allowed\u0027 was never awaited.`\n\nThis has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following:\n- a custom extension or downstream integration that imports `PyPIExtensionManager` and calls `install()` directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling `install()`);\n- an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install;\n- the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and\n- kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension\u0027s `install()` call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check)\n\n### Impact\n\nLow. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream integrations that called the public `install()` method directly and relied on it to self-enforce.\n\n### Patches\n\nJupyterLab [`v4.6.2`](https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.6.2) and [`v4.5.10`](https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.5.10) contain the patch.\n\nUsers of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update `jupyterlab` package too.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo action is required for deployments that only expose extension management through the JupyterLab HTTP API / Extension Manager UI, as that path was already enforcing the listing via the handler\u0027s own check. Deployments wanting to disable programmatic extension installation entirely can switch to the read-only extension manager:\n\n```bash\n--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly\n```\n\nor the following traitlet:\n\n```python\nc.LabApp.extension_manager = \u0027readonly\u0027\n```\n\nYou can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"293\" height=\"293\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8016c809-633e-4ed0-a5bc-6bc4793caa0f\" /\u003e",
"id": "BREW-jupyterlab-CVE-2026-73626",
"modified": "2026-11-10T09:47:39Z",
"published": "2026-08-14T09:11:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/security/advisories/GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/pull/19184"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/pull/19185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/pull/19186"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/be9303f5bcd5308eaeae953c5a3c903046682c2c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/f1beab4a2027af4719d6edc07d52d6cf5a39a432"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.5.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.6.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "JupyterLab: Allowlist/blocklist check in `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` not enforced for direct callers (missing `await`)",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j",
"BIT-jupyterlab-2026-73626",
"CVE-2026-73626"
]
}
bit-jupyterlab-2026-73626
Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
JupyterLab versions >=4.6.0,<=4.6.1 and <=4.5.9 contain an allowlist/blocklist enforcement gap in PyPIExtensionManager.install(). A missing 'await' caused the is_install_allowed coroutine to never execute, so the extension allowlist/blocklist check was not enforced for direct callers of install(). The stock JupyterLab HTTP API and Extension Manager UI are not affected, as they perform a separate, correctly awaited check. The issue affects only deployments where a custom extension or downstream integration imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted input, an allowlist/blocklist is configured, the PyPI Extension Manager is enabled, and kernels and terminals are disabled or delegated to remote hosts. Fixed in JupyterLab 4.6.2 and 4.5.10.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Bitnami",
"name": "jupyterlab",
"purl": "pkg:bitnami/jupyterlab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.10"
},
{
"introduced": "4.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.2"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73626"
],
"database_specific": {
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:jupyter:jupyterlab:*:*:*:*:*:python:*:*"
],
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "JupyterLab versions \u003e=4.6.0,\u003c=4.6.1 and \u003c=4.5.9 contain an allowlist/blocklist enforcement gap in PyPIExtensionManager.install(). A missing \u0027await\u0027 caused the is_install_allowed coroutine to never execute, so the extension allowlist/blocklist check was not enforced for direct callers of install(). The stock JupyterLab HTTP API and Extension Manager UI are not affected, as they perform a separate, correctly awaited check. The issue affects only deployments where a custom extension or downstream integration imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted input, an allowlist/blocklist is configured, the PyPI Extension Manager is enabled, and kernels and terminals are disabled or delegated to remote hosts. Fixed in JupyterLab 4.6.2 and 4.5.10.",
"id": "BIT-jupyterlab-2026-73626",
"modified": "2026-09-25T12:52:12.177Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:23:14.880Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/security/advisories/GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73626"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/jupyterlab-before-authentication-bypass-via-pypiextensionmanager"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.6.2",
"summary": "JupyterLab before 4.6.2 Authentication Bypass via PyPIExtensionManager"
}
CVE-2026-73626 (GCVE-0-2026-73626)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-13 11:28 – Updated: 2026-08-28 13:45- CWE-284 - Improper Access Control
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/security… | vendor-advisory |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/jupyterlab-b… | third-party-advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| jupyterlab | jupyterlab |
Affected:
4.6.0 , < 4.6.1
(semver)
Unaffected: 4.6.1 (semver) |
|
| jupyterlab | jupyterlab |
Affected:
0 , < 4.5.10
(semver)
Unaffected: 4.5.10 (semver) |
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GHSA-WHVH-WF3X-G77J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 23:12 – Updated: 2026-07-22 23:12The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside PyPIExtensionManager.install() was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: install() was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a RuntimeWarning: coroutine 'is_install_allowed' was never awaited.
This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following:
- a custom extension or downstream integration that imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling install());
- an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install;
- the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and
- kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension's install() call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check)
Impact
Low. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream integrations that called the public install() method directly and relied on it to self-enforce.
Patches
JupyterLab v4.6.2 and v4.5.10 contain the patch.
Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update jupyterlab package too.
Workarounds
No action is required for deployments that only expose extension management through the JupyterLab HTTP API / Extension Manager UI, as that path was already enforcing the listing via the handler's own check. Deployments wanting to disable programmatic extension installation entirely can switch to the read-only extension manager:
--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly
or the following traitlet:
c.LabApp.extension_manager = 'readonly'
You can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "jupyterlab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "jupyterlab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-636"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T23:12:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: `install()` was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a `RuntimeWarning: coroutine \u0027is_install_allowed\u0027 was never awaited.`\n\nThis has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following:\n- a custom extension or downstream integration that imports `PyPIExtensionManager` and calls `install()` directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling `install()`);\n- an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install;\n- the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and\n- kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension\u0027s `install()` call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check)\n\n### Impact\n\nLow. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream integrations that called the public `install()` method directly and relied on it to self-enforce.\n\n### Patches\n\nJupyterLab [`v4.6.2`](https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.6.2) and [`v4.5.10`](https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.5.10) contain the patch.\n\nUsers of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update `jupyterlab` package too.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo action is required for deployments that only expose extension management through the JupyterLab HTTP API / Extension Manager UI, as that path was already enforcing the listing via the handler\u0027s own check. Deployments wanting to disable programmatic extension installation entirely can switch to the read-only extension manager:\n\n```bash\n--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly\n```\n\nor the following traitlet:\n\n```python\nc.LabApp.extension_manager = \u0027readonly\u0027\n```\n\nYou can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"293\" height=\"293\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8016c809-633e-4ed0-a5bc-6bc4793caa0f\" /\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j",
"modified": "2026-07-22T23:12:22Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T23:12:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/security/advisories/GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/pull/19184"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/pull/19185"
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"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/pull/19186"
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/be9303f5bcd5308eaeae953c5a3c903046682c2c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/f1beab4a2027af4719d6edc07d52d6cf5a39a432"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.5.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.6.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "JupyterLab: Allowlist/blocklist check in `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` not enforced for direct callers (missing `await`)"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.