https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 05:43:04 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bit-jupyterlab-2026-73626 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Bitnami: jupyterlab</p> <p>JupyterLab versions &gt;=4.6.0,&lt;=4.6.1 and &lt;=4.5.9 contain an allowlist/blocklist enforcement gap in PyPIExtensionManager.install(). A missing &#39;await&#39; caused the is_install_allowed coroutine to never execute, so the extension allowlist/blocklist check was not enforced for direct callers of install(). The stock JupyterLab HTTP API and Extension Manager UI are not affected, as they perform a separate, correctly awaited check. The issue affects only deployments where a custom extension or downstream integration imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted input, an allowlist/blocklist is configured, the PyPI Extension Manager is enabled, and kernels and terminals are disabled or delegated to remote hosts. Fixed in JupyterLab 4.6.2 and 4.5.10.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Bitnami: jupyterlab</p> <p>JupyterLab versions &gt;=4.6.0,&lt;=4.6.1 and &lt;=4.5.9 contain an allowlist/blocklist enforcement gap in PyPIExtensionManager.install(). A missing &#39;await&#39; caused the is_install_allowed coroutine to never execute, so the extension allowlist/blocklist check was not enforced for direct callers of install(). The stock JupyterLab HTTP API and Extension Manager UI are not affected, as they perform a separate, correctly awaited check. The issue affects only deployments where a custom extension or downstream integration imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted input, an allowlist/blocklist is configured, the PyPI Extension Manager is enabled, and kernels and terminals are disabled or delegated to remote hosts. Fixed in JupyterLab 4.6.2 and 4.5.10.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bit-jupyterlab-2026-73626 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-73626 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> jupyterlab</p> <p>JupyterLab versions &gt;=4.6.0,&lt;=4.6.1 and &lt;=4.5.9 contain an allowlist/blocklist enforcement gap in PyPIExtensionManager.install(). A missing &#39;await&#39; caused the is_install_allowed coroutine to never execute, so the extension allowlist/blocklist check was not enforced for direct callers of install(). The stock JupyterLab HTTP API and Extension Manager UI are not affected, as they perform a separate, correctly awaited check. The issue affects only deployments where a custom extension or downstream integration imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted input, an allowlist/blocklist is configured, the PyPI Extension Manager is enabled, and kernels and terminals are disabled or delegated to remote hosts. Fixed in JupyterLab 4.6.2 and 4.5.10.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> jupyterlab</p> <p>JupyterLab versions &gt;=4.6.0,&lt;=4.6.1 and &lt;=4.5.9 contain an allowlist/blocklist enforcement gap in PyPIExtensionManager.install(). A missing &#39;await&#39; caused the is_install_allowed coroutine to never execute, so the extension allowlist/blocklist check was not enforced for direct callers of install(). The stock JupyterLab HTTP API and Extension Manager UI are not affected, as they perform a separate, correctly awaited check. The issue affects only deployments where a custom extension or downstream integration imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted input, an allowlist/blocklist is configured, the PyPI Extension Manager is enabled, and kernels and terminals are disabled or delegated to remote hosts. Fixed in JupyterLab 4.6.2 and 4.5.10.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-73626 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-whvh-wf3x-g77j <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: jupyterlab</p> <p>The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: `install()` was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a `RuntimeWarning: coroutine &#39;is_install_allowed&#39; was never awaited.`</p> <p>This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following: - a custom extension or downstream integration that imports `PyPIExtensionManager` and calls `install()` directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling `install()`); - an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install; - the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and - kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension&#39;s `install()` call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check)</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Low. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream i…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: jupyterlab</p> <p>The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: `install()` was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a `RuntimeWarning: coroutine &#39;is_install_allowed&#39; was never awaited.`</p> <p>This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following: - a custom extension or downstream integration that imports `PyPIExtensionManager` and calls `install()` directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling `install()`); - an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install; - the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and - kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension&#39;s `install()` call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check)</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Low. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream i…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-whvh-wf3x-g77j