Vulnerability-Lookup

BREW-GITUP-CVE-2026-100689 (GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-01 08:53 – Updated: 2026-10-02 08:53 – Source website

Summary

GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository

Details

Affected: GitPython 3.1.61 (latest release) and main — git/objects/submodule/base.py. git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty, so both are identical here.

The gap

The fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc added Submodule._validated_name() and wired it into update() and five siblings, closing the .gitmodules name → .git/modules/<name> traversal. The other attacker-controlled .gitmodules field, path, is read raw:

# git/objects/submodule/base.py:172-177
def _set_cache_(self, attr):
    if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
        reader = self.config_reader()
        self.path = reader.get("path")          # raw .gitmodules value

and GitPython's own containment guard is applied in only two of the places that consume it:

400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo, path)      # the guard (abspath + commonpath containment)
542:     path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)        # add()   — guarded
1041:    module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)   # move() — guarded

update() validates only the name and then uses the path-derived absolute location directly:

788:  self._validated_name(self.name)                    # NAME only
801:  checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath             # derived from self.path — unguarded
821:  os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)

So path = ../../../tmp/escaped in an attacker-authored .gitmodules selects the directory that gets created and, on the clone path, populated from the submodule URL. The same absolute location is what force_remove hands to shutil.rmtree.

The asymmetry is the argument: this is not a missing concept — the project wrote _to_relative_path() precisely for this, and add()/move() use it. update() does not.

Honest limits (please read before rating)

The most common flow is not affected. Repo.clone_from(...) → repo.submodules → sm.update(init=True) re-derives path from a canonical tree lookup, and real git refuses to check out a tree containing a .. component, so an evil .gitmodules never lands in the working tree in the first place. A reachable trigger therefore requires the victim's code to name a non-HEAD commit (a historical-commit API such as submodule_update(previous_commit=...)).
The researcher did not build that end-to-end trigger. The researcher only verified first-hand the code above: the guard's two call sites, the name-only validation in update(), and the unguarded abspath → os.makedirs() flow at 3.1.61 == main.

Suggested fix

Apply the guard the project already has, wherever the path is consumed:

# in update(), before deriving abspath (and in any other consumer of self.path):
checkout_rel = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, self.path)   # raises if it escapes the working tree

Better still, validate at the boundary: reject a .gitmodules entry whose path is absolute or contains a .. component when the section is first read in _set_cache_()/iter_items(), so no consumer can be added later without the check. A regression test with path = ../escaped alongside the existing name test would pin both fields.

Prior art checked

GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc (this is a residual of its fix, in the sibling field, not a re-report) plus the repository's 30 published advisories — none mentions the path field or _to_relative_path. Searched issues and PRs for _to_relative_path, gitmodules path and submodule traversal: no report of this.

Credit

kta1kri.

Appendix — `EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt` (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)

=== EVIDENCE: GitPython — the .gitmodules 'path' field reaches os.makedirs()/clone unguarded ===
Mon Aug 31 18:45:22 UTC 2026

--- artifact: tag 3.1.61 (latest release); git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty ---

--- the containment guard GitPython owns, and its only two call sites ---
33:    _to_relative_path,
400:    def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo: "Repo", path: PathLike) -> PathLike:
407:            path = _to_relative_path(parent_repo.working_tree_dir, path)
542:        path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)
1041:        module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)

--- the parent fix (_validated_name) call sites: it validates the NAME ---
309:    def _validated_name(cls, name: str) -> str:
321:        name = cls._validated_name(name)
541:        cls._validated_name(name)
788:            self._validated_name(self.name)
1040:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1181:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1439:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1440:        self._validated_name(new_name)
1489:        self._validated_name(self.name)

--- update(): name validated, path not; abspath -> os.makedirs ---

        try:
            self._validated_name(self.name)

            # ENSURE REPO IS PRESENT AND UP-TO-DATE
                # END early abort if init is not allowed

                checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath
                module_abspath = self._module_abspath(self.repo, self.path, self.name)

                # ``git submodule deinit`` leaves the repository in
                # ``.git/modules`` and empties the checkout. Reconnect that retained
                # repository instead of trying to clone over it.
                if not dry_run and osp.isdir(module_abspath):
                    try:
                        git.Repo(module_abspath)
                    except InvalidGitRepositoryError:
                        pass
                    else:
                        if osp.lexists(checkout_module_abspath) and (
                            osp.islink(checkout_module_abspath)
                            or not osp.isdir(checkout_module_abspath)
                            or os.listdir(checkout_module_abspath)
                        ):
                            raise OSError(
                                "Module directory at %r does already exist and is non-empty" % checkout_module_abspath
                            )
                        os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)
                        self._write_git_file_and_module_config(checkout_module_abspath, module_abspath)
                        mrepo = git.Repo(checkout_module_abspath)

--- where self.path comes from (raw .gitmodules value) ---
    def _set_cache_(self, attr: str) -> None:
        if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
            reader: SectionConstraint = self.config_reader()
            # Default submodule values.
            try:
                self.path = reader.get("path")
            except cp.NoSectionError as e:

Severity

6.1 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython…	WEB
	https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython…	WEB
	https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython…	WEB
	https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython…	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "gitpython",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "3.1.62"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "gitup",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/gitup"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.2.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.2_8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/gitpython@3.1.62",
        "name": "gitpython",
        "resource": "gitpython",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "3.1.62"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "**Affected:** `GitPython` **3.1.61** (latest release) and `main` \u2014 `git/objects/submodule/base.py`. `git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/` is empty, so both are identical here.\n\n---\n\n## The gap\n\nThe fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` added `Submodule._validated_name()` and wired it into `update()` and five siblings, closing the `.gitmodules` **name** \u2192 `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` traversal. The other attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` field, **`path`**, is read raw:\n\n```python\n# git/objects/submodule/base.py:172-177\ndef _set_cache_(self, attr):\n    if attr in (\"path\", \"_url\", \"_branch_path\"):\n        reader = self.config_reader()\n        self.path = reader.get(\"path\")          # raw .gitmodules value\n```\n\nand GitPython\u0027s own containment guard is applied in only two of the places that consume it:\n\n```\n400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo, path)      # the guard (abspath + commonpath containment)\n542:     path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)        # add()   \u2014 guarded\n1041:    module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)   # move() \u2014 guarded\n```\n\n`update()` validates only the name and then uses the path-derived absolute location directly:\n\n```\n788:  self._validated_name(self.name)                    # NAME only\n801:  checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath             # derived from self.path \u2014 unguarded\n821:  os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)\n```\n\nSo `path = ../../../tmp/escaped` in an attacker-authored `.gitmodules` selects the directory that gets created and, on the clone path, populated from the submodule URL. The same absolute location is what `force_remove` hands to `shutil.rmtree`.\n\nThe asymmetry is the argument: this is not a missing concept \u2014 the project wrote `_to_relative_path()` precisely for this, and `add()`/`move()` use it. `update()` does not.\n\n## Honest limits (please read before rating)\n\n- **The most common flow is not affected.** `Repo.clone_from(...)` \u2192 `repo.submodules` \u2192 `sm.update(init=True)` re-derives `path` from a canonical tree lookup, and real git refuses to check out a tree containing a `..` component, so an evil `.gitmodules` never lands in the working tree in the first place. A reachable trigger therefore requires the victim\u0027s code to name a **non-HEAD commit** (a historical-commit API such as `submodule_update(previous_commit=...)`).\n- **The researcher did not build that end-to-end trigger.** The researcher only verified first-hand the code above: the guard\u0027s two call sites, the name-only validation in `update()`, and the unguarded `abspath` \u2192 `os.makedirs()` flow at 3.1.61 == `main`.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nApply the guard the project already has, wherever the path is consumed:\n\n```python\n# in update(), before deriving abspath (and in any other consumer of self.path):\ncheckout_rel = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, self.path)   # raises if it escapes the working tree\n```\n\nBetter still, validate at the boundary: reject a `.gitmodules` entry whose `path` is absolute or contains a `..` component when the section is first read in `_set_cache_()`/`iter_items()`, so no consumer can be added later without the check. A regression test with `path = ../escaped` alongside the existing `name` test would pin both fields.\n\n## Prior art checked\n\n`GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` (this is a residual of its fix, in the sibling field, not a re-report) plus the repository\u0027s 30 published advisories \u2014 none mentions the `path` field or `_to_relative_path`. Searched issues and PRs for `_to_relative_path`, `gitmodules path` and `submodule traversal`: no report of this.\n\n## Credit\n\n**kta1kri**.\n\n\n---\n\n## Appendix \u2014 `EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt` (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)\n\n```text\n=== EVIDENCE: GitPython \u2014 the .gitmodules \u0027path\u0027 field reaches os.makedirs()/clone unguarded ===\nMon Aug 31 18:45:22 UTC 2026\n\n--- artifact: tag 3.1.61 (latest release); git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty ---\n\n--- the containment guard GitPython owns, and its only two call sites ---\n33:    _to_relative_path,\n400:    def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo: \"Repo\", path: PathLike) -\u003e PathLike:\n407:            path = _to_relative_path(parent_repo.working_tree_dir, path)\n542:        path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)\n1041:        module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)\n\n--- the parent fix (_validated_name) call sites: it validates the NAME ---\n309:    def _validated_name(cls, name: str) -\u003e str:\n321:        name = cls._validated_name(name)\n541:        cls._validated_name(name)\n788:            self._validated_name(self.name)\n1040:        self._validated_name(self.name)\n1181:        self._validated_name(self.name)\n1439:        self._validated_name(self.name)\n1440:        self._validated_name(new_name)\n1489:        self._validated_name(self.name)\n\n--- update(): name validated, path not; abspath -\u003e os.makedirs ---\n\n        try:\n            self._validated_name(self.name)\n\n            # ENSURE REPO IS PRESENT AND UP-TO-DATE\n                # END early abort if init is not allowed\n\n                checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath\n                module_abspath = self._module_abspath(self.repo, self.path, self.name)\n\n                # ``git submodule deinit`` leaves the repository in\n                # ``.git/modules`` and empties the checkout. Reconnect that retained\n                # repository instead of trying to clone over it.\n                if not dry_run and osp.isdir(module_abspath):\n                    try:\n                        git.Repo(module_abspath)\n                    except InvalidGitRepositoryError:\n                        pass\n                    else:\n                        if osp.lexists(checkout_module_abspath) and (\n                            osp.islink(checkout_module_abspath)\n                            or not osp.isdir(checkout_module_abspath)\n                            or os.listdir(checkout_module_abspath)\n                        ):\n                            raise OSError(\n                                \"Module directory at %r does already exist and is non-empty\" % checkout_module_abspath\n                            )\n                        os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)\n                        self._write_git_file_and_module_config(checkout_module_abspath, module_abspath)\n                        mrepo = git.Repo(checkout_module_abspath)\n\n--- where self.path comes from (raw .gitmodules value) ---\n    def _set_cache_(self, attr: str) -\u003e None:\n        if attr in (\"path\", \"_url\", \"_branch_path\"):\n            reader: SectionConstraint = self.config_reader()\n            # Default submodule values.\n            try:\n                self.path = reader.get(\"path\")\n            except cp.NoSectionError as e:\n```",
  "id": "BREW-gitup-CVE-2026-100689",
  "modified": "2026-10-02T08:53:00Z",
  "published": "2026-10-01T08:53:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1ed0ebc2f2e74d979cdc367a4864a7731fdcc093"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.62"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w",
    "CVE-2026-100689"
  ]
}

CVE-2026-100689 (GCVE-0-2026-100689)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-26 13:23 – Updated: 2026-09-30 17:41

Title

GitPython before 3.1.62 Path Traversal via gitmodules path

Summary

GitPython before 3.1.62 does not validate the `path` field read from an untrusted .gitmodules file when updating submodules. While a prior fix (GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) added Submodule._validated_name() to constrain the `name` field, and GitPython's own containment guard Submodule._to_relative_path() is applied in add() and move(), Submodule.update() derives the absolute checkout location from the raw `path` value without that guard. A .gitmodules entry containing directory traversal components (e.g., path = ../../../tmp/escaped) can therefore cause directories to be created via os.makedirs() outside the repository working tree, populated from the submodule URL on the clone path, and removed via shutil.rmtree() when force_remove is used. Exploitation requires an application flow that updates submodules at a non-HEAD commit (such as a historical-commit API); the common clone-then-update flow re-derives the path from a canonical tree lookup and is not affected. The issue is fixed in GitPython 3.1.62.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

5.9 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-30 17:41 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

VulnCheck mitre root Scorecard

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython…	vendor-advisory
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-be…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
gitpython-developers	GitPython	Affected: 0 , < 3.1.62 (semver) Unaffected: 3.1.62 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:gitpython_project:gitpython::::::::

Date Public

2026-09-07 00:00

Credits

kta1kri

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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    "dateReserved": "2026-09-26T02:37:41.037Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-30T17:41:12.280Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 23:47 – Updated: 2026-09-30 23:47

Summary

GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository

Details

Affected: GitPython 3.1.61 (latest release) and main — git/objects/submodule/base.py. git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty, so both are identical here.

The gap

# git/objects/submodule/base.py:172-177
def _set_cache_(self, attr):
    if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
        reader = self.config_reader()
        self.path = reader.get("path")          # raw .gitmodules value

and GitPython's own containment guard is applied in only two of the places that consume it:

400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo, path)      # the guard (abspath + commonpath containment)
542:     path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)        # add()   — guarded
1041:    module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)   # move() — guarded

update() validates only the name and then uses the path-derived absolute location directly:

788:  self._validated_name(self.name)                    # NAME only
801:  checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath             # derived from self.path — unguarded
821:  os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)

The asymmetry is the argument: this is not a missing concept — the project wrote _to_relative_path() precisely for this, and add()/move() use it. update() does not.

Honest limits (please read before rating)

The most common flow is not affected. Repo.clone_from(...) → repo.submodules → sm.update(init=True) re-derives path from a canonical tree lookup, and real git refuses to check out a tree containing a .. component, so an evil .gitmodules never lands in the working tree in the first place. A reachable trigger therefore requires the victim's code to name a non-HEAD commit (a historical-commit API such as submodule_update(previous_commit=...)).
The researcher did not build that end-to-end trigger. The researcher only verified first-hand the code above: the guard's two call sites, the name-only validation in update(), and the unguarded abspath → os.makedirs() flow at 3.1.61 == main.

Suggested fix

Apply the guard the project already has, wherever the path is consumed:

# in update(), before deriving abspath (and in any other consumer of self.path):
checkout_rel = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, self.path)   # raises if it escapes the working tree

Prior art checked

Credit

kta1kri.

Appendix — `EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt` (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)

=== EVIDENCE: GitPython — the .gitmodules 'path' field reaches os.makedirs()/clone unguarded ===
Mon Aug 31 18:45:22 UTC 2026

--- artifact: tag 3.1.61 (latest release); git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty ---

--- the containment guard GitPython owns, and its only two call sites ---
33:    _to_relative_path,
400:    def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo: "Repo", path: PathLike) -> PathLike:
407:            path = _to_relative_path(parent_repo.working_tree_dir, path)
542:        path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)
1041:        module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)

--- the parent fix (_validated_name) call sites: it validates the NAME ---
309:    def _validated_name(cls, name: str) -> str:
321:        name = cls._validated_name(name)
541:        cls._validated_name(name)
788:            self._validated_name(self.name)
1040:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1181:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1439:        self._validated_name(self.name)
1440:        self._validated_name(new_name)
1489:        self._validated_name(self.name)

--- update(): name validated, path not; abspath -> os.makedirs ---

        try:
            self._validated_name(self.name)

            # ENSURE REPO IS PRESENT AND UP-TO-DATE
                # END early abort if init is not allowed

                checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath
                module_abspath = self._module_abspath(self.repo, self.path, self.name)

                # ``git submodule deinit`` leaves the repository in
                # ``.git/modules`` and empties the checkout. Reconnect that retained
                # repository instead of trying to clone over it.
                if not dry_run and osp.isdir(module_abspath):
                    try:
                        git.Repo(module_abspath)
                    except InvalidGitRepositoryError:
                        pass
                    else:
                        if osp.lexists(checkout_module_abspath) and (
                            osp.islink(checkout_module_abspath)
                            or not osp.isdir(checkout_module_abspath)
                            or os.listdir(checkout_module_abspath)
                        ):
                            raise OSError(
                                "Module directory at %r does already exist and is non-empty" % checkout_module_abspath
                            )
                        os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)
                        self._write_git_file_and_module_config(checkout_module_abspath, module_abspath)
                        mrepo = git.Repo(checkout_module_abspath)

--- where self.path comes from (raw .gitmodules value) ---
    def _set_cache_(self, attr: str) -> None:
        if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
            reader: SectionConstraint = self.config_reader()
            # Default submodule values.
            try:
                self.path = reader.get("path")
            except cp.NoSectionError as e:

Severity

6.1 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.61"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "GitPython"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.62"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T23:47:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**Affected:** `GitPython` **3.1.61** (latest release) and `main` \u2014 `git/objects/submodule/base.py`. `git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/` is empty, so both are identical here.\n\n---\n\n## The gap\n\nThe fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` added `Submodule._validated_name()` and wired it into `update()` and five siblings, closing the `.gitmodules` **name** \u2192 `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` traversal. The other attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` field, **`path`**, is read raw:\n\n```python\n# git/objects/submodule/base.py:172-177\ndef _set_cache_(self, attr):\n    if attr in (\"path\", \"_url\", \"_branch_path\"):\n        reader = self.config_reader()\n        self.path = reader.get(\"path\")          # raw .gitmodules value\n```\n\nand GitPython\u0027s own containment guard is applied in only two of the places that consume it:\n\n```\n400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo, path)      # the guard (abspath + commonpath containment)\n542:     path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)        # add()   \u2014 guarded\n1041:    module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)   # move() \u2014 guarded\n```\n\n`update()` validates only the name and then uses the path-derived absolute location directly:\n\n```\n788:  self._validated_name(self.name)                    # NAME only\n801:  checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath             # derived from self.path \u2014 unguarded\n821:  os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)\n```\n\nSo `path = ../../../tmp/escaped` in an attacker-authored `.gitmodules` selects the directory that gets created and, on the clone path, populated from the submodule URL. The same absolute location is what `force_remove` hands to `shutil.rmtree`.\n\nThe asymmetry is the argument: this is not a missing concept \u2014 the project wrote `_to_relative_path()` precisely for this, and `add()`/`move()` use it. `update()` does not.\n\n## Honest limits (please read before rating)\n\n- **The most common flow is not affected.** `Repo.clone_from(...)` \u2192 `repo.submodules` \u2192 `sm.update(init=True)` re-derives `path` from a canonical tree lookup, and real git refuses to check out a tree containing a `..` component, so an evil `.gitmodules` never lands in the working tree in the first place. A reachable trigger therefore requires the victim\u0027s code to name a **non-HEAD commit** (a historical-commit API such as `submodule_update(previous_commit=...)`).\n- **The researcher did not build that end-to-end trigger.** The researcher only verified first-hand the code above: the guard\u0027s two call sites, the name-only validation in `update()`, and the unguarded `abspath` \u2192 `os.makedirs()` flow at 3.1.61 == `main`.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nApply the guard the project already has, wherever the path is consumed:\n\n```python\n# in update(), before deriving abspath (and in any other consumer of self.path):\ncheckout_rel = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, self.path)   # raises if it escapes the working tree\n```\n\nBetter still, validate at the boundary: reject a `.gitmodules` entry whose `path` is absolute or contains a `..` component when the section is first read in `_set_cache_()`/`iter_items()`, so no consumer can be added later without the check. A regression test with `path = ../escaped` alongside the existing `name` test would pin both fields.\n\n## Prior art checked\n\n`GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` (this is a residual of its fix, in the sibling field, not a re-report) plus the repository\u0027s 30 published advisories \u2014 none mentions the `path` field or `_to_relative_path`. Searched issues and PRs for `_to_relative_path`, `gitmodules path` and `submodule traversal`: no report of this.\n\n## Credit\n\n**kta1kri**.\n\n\n---\n\n## Appendix \u2014 `EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt` (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)\n\n```text\n=== EVIDENCE: GitPython \u2014 the .gitmodules \u0027path\u0027 field reaches os.makedirs()/clone unguarded ===\nMon Aug 31 18:45:22 UTC 2026\n\n--- artifact: tag 3.1.61 (latest release); git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty ---\n\n--- the containment guard GitPython owns, and its only two call sites ---\n33:    _to_relative_path,\n400:    def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo: \"Repo\", path: PathLike) -\u003e PathLike:\n407:            path = _to_relative_path(parent_repo.working_tree_dir, path)\n542:        path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)\n1041:        module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)\n\n--- the parent fix (_validated_name) call sites: it validates the NAME ---\n309:    def _validated_name(cls, name: str) -\u003e str:\n321:        name = cls._validated_name(name)\n541:        cls._validated_name(name)\n788:            self._validated_name(self.name)\n1040:        self._validated_name(self.name)\n1181:        self._validated_name(self.name)\n1439:        self._validated_name(self.name)\n1440:        self._validated_name(new_name)\n1489:        self._validated_name(self.name)\n\n--- update(): name validated, path not; abspath -\u003e os.makedirs ---\n\n        try:\n            self._validated_name(self.name)\n\n            # ENSURE REPO IS PRESENT AND UP-TO-DATE\n                # END early abort if init is not allowed\n\n                checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath\n                module_abspath = self._module_abspath(self.repo, self.path, self.name)\n\n                # ``git submodule deinit`` leaves the repository in\n                # ``.git/modules`` and empties the checkout. Reconnect that retained\n                # repository instead of trying to clone over it.\n                if not dry_run and osp.isdir(module_abspath):\n                    try:\n                        git.Repo(module_abspath)\n                    except InvalidGitRepositoryError:\n                        pass\n                    else:\n                        if osp.lexists(checkout_module_abspath) and (\n                            osp.islink(checkout_module_abspath)\n                            or not osp.isdir(checkout_module_abspath)\n                            or os.listdir(checkout_module_abspath)\n                        ):\n                            raise OSError(\n                                \"Module directory at %r does already exist and is non-empty\" % checkout_module_abspath\n                            )\n                        os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)\n                        self._write_git_file_and_module_config(checkout_module_abspath, module_abspath)\n                        mrepo = git.Repo(checkout_module_abspath)\n\n--- where self.path comes from (raw .gitmodules value) ---\n    def _set_cache_(self, attr: str) -\u003e None:\n        if attr in (\"path\", \"_url\", \"_branch_path\"):\n            reader: SectionConstraint = self.config_reader()\n            # Default submodule values.\n            try:\n                self.path = reader.get(\"path\")\n            except cp.NoSectionError as e:\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T23:47:12Z",
  "published": "2026-09-30T23:47:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1ed0ebc2f2e74d979cdc367a4864a7731fdcc093"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.62"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

BREW-GITUP-CVE-2026-100689 (GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W)

The gap

Honest limits (please read before rating)

Suggested fix

Prior art checked

Credit

Appendix — EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)

CVE-2026-100689 (GCVE-0-2026-100689)

GHSA-59CR-6R3X-644W

The gap

Honest limits (please read before rating)

Suggested fix

Prior art checked

Credit

Appendix — EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour

Appendix — `EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt` (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)

Appendix — `EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt` (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)