BREW-COPIER-CVE-2026-34726 (GHSA-85V3-4M8G-HRH6)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:41 – Updated: 2026-10-15 09:13 – Source websiteSummary
Copier's _subdirectory setting is documented as the subdirectory to use as the template root. However, the current implementation accepts parent-directory traversal such as .. and uses it directly when selecting the template root.
As a result, a template can escape its own directory and make Copier render files from the parent directory without --UNSAFE.
Details
The relevant code path is:
- the template defines
_subdirectory - Copier renders that string
template_copy_rootreturnsself.template.local_abspath / subdir- Copier walks that directory as the template root
Relevant code:
- https://github.com/copier-org/copier/blob/7aa7021bd73797c982492bac3535515d4484fdb7/copier/_main.py#L1056-L1062
- https://github.com/copier-org/copier/blob/7aa7021bd73797c982492bac3535515d4484fdb7/copier/_template.py#L504-L513
The effective sink is:
subdir = self._render_string(self.template.subdirectory) or ""
return self.template.local_abspath / subdir
There is no check that the resulting path stays inside the template directory.
The documentation for _subdirectory describes it as:
Subdirectory to use as the template root when generating a project.
and explains it as a way to separate template metadata from template source code:
That description fits values like template or poetry, but not ...
PoC
PoC 1: _subdirectory: .. escapes to the parent directory
mkdir -p root/template dst
echo 'loot' > root/loot.txt
printf '%s\n' '_subdirectory: ..' > root/template/copier.yml
copier copy --overwrite root/template dst
find dst -maxdepth 3 -type f | sort
cat dst/loot.txt
Expected output includes:
dst/loot.txt
dst/template/copier.yml
loot
This shows Copier is rendering from root/ rather than from root/template/.
Impact
If a user runs Copier on an untrusted template, that template can change the effective template root and make Copier render files from outside the intended template directory.
Practical impact:
- template-root escape via
.. - rendering of parent-directory files that were not meant to be part of the template
- possible without
--UNSAFE
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "9.14.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "copier",
"purl": "pkg:brew/copier"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.14.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/copier@9.19.1",
"name": "copier",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "9.19.1"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nCopier\u0027s `_subdirectory` setting is documented as the subdirectory to use as the template root. However, the current implementation accepts parent-directory traversal such as `..` and uses it directly when selecting the template root.\n\nAs a result, a template can escape its own directory and make Copier render files from the parent directory without `--UNSAFE`.\n\n### Details\n\nThe relevant code path is:\n\n1. the template defines `_subdirectory`\n2. Copier renders that string\n3. `template_copy_root` returns `self.template.local_abspath / subdir`\n4. Copier walks that directory as the template root\n\nRelevant code:\n\n- \u003chttps://github.com/copier-org/copier/blob/7aa7021bd73797c982492bac3535515d4484fdb7/copier/_main.py#L1056-L1062\u003e\n- \u003chttps://github.com/copier-org/copier/blob/7aa7021bd73797c982492bac3535515d4484fdb7/copier/_template.py#L504-L513\u003e\n\nThe effective sink is:\n\n```python\nsubdir = self._render_string(self.template.subdirectory) or \"\"\nreturn self.template.local_abspath / subdir\n```\n\nThere is no check that the resulting path stays inside the template directory.\n\nThe documentation for `_subdirectory` describes it as:\n\n\u003e Subdirectory to use as the template root when generating a project.\n\nand explains it as a way to separate template metadata from template source code:\n\n\u003chttps://github.com/copier-org/copier/blob/7aa7021bd73797c982492bac3535515d4484fdb7/docs/configuring.md#L1582-L1646\u003e\n\nThat description fits values like `template` or `poetry`, but not `..`.\n\n### PoC\n\n#### PoC 1: `_subdirectory: ..` escapes to the parent directory\n\n```sh\nmkdir -p root/template dst\necho \u0027loot\u0027 \u003e root/loot.txt\nprintf \u0027%s\\n\u0027 \u0027_subdirectory: ..\u0027 \u003e root/template/copier.yml\n\ncopier copy --overwrite root/template dst\nfind dst -maxdepth 3 -type f | sort\ncat dst/loot.txt\n```\n\nExpected output includes:\n\n```text\ndst/loot.txt\ndst/template/copier.yml\nloot\n```\n\nThis shows Copier is rendering from `root/` rather than from `root/template/`.\n\n### Impact\n\nIf a user runs Copier on an untrusted template, that template can change the effective template root and make Copier render files from outside the intended template directory.\n\nPractical impact:\n\n- template-root escape via `..`\n- rendering of parent-directory files that were not meant to be part of the template\n- possible without `--UNSAFE`",
"id": "BREW-copier-CVE-2026-34726",
"modified": "2026-10-15T09:13:31Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T16:41:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier/security/advisories/GHSA-85v3-4m8g-hrh6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier/commit/cb80a3ffc9c3787de3ed837e04ca29a0ff8ca3df"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier/releases/tag/v9.14.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Copier `_subdirectory` allows template root escape via parent-directory traversal",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-85v3-4m8g-hrh6",
"CVE-2026-34726",
"PYSEC-2026-2134"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.