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PYSEC-2026-3731
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-08-22 15:16 - Updated: 2026-09-01 08:54NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a logic bug in FileSystemPathPointer.open() where the sandbox validation check compares a normalized path against itself, making the security check permanently inert. Attackers can pass file:// URLs to nltk.data.load() to read arbitrary files accessible to the process user, including credentials and configuration files.
| Name | purl | nltk | pkg:pypi/nltk |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.8",
"0.9",
"0.9.3",
"0.9.4",
"0.9.5",
"0.9.6",
"0.9.7",
"0.9.8",
"0.9.9",
"2.0.1",
"2.0.1rc1",
"2.0.1rc2-git",
"2.0.1rc3",
"2.0.1rc4",
"2.0.2",
"2.0.3",
"2.0.4",
"2.0.5",
"2.0b4",
"2.0b5",
"2.0b6",
"2.0b7",
"2.0b8",
"2.0b9",
"3.0.0",
"3.0.0b1",
"3.0.0b2",
"3.0.1",
"3.0.2",
"3.0.3",
"3.0.4",
"3.0.5",
"3.1",
"3.2",
"3.2.1",
"3.2.2",
"3.2.3",
"3.2.4",
"3.2.5",
"3.3",
"3.4",
"3.4.1",
"3.4.2",
"3.4.3",
"3.4.4",
"3.4.5",
"3.5",
"3.5b1",
"3.6",
"3.6.1",
"3.6.2",
"3.6.3",
"3.6.4",
"3.6.5",
"3.6.6",
"3.6.7",
"3.7",
"3.8",
"3.8.1",
"3.9",
"3.9.1",
"3.9.2",
"3.9.3",
"3.9.4",
"3.9b1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-65915",
"GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9"
],
"details": "NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a logic bug in FileSystemPathPointer.open() where the sandbox validation check compares a normalized path against itself, making the security check permanently inert. Attackers can pass file:// URLs to nltk.data.load() to read arbitrary files accessible to the process user, including credentials and configuration files.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-3731",
"modified": "2026-09-01T08:54:51.735365Z",
"published": "2026-08-22T15:16:19.500Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-arbitrary-file-read-via-filesystempathpointer"
},
{
"type": "EVIDENCE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
BREW-ACRONYM-CVE-2026-65915 (PYSEC-2026-3731)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-09-02 08:43 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:52 – Source websiteSummary
There's a logic bug in FileSystemPathPointer.open() inside nltk/data.py
that makes the sandbox check permanently inert. The guard condition is always
False — meaning any file the process can read is accessible by passing a
file:// URL to nltk.data.load().
Details
In nltk/data.py, FileSystemPathPointer.open() was patched at some point
with a comment saying "SECURITY PATCH ENFORCING SANDBOX", but the check
doesn't work:
def open(self, encoding=None):
path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
# Block raw absolute reads such as "/" "C:\\Windows" etc.
if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
path is set to os.path.normpath(self._path) on line 1, then compared
against os.path.normpath(self._path) again in the condition. They are
always equal. The ValueError never fires.
On top of that, __init__ already calls os.path.abspath() before storing
self._path, so it's normalized before open() is even called. Running
normpath on it again changes nothing.
The stream = open(self._path, "rb") line is always reached regardless of
what path was passed in.
PoC
Tested on Python 3.11, NLTK 3.9.1, Ubuntu 22.04.
import nltk
from nltk.data import FileSystemPathPointer
# direct construction
ptr = FileSystemPathPointer("/etc/passwd")
with ptr.open() as f:
print(f.read(300))
# via load() using file:// URL
data = nltk.data.load("file:///etc/passwd", format="raw")
print(data[:300])
Both print file contents. No exception is raised.
Impact
Any app that lets users influence the string passed to nltk.data.load() or
nltk.data.find() is exposed — web APIs, notebook servers, multi-tenant
pipelines. An attacker can read any file the process user has access to:
/etc/passwd, .env files, private keys, ~/.aws/credentials, etc.
Suggested Fix
File: nltk/data.py — FileSystemPathPointer.open() (lines 378–390)
What's wrong
Line 387 compares normpath(self._path) against itself — always equal,
so the ValueError never fires. The check is dead code.
__init__ already calls abspath() on construction, so re-running
normpath inside open() changes nothing either.
Fix
Validate against the actual list of permitted data directories instead:
def open(self, encoding=None):
import nltk.data as _d
allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
if allowed and not any(
os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
):
raise ValueError(
f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}"
)
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
if encoding is not None:
stream = SeekableUnicodeStreamReader(stream, encoding)
return stream
Why commonpath not startswith
startswith is bypassable by a path that shares a prefix:
/tmp/nltk_data_evil".startswith("/tmp/nltk_data") → True ✗
commonpath(["/tmp/nltk_data_evil", "/tmp/nltk_data"]) → "/tmp" ✓
Diff
- path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
- if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
- raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
-
+ import nltk.data as _d
+ allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
+ if allowed and not any(
+ os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
+ ):
+ raise ValueError(f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "nltk",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/nltk@3.10.4",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.10.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "acronym",
"purl": "pkg:brew/acronym"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0_4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/nltk@3.10.4",
"name": "nltk",
"resource": "nltk",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.10.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThere\u0027s a logic bug in `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` inside `nltk/data.py`\nthat makes the sandbox check permanently inert. The guard condition is always\n`False` \u2014 meaning any file the process can read is accessible by passing a\n`file://` URL to `nltk.data.load()`.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nIn `nltk/data.py`, `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` was patched at some point\nwith a comment saying \"SECURITY PATCH ENFORCING SANDBOX\", but the check\ndoesn\u0027t work:\n```python\ndef open(self, encoding=None):\n path = os.path.normpath(self._path)\n\n # Block raw absolute reads such as \"/\" \"C:\\\\Windows\" etc.\n if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):\n raise ValueError(f\"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}\")\n\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n```\n\n`path` is set to `os.path.normpath(self._path)` on line 1, then compared\nagainst `os.path.normpath(self._path)` again in the condition. They are\nalways equal. The `ValueError` never fires.\n\nOn top of that, `__init__` already calls `os.path.abspath()` before storing\n`self._path`, so it\u0027s normalized before `open()` is even called. Running\n`normpath` on it again changes nothing.\n\nThe `stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")` line is always reached regardless of\nwhat path was passed in.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on Python 3.11, NLTK 3.9.1, Ubuntu 22.04.\n```python\nimport nltk\nfrom nltk.data import FileSystemPathPointer\n\n# direct construction\nptr = FileSystemPathPointer(\"/etc/passwd\")\nwith ptr.open() as f:\n print(f.read(300))\n\n# via load() using file:// URL\ndata = nltk.data.load(\"file:///etc/passwd\", format=\"raw\")\nprint(data[:300])\n```\n\nBoth print file contents. No exception is raised.\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAny app that lets users influence the string passed to `nltk.data.load()` or\n`nltk.data.find()` is exposed \u2014 web APIs, notebook servers, multi-tenant\npipelines. An attacker can read any file the process user has access to:\n`/etc/passwd`, `.env` files, private keys, `~/.aws/credentials`, etc.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n**File:** `nltk/data.py` \u2014 `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` (lines 378\u2013390)\n\n### What\u0027s wrong\n\nLine 387 compares `normpath(self._path)` against itself \u2014 always equal,\nso the `ValueError` never fires. The check is dead code.\n`__init__` already calls `abspath()` on construction, so re-running\n`normpath` inside `open()` changes nothing either.\n\n---\n\n### Fix\n\nValidate against the actual list of permitted data directories instead:\n```python\ndef open(self, encoding=None):\n import nltk.data as _d\n allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]\n if allowed and not any(\n os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed\n ):\n raise ValueError(\n f\"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}\"\n )\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n if encoding is not None:\n stream = SeekableUnicodeStreamReader(stream, encoding)\n return stream\n```\n\n---\n\n### Why `commonpath` not `startswith`\n\n`startswith` is bypassable by a path that shares a prefix:\n```\n/tmp/nltk_data_evil\".startswith(\"/tmp/nltk_data\") \u2192 True \u2717\ncommonpath([\"/tmp/nltk_data_evil\", \"/tmp/nltk_data\"]) \u2192 \"/tmp\" \u2713\n```\n\n---\n\n### Diff\n```diff\n- path = os.path.normpath(self._path)\n- if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):\n- raise ValueError(f\"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}\")\n-\n+ import nltk.data as _d\n+ allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]\n+ if allowed and not any(\n+ os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed\n+ ):\n+ raise ValueError(f\"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}\")\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n```",
"id": "BREW-acronym-CVE-2026-65915",
"modified": "2026-10-29T21:52:04Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T08:43:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65915"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3522"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/69db9911fdba914ceeaca7aec6e892d1b14586a9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3731.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/a510de7b-ffaf-4a83-9bf8-fa7e63f4bd2d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-arbitrary-file-read-via-filesystempathpointer"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: FileSystemPathPointer.open() sandbox check is dead code \u2014 arbitrary file read via file:// protocol",
"upstream": [
"PYSEC-2026-3731",
"CVE-2026-65915",
"GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9"
]
}
BREW-GPTLINE-CVE-2026-65915 (PYSEC-2026-3731)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-09-02 09:04 – Updated: 2026-10-27 09:31 – Source websiteSummary
There's a logic bug in FileSystemPathPointer.open() inside nltk/data.py
that makes the sandbox check permanently inert. The guard condition is always
False — meaning any file the process can read is accessible by passing a
file:// URL to nltk.data.load().
Details
In nltk/data.py, FileSystemPathPointer.open() was patched at some point
with a comment saying "SECURITY PATCH ENFORCING SANDBOX", but the check
doesn't work:
def open(self, encoding=None):
path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
# Block raw absolute reads such as "/" "C:\\Windows" etc.
if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
path is set to os.path.normpath(self._path) on line 1, then compared
against os.path.normpath(self._path) again in the condition. They are
always equal. The ValueError never fires.
On top of that, __init__ already calls os.path.abspath() before storing
self._path, so it's normalized before open() is even called. Running
normpath on it again changes nothing.
The stream = open(self._path, "rb") line is always reached regardless of
what path was passed in.
PoC
Tested on Python 3.11, NLTK 3.9.1, Ubuntu 22.04.
import nltk
from nltk.data import FileSystemPathPointer
# direct construction
ptr = FileSystemPathPointer("/etc/passwd")
with ptr.open() as f:
print(f.read(300))
# via load() using file:// URL
data = nltk.data.load("file:///etc/passwd", format="raw")
print(data[:300])
Both print file contents. No exception is raised.
Impact
Any app that lets users influence the string passed to nltk.data.load() or
nltk.data.find() is exposed — web APIs, notebook servers, multi-tenant
pipelines. An attacker can read any file the process user has access to:
/etc/passwd, .env files, private keys, ~/.aws/credentials, etc.
Suggested Fix
File: nltk/data.py — FileSystemPathPointer.open() (lines 378–390)
What's wrong
Line 387 compares normpath(self._path) against itself — always equal,
so the ValueError never fires. The check is dead code.
__init__ already calls abspath() on construction, so re-running
normpath inside open() changes nothing either.
Fix
Validate against the actual list of permitted data directories instead:
def open(self, encoding=None):
import nltk.data as _d
allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
if allowed and not any(
os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
):
raise ValueError(
f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}"
)
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
if encoding is not None:
stream = SeekableUnicodeStreamReader(stream, encoding)
return stream
Why commonpath not startswith
startswith is bypassable by a path that shares a prefix:
/tmp/nltk_data_evil".startswith("/tmp/nltk_data") → True ✗
commonpath(["/tmp/nltk_data_evil", "/tmp/nltk_data"]) → "/tmp" ✓
Diff
- path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
- if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
- raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
-
+ import nltk.data as _d
+ allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
+ if allowed and not any(
+ os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
+ ):
+ raise ValueError(f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "nltk",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/nltk@3.10.4",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.10.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "gptline",
"purl": "pkg:brew/gptline"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.8"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.8_22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/nltk@3.10.4",
"name": "nltk",
"resource": "nltk",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.10.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThere\u0027s a logic bug in `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` inside `nltk/data.py`\nthat makes the sandbox check permanently inert. The guard condition is always\n`False` \u2014 meaning any file the process can read is accessible by passing a\n`file://` URL to `nltk.data.load()`.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nIn `nltk/data.py`, `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` was patched at some point\nwith a comment saying \"SECURITY PATCH ENFORCING SANDBOX\", but the check\ndoesn\u0027t work:\n```python\ndef open(self, encoding=None):\n path = os.path.normpath(self._path)\n\n # Block raw absolute reads such as \"/\" \"C:\\\\Windows\" etc.\n if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):\n raise ValueError(f\"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}\")\n\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n```\n\n`path` is set to `os.path.normpath(self._path)` on line 1, then compared\nagainst `os.path.normpath(self._path)` again in the condition. They are\nalways equal. The `ValueError` never fires.\n\nOn top of that, `__init__` already calls `os.path.abspath()` before storing\n`self._path`, so it\u0027s normalized before `open()` is even called. Running\n`normpath` on it again changes nothing.\n\nThe `stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")` line is always reached regardless of\nwhat path was passed in.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on Python 3.11, NLTK 3.9.1, Ubuntu 22.04.\n```python\nimport nltk\nfrom nltk.data import FileSystemPathPointer\n\n# direct construction\nptr = FileSystemPathPointer(\"/etc/passwd\")\nwith ptr.open() as f:\n print(f.read(300))\n\n# via load() using file:// URL\ndata = nltk.data.load(\"file:///etc/passwd\", format=\"raw\")\nprint(data[:300])\n```\n\nBoth print file contents. No exception is raised.\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAny app that lets users influence the string passed to `nltk.data.load()` or\n`nltk.data.find()` is exposed \u2014 web APIs, notebook servers, multi-tenant\npipelines. An attacker can read any file the process user has access to:\n`/etc/passwd`, `.env` files, private keys, `~/.aws/credentials`, etc.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n**File:** `nltk/data.py` \u2014 `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` (lines 378\u2013390)\n\n### What\u0027s wrong\n\nLine 387 compares `normpath(self._path)` against itself \u2014 always equal,\nso the `ValueError` never fires. The check is dead code.\n`__init__` already calls `abspath()` on construction, so re-running\n`normpath` inside `open()` changes nothing either.\n\n---\n\n### Fix\n\nValidate against the actual list of permitted data directories instead:\n```python\ndef open(self, encoding=None):\n import nltk.data as _d\n allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]\n if allowed and not any(\n os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed\n ):\n raise ValueError(\n f\"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}\"\n )\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n if encoding is not None:\n stream = SeekableUnicodeStreamReader(stream, encoding)\n return stream\n```\n\n---\n\n### Why `commonpath` not `startswith`\n\n`startswith` is bypassable by a path that shares a prefix:\n```\n/tmp/nltk_data_evil\".startswith(\"/tmp/nltk_data\") \u2192 True \u2717\ncommonpath([\"/tmp/nltk_data_evil\", \"/tmp/nltk_data\"]) \u2192 \"/tmp\" \u2713\n```\n\n---\n\n### Diff\n```diff\n- path = os.path.normpath(self._path)\n- if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):\n- raise ValueError(f\"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}\")\n-\n+ import nltk.data as _d\n+ allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]\n+ if allowed and not any(\n+ os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed\n+ ):\n+ raise ValueError(f\"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}\")\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n```",
"id": "BREW-gptline-CVE-2026-65915",
"modified": "2026-10-27T09:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T09:04:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65915"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3522"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/69db9911fdba914ceeaca7aec6e892d1b14586a9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3731.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/a510de7b-ffaf-4a83-9bf8-fa7e63f4bd2d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-arbitrary-file-read-via-filesystempathpointer"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: FileSystemPathPointer.open() sandbox check is dead code \u2014 arbitrary file read via file:// protocol",
"upstream": [
"PYSEC-2026-3731",
"CVE-2026-65915",
"GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9"
]
}
BREW-SAFETY-CVE-2026-65915 (PYSEC-2026-3731)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-09-02 09:53 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:42 – Source websiteSummary
There's a logic bug in FileSystemPathPointer.open() inside nltk/data.py
that makes the sandbox check permanently inert. The guard condition is always
False — meaning any file the process can read is accessible by passing a
file:// URL to nltk.data.load().
Details
In nltk/data.py, FileSystemPathPointer.open() was patched at some point
with a comment saying "SECURITY PATCH ENFORCING SANDBOX", but the check
doesn't work:
def open(self, encoding=None):
path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
# Block raw absolute reads such as "/" "C:\\Windows" etc.
if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
path is set to os.path.normpath(self._path) on line 1, then compared
against os.path.normpath(self._path) again in the condition. They are
always equal. The ValueError never fires.
On top of that, __init__ already calls os.path.abspath() before storing
self._path, so it's normalized before open() is even called. Running
normpath on it again changes nothing.
The stream = open(self._path, "rb") line is always reached regardless of
what path was passed in.
PoC
Tested on Python 3.11, NLTK 3.9.1, Ubuntu 22.04.
import nltk
from nltk.data import FileSystemPathPointer
# direct construction
ptr = FileSystemPathPointer("/etc/passwd")
with ptr.open() as f:
print(f.read(300))
# via load() using file:// URL
data = nltk.data.load("file:///etc/passwd", format="raw")
print(data[:300])
Both print file contents. No exception is raised.
Impact
Any app that lets users influence the string passed to nltk.data.load() or
nltk.data.find() is exposed — web APIs, notebook servers, multi-tenant
pipelines. An attacker can read any file the process user has access to:
/etc/passwd, .env files, private keys, ~/.aws/credentials, etc.
Suggested Fix
File: nltk/data.py — FileSystemPathPointer.open() (lines 378–390)
What's wrong
Line 387 compares normpath(self._path) against itself — always equal,
so the ValueError never fires. The check is dead code.
__init__ already calls abspath() on construction, so re-running
normpath inside open() changes nothing either.
Fix
Validate against the actual list of permitted data directories instead:
def open(self, encoding=None):
import nltk.data as _d
allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
if allowed and not any(
os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
):
raise ValueError(
f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}"
)
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
if encoding is not None:
stream = SeekableUnicodeStreamReader(stream, encoding)
return stream
Why commonpath not startswith
startswith is bypassable by a path that shares a prefix:
/tmp/nltk_data_evil".startswith("/tmp/nltk_data") → True ✗
commonpath(["/tmp/nltk_data_evil", "/tmp/nltk_data"]) → "/tmp" ✓
Diff
- path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
- if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
- raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
-
+ import nltk.data as _d
+ allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
+ if allowed and not any(
+ os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
+ ):
+ raise ValueError(f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "nltk",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/nltk@3.10.4",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.10.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "safety",
"purl": "pkg:brew/safety"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.3.1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.8.1_1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/nltk@3.10.4",
"name": "nltk",
"resource": "nltk",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.10.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThere\u0027s a logic bug in `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` inside `nltk/data.py`\nthat makes the sandbox check permanently inert. The guard condition is always\n`False` \u2014 meaning any file the process can read is accessible by passing a\n`file://` URL to `nltk.data.load()`.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nIn `nltk/data.py`, `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` was patched at some point\nwith a comment saying \"SECURITY PATCH ENFORCING SANDBOX\", but the check\ndoesn\u0027t work:\n```python\ndef open(self, encoding=None):\n path = os.path.normpath(self._path)\n\n # Block raw absolute reads such as \"/\" \"C:\\\\Windows\" etc.\n if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):\n raise ValueError(f\"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}\")\n\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n```\n\n`path` is set to `os.path.normpath(self._path)` on line 1, then compared\nagainst `os.path.normpath(self._path)` again in the condition. They are\nalways equal. The `ValueError` never fires.\n\nOn top of that, `__init__` already calls `os.path.abspath()` before storing\n`self._path`, so it\u0027s normalized before `open()` is even called. Running\n`normpath` on it again changes nothing.\n\nThe `stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")` line is always reached regardless of\nwhat path was passed in.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on Python 3.11, NLTK 3.9.1, Ubuntu 22.04.\n```python\nimport nltk\nfrom nltk.data import FileSystemPathPointer\n\n# direct construction\nptr = FileSystemPathPointer(\"/etc/passwd\")\nwith ptr.open() as f:\n print(f.read(300))\n\n# via load() using file:// URL\ndata = nltk.data.load(\"file:///etc/passwd\", format=\"raw\")\nprint(data[:300])\n```\n\nBoth print file contents. No exception is raised.\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAny app that lets users influence the string passed to `nltk.data.load()` or\n`nltk.data.find()` is exposed \u2014 web APIs, notebook servers, multi-tenant\npipelines. An attacker can read any file the process user has access to:\n`/etc/passwd`, `.env` files, private keys, `~/.aws/credentials`, etc.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n**File:** `nltk/data.py` \u2014 `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` (lines 378\u2013390)\n\n### What\u0027s wrong\n\nLine 387 compares `normpath(self._path)` against itself \u2014 always equal,\nso the `ValueError` never fires. The check is dead code.\n`__init__` already calls `abspath()` on construction, so re-running\n`normpath` inside `open()` changes nothing either.\n\n---\n\n### Fix\n\nValidate against the actual list of permitted data directories instead:\n```python\ndef open(self, encoding=None):\n import nltk.data as _d\n allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]\n if allowed and not any(\n os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed\n ):\n raise ValueError(\n f\"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}\"\n )\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n if encoding is not None:\n stream = SeekableUnicodeStreamReader(stream, encoding)\n return stream\n```\n\n---\n\n### Why `commonpath` not `startswith`\n\n`startswith` is bypassable by a path that shares a prefix:\n```\n/tmp/nltk_data_evil\".startswith(\"/tmp/nltk_data\") \u2192 True \u2717\ncommonpath([\"/tmp/nltk_data_evil\", \"/tmp/nltk_data\"]) \u2192 \"/tmp\" \u2713\n```\n\n---\n\n### Diff\n```diff\n- path = os.path.normpath(self._path)\n- if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):\n- raise ValueError(f\"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}\")\n-\n+ import nltk.data as _d\n+ allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]\n+ if allowed and not any(\n+ os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed\n+ ):\n+ raise ValueError(f\"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}\")\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n```",
"id": "BREW-safety-CVE-2026-65915",
"modified": "2026-10-29T21:42:01Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T09:53:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65915"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3522"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/69db9911fdba914ceeaca7aec6e892d1b14586a9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3731.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/a510de7b-ffaf-4a83-9bf8-fa7e63f4bd2d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-arbitrary-file-read-via-filesystempathpointer"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: FileSystemPathPointer.open() sandbox check is dead code \u2014 arbitrary file read via file:// protocol",
"upstream": [
"PYSEC-2026-3731",
"CVE-2026-65915",
"GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9"
]
}
CVE-2026-65915 (GCVE-0-2026-65915)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-22 14:12 – Updated: 2026-08-24 19:20- CWE-284 - Improper Access Control
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/… | vendor-advisory |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-… | third-party-advisory |
{
"containers": {
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"metrics": [
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"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-65915",
"options": [
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{
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{
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-24T19:20:34.826563Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
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"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
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"cna": {
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"product": "nltk",
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}
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"metrics": [
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GHSA-72R2-7MFR-5XR9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 15:27 – Updated: 2026-09-08 15:27Summary
There's a logic bug in FileSystemPathPointer.open() inside nltk/data.py
that makes the sandbox check permanently inert. The guard condition is always
False — meaning any file the process can read is accessible by passing a
file:// URL to nltk.data.load().
Details
In nltk/data.py, FileSystemPathPointer.open() was patched at some point
with a comment saying "SECURITY PATCH ENFORCING SANDBOX", but the check
doesn't work:
def open(self, encoding=None):
path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
# Block raw absolute reads such as "/" "C:\\Windows" etc.
if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
path is set to os.path.normpath(self._path) on line 1, then compared
against os.path.normpath(self._path) again in the condition. They are
always equal. The ValueError never fires.
On top of that, __init__ already calls os.path.abspath() before storing
self._path, so it's normalized before open() is even called. Running
normpath on it again changes nothing.
The stream = open(self._path, "rb") line is always reached regardless of
what path was passed in.
PoC
Tested on Python 3.11, NLTK 3.9.1, Ubuntu 22.04.
import nltk
from nltk.data import FileSystemPathPointer
# direct construction
ptr = FileSystemPathPointer("/etc/passwd")
with ptr.open() as f:
print(f.read(300))
# via load() using file:// URL
data = nltk.data.load("file:///etc/passwd", format="raw")
print(data[:300])
Both print file contents. No exception is raised.
Impact
Any app that lets users influence the string passed to nltk.data.load() or
nltk.data.find() is exposed — web APIs, notebook servers, multi-tenant
pipelines. An attacker can read any file the process user has access to:
/etc/passwd, .env files, private keys, ~/.aws/credentials, etc.
Suggested Fix
File: nltk/data.py — FileSystemPathPointer.open() (lines 378–390)
What's wrong
Line 387 compares normpath(self._path) against itself — always equal,
so the ValueError never fires. The check is dead code.
__init__ already calls abspath() on construction, so re-running
normpath inside open() changes nothing either.
Fix
Validate against the actual list of permitted data directories instead:
def open(self, encoding=None):
import nltk.data as _d
allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
if allowed and not any(
os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
):
raise ValueError(
f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}"
)
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
if encoding is not None:
stream = SeekableUnicodeStreamReader(stream, encoding)
return stream
Why commonpath not startswith
startswith is bypassable by a path that shares a prefix:
/tmp/nltk_data_evil".startswith("/tmp/nltk_data") → True ✗
commonpath(["/tmp/nltk_data_evil", "/tmp/nltk_data"]) → "/tmp" ✓
Diff
- path = os.path.normpath(self._path)
- if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):
- raise ValueError(f"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}")
-
+ import nltk.data as _d
+ allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]
+ if allowed and not any(
+ os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed
+ ):
+ raise ValueError(f"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}")
stream = open(self._path, "rb")
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.9.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-65915"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T15:27:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThere\u0027s a logic bug in `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` inside `nltk/data.py`\nthat makes the sandbox check permanently inert. The guard condition is always\n`False` \u2014 meaning any file the process can read is accessible by passing a\n`file://` URL to `nltk.data.load()`.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nIn `nltk/data.py`, `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` was patched at some point\nwith a comment saying \"SECURITY PATCH ENFORCING SANDBOX\", but the check\ndoesn\u0027t work:\n```python\ndef open(self, encoding=None):\n path = os.path.normpath(self._path)\n\n # Block raw absolute reads such as \"/\" \"C:\\\\Windows\" etc.\n if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):\n raise ValueError(f\"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}\")\n\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n```\n\n`path` is set to `os.path.normpath(self._path)` on line 1, then compared\nagainst `os.path.normpath(self._path)` again in the condition. They are\nalways equal. The `ValueError` never fires.\n\nOn top of that, `__init__` already calls `os.path.abspath()` before storing\n`self._path`, so it\u0027s normalized before `open()` is even called. Running\n`normpath` on it again changes nothing.\n\nThe `stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")` line is always reached regardless of\nwhat path was passed in.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on Python 3.11, NLTK 3.9.1, Ubuntu 22.04.\n```python\nimport nltk\nfrom nltk.data import FileSystemPathPointer\n\n# direct construction\nptr = FileSystemPathPointer(\"/etc/passwd\")\nwith ptr.open() as f:\n print(f.read(300))\n\n# via load() using file:// URL\ndata = nltk.data.load(\"file:///etc/passwd\", format=\"raw\")\nprint(data[:300])\n```\n\nBoth print file contents. No exception is raised.\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAny app that lets users influence the string passed to `nltk.data.load()` or\n`nltk.data.find()` is exposed \u2014 web APIs, notebook servers, multi-tenant\npipelines. An attacker can read any file the process user has access to:\n`/etc/passwd`, `.env` files, private keys, `~/.aws/credentials`, etc.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n**File:** `nltk/data.py` \u2014 `FileSystemPathPointer.open()` (lines 378\u2013390)\n\n### What\u0027s wrong\n\nLine 387 compares `normpath(self._path)` against itself \u2014 always equal,\nso the `ValueError` never fires. The check is dead code.\n`__init__` already calls `abspath()` on construction, so re-running\n`normpath` inside `open()` changes nothing either.\n\n---\n\n### Fix\n\nValidate against the actual list of permitted data directories instead:\n```python\ndef open(self, encoding=None):\n import nltk.data as _d\n allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]\n if allowed and not any(\n os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed\n ):\n raise ValueError(\n f\"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}\"\n )\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n if encoding is not None:\n stream = SeekableUnicodeStreamReader(stream, encoding)\n return stream\n```\n\n---\n\n### Why `commonpath` not `startswith`\n\n`startswith` is bypassable by a path that shares a prefix:\n```\n/tmp/nltk_data_evil\".startswith(\"/tmp/nltk_data\") \u2192 True \u2717\ncommonpath([\"/tmp/nltk_data_evil\", \"/tmp/nltk_data\"]) \u2192 \"/tmp\" \u2713\n```\n\n---\n\n### Diff\n```diff\n- path = os.path.normpath(self._path)\n- if os.path.isabs(path) and path != os.path.normpath(self._path):\n- raise ValueError(f\"Direct absolute file access blocked: {path}\")\n-\n+ import nltk.data as _d\n+ allowed = [os.path.abspath(p) for p in _d.path if p]\n+ if allowed and not any(\n+ os.path.commonpath([self._path, r]) == r for r in allowed\n+ ):\n+ raise ValueError(f\"Access outside nltk_data blocked: {self._path!r}\")\n stream = open(self._path, \"rb\")\n```",
"id": "GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9",
"modified": "2026-09-08T15:27:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T15:27:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-72r2-7mfr-5xr9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65915"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3522"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/69db9911fdba914ceeaca7aec6e892d1b14586a9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3731.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/a510de7b-ffaf-4a83-9bf8-fa7e63f4bd2d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-arbitrary-file-read-via-filesystempathpointer"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: FileSystemPathPointer.open() sandbox check is dead code \u2014 arbitrary file read via file:// protocol"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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