GHSA-XVCM-6775-5M9R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 19:02 – Updated: 2026-09-03 16:38
VLAI
Summary
Immutable: Hash-collision algorithmic complexity denial of service in Immutable.Map/Set
Details

Summary

Immutable.Map and Immutable.Set keep keys that share the same 32-bit hash in a collision bucket that is scanned linearly. The string hash is public and deterministic, so an attacker who controls the keys inserted into a Map can craft many keys that all collide, degrading insertion and lookup from amortized O(1) to O(n) per operation — and O(n²) to build or read the whole set. A small, attacker-shaped payload can therefore consume disproportionate CPU and, on a single-threaded runtime such as Node.js, stall the event loop and deny service.

Details

The string hash uses the JVM-style polynomial hashed = (31 * hashed + charCode) | 0. Strings such as "Aa" and "BB" hash to the same value (65*31+97 == 66*31+66 == 2112), and concatenating such blocks yields 2^n distinct strings sharing one hash (40 characters ⇒ >1,000,000 colliding keys). All such keys route to a single HashCollisionNode, whose get/update walk the entire bucket testing is(). There is no per-process salt, so the colliding set is fully precomputable from the open-source algorithm.

Proof of concept

Inserting N colliding keys (e.g. via Immutable.Map(obj) / Immutable.fromJS(obj)) is O(N²). Measured on one machine, ~8,000 colliding keys take ~0.7 s to build and ~0.6 s to read, scaling ×4 per doubling; ~16,000 keys exceed several seconds.

Impact

CPU-bound denial of service in applications that ingest attacker-controlled object keys into Immutable structures, e.g. Immutable.Map(req.body), Immutable.fromJS(req.body), state.merge(userObject) / mergeDeep(...). Applications that only store attacker input as values under fixed keys are not affected.

Affected versions

  • = 4.0.0-beta.1, < 4.3.9

  • = 5.0.0-beta.1, < 5.1.8

  • < 3.8.4

Patches

Fixed in 5.1.8 (adjust to the actual release): large collision buckets are indexed by a per-process seeded secondary hash, restoring near-linear behavior for the affected paths. The public hash() is unchanged (no breaking change), and is() remains the sole authority on key equality. Also fixed in 4.3.9 and 3.8.4.

Workarounds

Before passing untrusted data to Immutable.js: cap request body size, limit object key count/length, and reject high-cardinality payloads; avoid building Maps directly from untrusted object keys.

References

  • CWE-407 (Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity), CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)
  • OWASP API4:2023 (Unrestricted Resource Consumption)
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "immutable"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.3.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "immutable"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "immutable"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.8.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59880"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T19:02:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T16:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`Immutable.Map` and `Immutable.Set` keep keys that share the same 32-bit hash in a collision bucket that is scanned linearly. The string hash is public and deterministic, so an attacker who controls the **keys** inserted into a Map can craft many keys that all collide, degrading insertion and lookup from amortized O(1) to O(n) per operation \u2014 and O(n\u00b2) to build or read the whole set. A small, attacker-shaped payload can therefore consume disproportionate CPU and, on a single-threaded runtime such as Node.js, stall the event loop and deny service.\n\n## Details\n\nThe string hash uses the JVM-style polynomial `hashed = (31 * hashed + charCode) | 0`. Strings such as `\"Aa\"` and `\"BB\"` hash to the same value (`65*31+97 == 66*31+66 == 2112`), and concatenating such blocks yields `2^n` distinct strings sharing one hash (40 characters \u21d2 \u003e1,000,000 colliding keys). \nAll such keys route to a single `HashCollisionNode`, whose `get`/`update` walk the entire bucket testing `is()`. There is no per-process salt, so the colliding set is fully precomputable from the open-source algorithm.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nInserting N colliding keys (e.g. via `Immutable.Map(obj)` / `Immutable.fromJS(obj)`) is O(N\u00b2). Measured on one machine, ~8,000 colliding\nkeys take ~0.7 s to build and ~0.6 s to read, scaling \u00d74 per doubling; ~16,000 keys exceed several seconds.\n\n## Impact\n\nCPU-bound denial of service in applications that ingest attacker-controlled object **keys** into Immutable structures, e.g. `Immutable.Map(req.body)`, `Immutable.fromJS(req.body)`, `state.merge(userObject)` / `mergeDeep(...)`. Applications that only store attacker input as **values** under fixed keys are not affected.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- \u003e= 4.0.0-beta.1, \u003c 4.3.9\n- \u003e= 5.0.0-beta.1, \u003c 5.1.8\n- \u003c 3.8.4\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `5.1.8` _(adjust to the actual release)_: large collision buckets are indexed by a per-process **seeded** secondary hash, restoring near-linear behavior for the affected paths. The public `hash()` is unchanged (no breaking change), and `is()` remains the sole authority on key equality. Also fixed in 4.3.9 and 3.8.4.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nBefore passing untrusted data to Immutable.js: cap request body size, limit object key count/length, and reject high-cardinality payloads; avoid building Maps directly from untrusted object keys.\n\n## References\n\n- CWE-407 (Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity), CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)\n- OWASP API4:2023 (Unrestricted Resource Consumption)",
  "id": "GHSA-xvcm-6775-5m9r",
  "modified": "2026-09-03T16:38:01Z",
  "published": "2026-07-21T19:02:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/security/advisories/GHSA-xvcm-6775-5m9r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59880"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/commit/3dd7e5655012597a41873e328bf9142a8901527b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/commit/e51d49fc612ded5ec4dfb94ff294d22074269b0f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/releases/tag/v3.8.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/releases/tag/v4.3.9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/releases/tag/v5.1.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Immutable: Hash-collision algorithmic complexity denial of service in Immutable.Map/Set"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.