GHSA-X35M-3GP4-4FH5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 03:21 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:54Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
A vulnerability in etcd allows read access via PrevKv, or lease attachment in Put requests within transaction operations, to bypass RBAC authorization checks. An authenticated user without sufficient read or lease-related permissions may be able to access unauthorized data or attach leases by invoking transaction operations with these features enabled.
Kubernetes does not rely on etcd’s built-in authentication and authorization. Instead, the API server handles authentication and authorization itself, so typical Kubernetes deployments are not affected.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
This vulnerability is patched in the following versions: - etcd 3.6.11 - etcd 3.5.30 - etcd 3.4.44
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
If upgrading is not immediately possible, reduce exposure by treating the affected RPCs as unauthenticated in practice.
- restrict network access to etcd server ports so only trusted components can connect
- require strong client identity at the transport layer, such as mTLS with tightly scoped client certificate distribution
Reporters
Samy Ghannad (@SamyGhannad on Github) reported that read access via PrevKv in a Put request within etcd transactions bypassed RBAC authorization checks. Benjamin Wang (@ahrtr ) further analyzed that lease attachment in a Put request within etcd transactions also bypassed RBAC authorization checks
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.10"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "go.etcd.io/etcd/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.5.29"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "go.etcd.io/etcd/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.5.30"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.4.43"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "go.etcd.io/etcd"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.44"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44283"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T03:21:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T18:16:49Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nA vulnerability in etcd allows read access via PrevKv, or lease attachment in Put requests within transaction operations, to bypass RBAC authorization checks. An authenticated user without sufficient read or lease-related permissions may be able to access unauthorized data or attach leases by invoking transaction operations with these features enabled.\n\nKubernetes does not rely on etcd\u2019s built-in authentication and authorization. Instead, the API server handles authentication and authorization itself, so typical Kubernetes deployments are not affected.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nThis vulnerability is patched in the following versions:\n- etcd 3.6.11\n- etcd 3.5.30\n- etcd 3.4.44\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, reduce exposure by treating the affected\nRPCs as unauthenticated in practice.\n\n- restrict network access to etcd server ports so only trusted components can connect\n- require strong client identity at the transport layer, such as mTLS with tightly scoped client certificate\ndistribution\n\n### Reporters\n\nSamy Ghannad (@SamyGhannad on Github) reported that read access via PrevKv in a Put request within etcd transactions bypassed RBAC authorization checks. Benjamin Wang (@ahrtr ) further analyzed that lease attachment in a Put request within etcd transactions also bypassed RBAC authorization checks",
"id": "GHSA-x35m-3gp4-4fh5",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:54:29Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T03:21:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/security/advisories/GHSA-x35m-3gp4-4fh5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44283"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "etcd RBAC bypass allows unauthorized data access via PrevKv/lease attachment in nested transaction Put requests"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
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