GHSA-X35M-3GP4-4FH5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 03:21 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:54
VLAI?
Summary
etcd RBAC bypass allows unauthorized data access via PrevKv/lease attachment in nested transaction Put requests
Details

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

A vulnerability in etcd allows read access via PrevKv, or lease attachment in Put requests within transaction operations, to bypass RBAC authorization checks. An authenticated user without sufficient read or lease-related permissions may be able to access unauthorized data or attach leases by invoking transaction operations with these features enabled.

Kubernetes does not rely on etcd’s built-in authentication and authorization. Instead, the API server handles authentication and authorization itself, so typical Kubernetes deployments are not affected.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

This vulnerability is patched in the following versions: - etcd 3.6.11 - etcd 3.5.30 - etcd 3.4.44

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

If upgrading is not immediately possible, reduce exposure by treating the affected RPCs as unauthenticated in practice.

  • restrict network access to etcd server ports so only trusted components can connect
  • require strong client identity at the transport layer, such as mTLS with tightly scoped client certificate distribution

Reporters

Samy Ghannad (@SamyGhannad on Github) reported that read access via PrevKv in a Put request within etcd transactions bypassed RBAC authorization checks. Benjamin Wang (@ahrtr ) further analyzed that lease attachment in a Put request within etcd transactions also bypassed RBAC authorization checks

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.10"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "go.etcd.io/etcd/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.6.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.5.29"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "go.etcd.io/etcd/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.5.30"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.4.43"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "go.etcd.io/etcd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.44"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44283"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T03:21:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T18:16:49Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nA vulnerability in etcd allows read access via PrevKv, or lease attachment in Put requests within transaction operations, to bypass RBAC authorization checks. An authenticated user without sufficient read or lease-related permissions may be able to access unauthorized data or attach leases by invoking transaction operations with these features enabled.\n\nKubernetes does not rely on etcd\u2019s built-in authentication and authorization. Instead, the API server handles authentication and authorization itself, so typical Kubernetes deployments are not affected.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nThis vulnerability is patched in the following versions:\n- etcd 3.6.11\n- etcd 3.5.30\n- etcd 3.4.44\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, reduce exposure by treating the affected\nRPCs as unauthenticated in practice.\n\n- restrict network access to etcd server ports so only trusted components can connect\n- require strong client identity at the transport layer, such as mTLS with tightly scoped client certificate\ndistribution\n\n### Reporters\n\nSamy Ghannad (@SamyGhannad on Github) reported that read access via PrevKv in a Put request within etcd transactions bypassed RBAC authorization checks. Benjamin Wang (@ahrtr ) further analyzed that lease attachment in a Put request within etcd transactions also bypassed RBAC authorization checks",
  "id": "GHSA-x35m-3gp4-4fh5",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:54:29Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T03:21:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/security/advisories/GHSA-x35m-3gp4-4fh5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44283"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "etcd RBAC bypass allows unauthorized data access via PrevKv/lease attachment in nested transaction Put requests"
}


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Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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