GHSA-RHQ2-3VR9-6MCR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-21 23:43 – Updated: 2024-11-18 16:26Impact
This is a vulnerability that affects anyone who creates and publicly shares Gradio interfaces using gradio<2.4.8. Because of the way that static files were being served, someone who generated a public Gradio link and shared it with others would potentially be exposing the files on the computer that generated the link, while the link was active. An attacker would be able to view the contents of a file on the computer if they knew the exact relative filepath. We do not have any evidence that this was ever exploited, but we treated the issue seriously and immediately took steps to mitigate it (see below)
Response
- We worked with @haby0 to immediately patch the issue and released a new version,
gradio 2.5.0, within 24 hours of the issue being brought to our attention - We enabled a notification that is printed to anyone using an older version of gradio telling them to upgrade (see screenshot below)
- We expanded our test suite to test for this vulnerability ensuring that our patch does not get reverted in future releases of
gradio

Patches
The problem has been patched in gradio>=2.5.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "gradio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-43831"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-01-18T21:15:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-15T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThis is a vulnerability that affects anyone who creates and publicly shares Gradio interfaces using `gradio\u003c2.4.8`. Because of the way that static files were being served, someone who generated a public Gradio link and shared it with others would potentially be exposing the files on the computer that generated the link, while the link was active. An attacker would be able to view the contents of a file on the computer if they knew the exact relative filepath. We do not have any evidence that this was ever exploited, but we treated the issue seriously and immediately took steps to mitigate it (see below)\n\n### Response\n1. We worked with @haby0 to immediately patch the issue and released a new version, `gradio 2.5.0`, within 24 hours of the issue being brought to our attention \n2. We enabled a notification that is printed to anyone using an older version of gradio telling them to upgrade (see screenshot below)\n3. We expanded our test suite to test for this vulnerability ensuring that our patch does not get reverted in future releases of `gradio`\n\n\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched in `gradio\u003e=2.5.0`.\n",
"id": "GHSA-rhq2-3vr9-6mcr",
"modified": "2024-11-18T16:26:18Z",
"published": "2022-01-21T23:43:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/security/advisories/GHSA-rhq2-3vr9-6mcr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-43831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/commit/41bd3645bdb616e1248b2167ca83636a2653f781"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/gradio/PYSEC-2021-873.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Files on the host computer can be accessed from the Gradio interface"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.