GHSA-R3XG-RG9J-67FV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-03 21:13 – Updated: 2026-07-21 15:04
VLAI
Summary
Docling: Unsafe Archive Extraction and XML Parsing in METS-GBS Backend
Details

Impact

The METS-GBS backend's XML parsing and the input document format detection lacked security controls, enabling: - XML External Entity (XXE) attacks to read local files or cause denial of service - Decompression bombs (zip bombs) to exhaust memory and disk space - Unbounded archive extraction consuming system resources

An attacker could craft malicious METS-GBS archives that, when processed, could read sensitive files, exhaust system resources, or cause application crashes.

Patches

Fixed in version 2.91.0. The fix implements: - Secure XML parsing with resolve_entities=False, load_dtd=False, and no_network=True - Configurable limits: 300 MB total extraction size, 10 MB per file, 1000 member count - Cumulative size tracking across all extractions - Early termination when limits are exceeded - Secure format detection of METS-GBS tar archives with _detect_mets_gbs() method: maximum file size (10 MB per file), maximum member count (1000 members), and exception handling to gracefully fail when limits are exceeded

Workarounds

Avoid processing METS-GBS archives from untrusted sources. If necessary, pre-validate archives in an isolated environment with resource limits.

References

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "docling"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.45.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.91.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44018"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409",
      "CWE-611",
      "CWE-776"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-03T21:13:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T16:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe METS-GBS backend\u0027s XML parsing and the input document format detection lacked security controls, enabling:\n- XML External Entity (XXE) attacks to read local files or cause denial of service\n- Decompression bombs (zip bombs) to exhaust memory and disk space\n- Unbounded archive extraction consuming system resources\n\nAn attacker could craft malicious METS-GBS archives that, when processed, could read sensitive files, exhaust system resources, or cause application crashes.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in version 2.91.0. The fix implements:\n- Secure XML parsing with `resolve_entities=False`, `load_dtd=False`, and `no_network=True`\n- Configurable limits: 300 MB total extraction size, 10 MB per file, 1000 member count\n- Cumulative size tracking across all extractions\n- Early termination when limits are exceeded\n- Secure format detection of METS-GBS tar archives with `_detect_mets_gbs()` method: maximum file size (10 MB per file), maximum member count (1000 members), and exception handling to gracefully fail when limits are exceeded\n\n### Workarounds\nAvoid processing METS-GBS archives from untrusted sources. If necessary, pre-validate archives in an isolated environment with resource limits.\n\n### References\n- Fix release: [v2.91.0](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/releases/tag/v2.91.0)",
  "id": "GHSA-r3xg-rg9j-67fv",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T15:04:20Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T21:13:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling/security/advisories/GHSA-r3xg-rg9j-67fv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44018"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling/releases/tag/v2.91.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/docling/PYSEC-2026-2144.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Docling: Unsafe Archive Extraction and XML Parsing in METS-GBS Backend"
}



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