GHSA-QW65-CVWX-89V3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-28 21:24 – Updated: 2026-09-28 21:24
VLAI
Summary
fast-uri vulnerable to authority injection via an unvalidated port in serialize
Details

Impact

fast-uri serializes the port component of a URI without validating it. When recomposing the authority, fast-uri escapes the userinfo and host components but concatenates the port verbatim, so a port value that is not a sequence of digits can inject authority delimiters. For example, serializing a component whose port is @127.0.0.1:8124 produces http://trusted.example:@127.0.0.1:8124/app, demoting the intended host to userinfo and pointing the authority at an attacker-controlled host. Both fast-uri and Node's URL read the result back as the attacker's host with no error, so re-validating the built URI does not catch it.

This affects applications that build URIs from parts and assign untrusted data to the port component (for example a fixed host from configuration and a port taken from user input or a service record). The same path is reachable through serialize(), normalize(), and equal() in their object forms. A port obtained from parse() is always digits and is not affected.

Patches

This vulnerability has been patched in fast-uri 4.1.4, 3.1.7, and 2.4.6. recomposeAuthority now rejects any port that is not *DIGIT per RFC 3986. All users should upgrade.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, validate the port value against the RFC 3986 grammar (digits only) before passing a component to serialize(), normalize(), or equal(), and reject anything else, for example if (!/^\d*$/.test(String(port))) throw new Error('invalid port').

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-uri"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-uri"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-uri"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-84292"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-28T21:24:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-02T20:17:39Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` serializes the `port` component of a URI without validating it. When recomposing the authority, `fast-uri` escapes the userinfo and host components but concatenates the port verbatim, so a `port` value that is not a sequence of digits can inject authority delimiters. For example, serializing a component whose `port` is `@127.0.0.1:8124` produces `http://trusted.example:@127.0.0.1:8124/app`, demoting the intended host to userinfo and pointing the authority at an attacker-controlled host. Both `fast-uri` and Node\u0027s `URL` read the result back as the attacker\u0027s host with no error, so re-validating the built URI does not catch it.\n\nThis affects applications that build URIs from parts and assign untrusted data to the `port` component (for example a fixed host from configuration and a port taken from user input or a service record). The same path is reachable through `serialize()`, `normalize()`, and `equal()` in their object forms. A `port` obtained from `parse()` is always digits and is not affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis vulnerability has been patched in fast-uri `4.1.4`, `3.1.7`, and `2.4.6`. `recomposeAuthority` now rejects any port that is not `*DIGIT` per RFC 3986. All users should upgrade.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, validate the `port` value against the RFC 3986 grammar (digits only) before passing a component to `serialize()`, `normalize()`, or `equal()`, and reject anything else, for example `if (!/^\\d*$/.test(String(port))) throw new Error(\u0027invalid port\u0027)`.",
  "id": "GHSA-qw65-cvwx-89v3",
  "modified": "2026-09-28T21:24:39Z",
  "published": "2026-09-28T21:24:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/security/advisories/GHSA-qw65-cvwx-89v3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/commit/820e8478dd7da3d09f187bfaf35d50b71f67b8b4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/releases/tag/v2.4.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/releases/tag/v3.1.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/releases/tag/v4.1.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-uri vulnerable to authority injection via an unvalidated port in serialize"
}



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