GHSA-J43X-5HJQ-RGXF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-23 14:00 – Updated: 2026-09-23 14:00Summary
Plug's nested-parameter decoder (Plug.Conn.Query) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.
Details
For a key like a[a][a]...=1, Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6 (in lib/plug/conn/query.ex) builds an accumulator of :binary.part prefixes (a, a[a], a[a][a], …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3 then does one Map.put per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2 repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is O(N²) in nesting depth.
The same code path handles query strings, application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies, and multipart field names via Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4 and decode_each/2. The default Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but Plug.Parsers accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The decoder shows ~4× scaling per 2× input (16k levels ≈ 195 ms on a single scheduler).
PoC
- POST
a[a][a]...[a]=1asapplication/x-www-form-urlencodedto any endpoint of a Plug-based app. Even at the 1 MB urlencoded-parser default the payload carries ~333,000 nesting levels; with the broaderPlug.Parsersbody limit (20 MB default) a single request can carry millions. - Launch one such request per scheduler concurrently. Each pins a scheduler for minutes; legitimate traffic stalls once all schedulers are busy.
Impact
A single low-bandwidth sender can render any internet-reachable Plug-based service (most Phoenix and standalone Elixir/Erlang web stacks) unresponsive. No credentials, specific endpoint, or prior knowledge of the application is required.
References
- Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/712b875d3442c765d8d37e546ffd5ad9f8afcc55
- Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/b4aa8a0665ce2726a6d5af44467fb4f59595b107
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "plug"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.15.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.15.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "plug"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.16.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.16.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "plug"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.17.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.17.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "plug"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.18.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.18.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "plug"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.19.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54892"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-23T14:00:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T13:16:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nPlug\u0027s nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.\n\n### Details\n\nFor a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, \u2026) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N\u00b2)` in nesting depth.\n\nThe same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The decoder shows ~4\u00d7 scaling per 2\u00d7 input (16k levels \u2248 195 ms on a single scheduler).\n\n### PoC\n\n1. POST `a[a][a]...[a]=1` as `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` to any endpoint of a Plug-based app. Even at the 1 MB urlencoded-parser default the payload carries ~333,000 nesting levels; with the broader `Plug.Parsers` body limit (20 MB default) a single request can carry millions.\n2. Launch one such request per scheduler concurrently. Each pins a scheduler for minutes; legitimate traffic stalls once all schedulers are busy.\n\n### Impact\n\nA single low-bandwidth sender can render any internet-reachable Plug-based service (most Phoenix and standalone Elixir/Erlang web stacks) unresponsive. No credentials, specific endpoint, or prior knowledge of the application is required.\n\n### References\n\n* Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/712b875d3442c765d8d37e546ffd5ad9f8afcc55\n* Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/b4aa8a0665ce2726a6d5af44467fb4f59595b107",
"id": "GHSA-j43x-5hjq-rgxf",
"modified": "2026-09-23T14:00:22Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T14:00:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/security/advisories/GHSA-j43x-5hjq-rgxf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54892"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/9c5d37c440eaae92869eed7c014c47266744fadb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/a61124aa625d819a218fb07f90afbac8aa85eb0e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/c317d08fdcf96e17931f7419275b2b8c4bf3e951"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/d4e5568392a4b29e545b91e12e87d6098f976145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/d737eb236f17e31a36290e39f9ef3cd86a1343bd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-54892.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/blob/v1.19.3/CHANGELOG.md#v1193-2026-06-23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-54892"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": " Plug: quadratic-time decoding of nested query/body parameters enables denial of service"
}
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