GHSA-FPG8-7664-JC5Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 21:43 – Updated: 2026-07-10 21:43Previously, Apko verified the control section hash (.PKGINFO etc.) against the signed APKINDEX, but never verified the data section hash (the actual package files that get installed). An attacker who could compromise a mirror, poison a cache, or MITM a package fetch could substitute arbitrary file contents while the control hash check still passed.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "chainguard.dev/apko"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "chainguard.dev/melange"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.50.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54174"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T21:43:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Previously, Apko verified the control section hash (`.PKGINFO` etc.) against the signed `APKINDEX`, but never verified the data section hash (the actual package files that get installed). An attacker who could compromise a mirror, poison a cache, or MITM a package fetch could substitute arbitrary file contents while the control hash check still passed.",
"id": "GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q",
"modified": "2026-07-10T21:43:05Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T21:43:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/security/advisories/GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "melange: Incomplete package integrity verification allows data section substitution"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.