GHSA-G3QG-6746-3MG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-20 18:08 – Updated: 2025-06-27 23:59Due to a missing constraint in the rv32im circuit, any 3-register RISC-V instruction (including remu and divu) in risc0-zkvm 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 are vulnerable to an attack by a malicious prover. The main idea for the attack is to confuse the RISC-V virtual machine into treating the value of the rs1 register as the same as the rs2 register due to a lack of constraints in the rv32im circuit.
This vulnerability was reported by Christoph Hochrainer via our Hackenproof bug bounty. We have evaluated the severity of the vulnerability as “Critical,” and paid a bounty.
The fix for the circuit was implemented in zirgen/pull/238, and the update to risc0 was implemented in risc0/pull/3181. Impacted on-chain verifiers have already been disabled via the estop mechanism outlined in the Verifier Management Design.
Mitigation
We recommend all impacted users upgrade as soon as possible.
Rust applications using the risc0-zkvm crate at versions 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 should upgrade to version 2.1.0.
Smart contract applications using the official RISC Zero Verifier Router do not need to take any action: zkVM version 2.1 is active on all official routers, and version 2.0 has been disabled.
Smart contract applications not using the verifier router should update their contracts to send verification calls to the 2.1 version of the verifier.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "risc0-zkvm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "risc0-circuit-rv32im"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-52484"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-20T18:08:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-20T18:15:28Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Due to a missing constraint in the rv32im circuit, any 3-register RISC-V instruction (including remu and divu) in risc0-zkvm 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 are vulnerable to an attack by a malicious prover. The main idea for the attack is to confuse the RISC-V virtual machine into treating the value of the rs1 register as the same as the rs2 register due to a lack of constraints in the rv32im circuit.\n\nThis vulnerability was reported by Christoph Hochrainer via our Hackenproof bug bounty. We have evaluated the severity of the vulnerability as \u201cCritical,\u201d and paid a bounty. \n\nThe fix for the circuit was implemented in [zirgen/pull/238](https://github.com/risc0/zirgen/pull/238), and the update to risc0 was implemented in [risc0/pull/3181](https://github.com/risc0/risc0/pull/3181). Impacted on-chain verifiers have already been disabled via the estop mechanism outlined in the [Verifier Management Design](https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/release-2.0/contracts/version-management-design.md#base-verifier-implementations). \n\n## Mitigation\nWe recommend all impacted users upgrade as soon as possible.\n\nRust applications using the risc0-zkvm crate at versions 2.0.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2 should upgrade to version 2.1.0.\n\nSmart contract applications using the official [RISC Zero Verifier Router](https://dev.risczero.com/api/blockchain-integration/contracts/verifier#verifier-router) do not need to take any action: zkVM version 2.1 is active on all official routers, and version 2.0 has been disabled.\n\nSmart contract applications not using the verifier router should update their contracts to send verification calls to the 2.1 version of the verifier.",
"id": "GHSA-g3qg-6746-3mg9",
"modified": "2025-06-27T23:59:02Z",
"published": "2025-06-20T18:08:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/security/advisories/GHSA-g3qg-6746-3mg9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52484"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/pull/3181"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/zirgen/pull/238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/commit/006d86c363b16d2b2ac42d32d832a209ff8ab4c9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/commit/1873bbb8a56793edd1f6195242d184cf6cc5175d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/commit/67f2d81c638bff5f4fcfe11a084ebb34799b7a89"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/zirgen/commit/e0e2918302c93e956f73ca2e44aef2b861d8c3ae"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "zkVM Underconstrained Vulnerability"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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