GHSA-8M32-P958-JG99
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-04 06:06 – Updated: 2026-04-07 14:19Summary
Directus's Single Sign-On (SSO) login pages lacked a Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy (COOP) HTTP response header. Without this header, a malicious cross-origin window that opens the Directus login page retains the ability to access and manipulate the window object of that page. An attacker can exploit this to intercept and redirect the OAuth authorization flow to an attacker-controlled OAuth client, causing the victim to unknowingly grant access to their authentication provider account (e.g. Google, Discord).
Impact
A successful attack allows the attacker to obtain an OAuth access token for the victim's third-party identity provider account. Depending on the scopes authorized, this can lead to: - Unauthorized access to the victim's linked identity provider account - Account takeover of the Directus instance if the attacker can authenticate using the stolen credentials or provider session
Patches
This issue has been addressed by adding the Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin HTTP response header to SSO-related endpoints. This header instructs the browser to place the page in its own browsing context group, severing any reference the opener window may hold.
Workarounds
Users who are unable to upgrade immediately can mitigate this vulnerability by configuring their reverse proxy or web server to add the following HTTP response header to all Directus responses: Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "directus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35408"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T06:06:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T22:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nDirectus\u0027s Single Sign-On (SSO) login pages lacked a `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy` (COOP) HTTP response header. Without this header, a malicious cross-origin window that opens the Directus login page retains the ability to access and manipulate the `window` object of that page. An attacker can exploit this to intercept and redirect the OAuth authorization flow to an attacker-controlled OAuth client, causing the victim to unknowingly grant access to their authentication provider account (e.g. Google, Discord).\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful attack allows the attacker to obtain an OAuth access token for the victim\u0027s third-party identity provider account. Depending on the scopes authorized, this can lead to:\n- Unauthorized access to the victim\u0027s linked identity provider account\n- Account takeover of the Directus instance if the attacker can authenticate using the stolen credentials or provider session\n\n## Patches\n\nThis issue has been addressed by adding the `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin` HTTP response header to SSO-related endpoints. This header instructs the browser to place the page in its own browsing context group, severing any reference the opener window may hold.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUsers who are unable to upgrade immediately can mitigate this vulnerability by configuring their reverse proxy or web server to add the following HTTP response header to all Directus responses: `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin`",
"id": "GHSA-8m32-p958-jg99",
"modified": "2026-04-07T14:19:49Z",
"published": "2026-04-04T06:06:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-8m32-p958-jg99"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35408"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directus: Missing Cross-Origin Opener Policy"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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