GHSA-2RGF-HM63-5QPH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 22:17 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:47Summary
OpenClaw used left-most X-Forwarded-For values when requests came from configured trusted proxies. In proxy chains that append/preserve header values, this could let attacker-controlled header content influence security decisions tied to client IP.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
<= 2026.2.19-2 - Patched:
2026.2.21(planned next release)
Impact
Possible client-IP spoofing in security-sensitive paths (for example auth rate-limit identity and local/private classification) for deployments behind trusted proxies with non-recommended forwarding behavior.
Scope Note
OpenClaw docs recommend reverse proxies overwrite (not append/preserve) inbound forwarding headers. This condition reduces severity.
Fix Commit(s)
07039dc089e51589a213ec0d16f8d6f2cd871fa18877bfd11ec7760b115b2d0d7500a45da2749747
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.21). After npm release is out, publish this advisory.
OpenClaw thanks @AnthonyDiSanti for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.19-2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32029"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-807"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T22:17:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOpenClaw used left-most `X-Forwarded-For` values when requests came from configured trusted proxies. In proxy chains that append/preserve header values, this could let attacker-controlled header content influence security decisions tied to client IP.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.19-2`\n- Patched: `2026.2.21` (planned next release)\n\n### Impact\n\nPossible client-IP spoofing in security-sensitive paths (for example auth rate-limit identity and local/private classification) for deployments behind trusted proxies with non-recommended forwarding behavior.\n\n### Scope Note\n\nOpenClaw docs recommend reverse proxies overwrite (not append/preserve) inbound forwarding headers. This condition reduces severity.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `07039dc089e51589a213ec0d16f8d6f2cd871fa1`\n- `8877bfd11ec7760b115b2d0d7500a45da2749747`\n\n### Release Process Note\n\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.21`). After npm release is out, publish this advisory.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @AnthonyDiSanti for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-2rgf-hm63-5qph",
"modified": "2026-03-25T18:47:26Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T22:17:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-2rgf-hm63-5qph"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32029"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/07039dc089e51589a213ec0d16f8d6f2cd871fa1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/8877bfd11ec7760b115b2d0d7500a45da2749747"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-client-ip-spoofing-via-x-forwarded-for-header-parsing"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw improperly parses X-Forwarded-For behind trusted proxies allows client IP spoofing in security decisions"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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