GCVE-1-2026-20026 (CVE-2026-87827)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-09 10:27 – Updated: 2026-09-09 10:53- CWE-1188 - Insecure Default Initialization of Resource
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://blog.netlab.360.com/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-… | technical-description |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KGUARD | KGUARD_firmware |
Unknown:
0 , ≤ *
(semver)
|
guessed |
CIRCL
Known Exploited Vulnerability - GCVE BCP-07 Compliant
Exploited: Yes
Characteristics
Timestamps
Scope
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
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"versions": [
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"value": "\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003eCertain KGUARD DVR devices running vulnerable firmware expose a system command execution service on all network interfaces without requiring authentication. A remote unauthenticated attacker with network access to the affected service can execute arbitrary system commands on the device, potentially resulting in complete compromise of the DVR.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe vulnerability is known to have been exploited in the wild by the Mirai_ptea (Rimasuta) and Mirai_aurora botnets for malware propagation and subsequent DDoS activity. The vulnerability was reported to affect firmware dating from 2016, while firmware released after 2017 appears to mitigate the issue by restricting the affected service to the localhost interface (\u003ccode\u003e127.0.0.1\u003c/code\u003e) instead of exposing it on all interfaces (\u003ccode\u003e0.0.0.0\u003c/code\u003e).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe affected-device list reported by Netlab includes many \u003ccode\u003eD1004NR\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eD1008NR\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eD1016NR\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eD1104\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eD1104NR\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eD1108NR\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eD1116NR\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eD1132NR\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eD2116NR\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eD97xx\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eD98xx\u003c/code\u003e, and \u003ccode\u003eD99xx\u003c/code\u003e variants and several associated hardware revisions\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003eThe exploit is included in some version of\u0026nbsp;rapperbot and exploited in 2026. This assignment has been made to document the active exploitation and lack of documentation from the vendor.\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 10,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
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"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"descriptions": [
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"tags": [
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],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "KGUARD DVR unauthenticated remote command execution vulnerability",
"x_gcve": [
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"datePublished": "2026-09-09T10:27:00.000Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-09T10:41:00.000Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-09T10:53:31.849724Z",
"requesterUserId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
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"state": "PUBLISHED",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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