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CVE-2026-72343 (GCVE-0-2026-72343)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-15 05:55 – Updated: 2026-08-17 05:43
VLAI
Title
net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(), before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv->stats_nch is still zero, because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(), which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel(). mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather than NULL. The "if (!buf)" guard does not catch this, and mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes "successfully" with priv->stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Once channels are opened (priv->stats_nch > 0) and the hypervisor enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10. Allocate the buffer based on priv->max_nch, which is set in mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch: - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create(). - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on stats_nch) for the worker's active payload size, so the wire format (block->rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged. The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where mlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a detach/resume cycle while priv->stats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev does not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when the netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute buf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based on the reduced max_nch. Allocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns early without (re)creating the agent. Clear priv->stats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after freeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a subsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left from a previous enable/disable cycle. This mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of size max_nch (e.g. priv->channel_stats) and lazily populating entries up to stats_nch on demand.
Severity
8.4 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Linux Linux Affected: fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 , < 3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50 (git)
Affected: fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 , < 5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01 (git)
Affected: fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 , < 22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf (git)
Affected: fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 , < 420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4 (git)
Affected: fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 , < abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2 (git)
Affected: fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 , < 25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17 (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 5.17
Unaffected: 0 , < 5.17 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.1.178 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.6.145 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.12.97 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.18.40 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.1.5 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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{
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            "drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/hv_vhca_stats.c"
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation\n\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),\nbefore mlx5e_open(). At that point priv-\u003estats_nch is still zero,\nbecause it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(),\nwhich is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().\n\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and\nkvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather\nthan NULL. The \"if (!buf)\" guard does not catch this, and\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes \"successfully\" with\npriv-\u003estats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.\n\nOnce channels are opened (priv-\u003estats_nch \u003e 0) and the hypervisor\nenables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes\nbuf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls\nmemset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.\n\nAllocate the buffer based on priv-\u003emax_nch, which is set in\nmlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:\n\n  - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that\n    returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and\n    use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().\n  - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on\n    stats_nch) for the worker\u0027s active payload size, so the wire\n    format (block-\u003erings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled\n    by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.\n\nThe max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where\nmlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a\ndetach/resume cycle while priv-\u003estats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev\ndoes not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when\nthe netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute\nbuf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based\non the reduced max_nch.\n\nAllocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns\nearly without (re)creating the agent. Clear\npriv-\u003estats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after\nfreeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a\nsubsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left\nfrom a previous enable/disable cycle.\n\nThis mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of\nsize max_nch (e.g. priv-\u003echannel_stats) and lazily populating\nentries up to stats_nch on demand."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
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            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
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            "version": "3.1"
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              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The flaw is reached via the Hyper-V VMBus PCI config back-channel (PCI_INVALIDATE_BLOCK) into mlx5e HV VHCA stats handling during mlx5e driver operation on Azure mlx5 NICs, not via remote network packets or guest syscall/ioctl paths.\nAC:L - mlx5e_nic_enable always calls mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create before mlx5e_open, so kvzalloc(0) deterministically stores ZERO_SIZE_PTR; once channels open and the hypervisor enables stats reporting, the worker always memset()s with buf_len\u003e0 and faults.\nPR:N - On Azure/Hyper-V mlx5 VMs the host routinely drives VHCA stats collection over the PCI config back-channel during normal operation; no guest credentials, CAP_NET_ADMIN, or other elevated guest privileges are required beyond standard VM boot with the NIC active.\nUI:N - Triggering requires only normal VM boot and mlx5e driver bring-up with channels opened; no victim file open, mount, or other interactive administrator action is needed to reach the faulty memset path.\nS:U - Kernel memory corruption and panic are confined to the guest kernel running mlx5e on the affected VM; the bug does not cross VM/host, IOMMU, or other security boundaries into a separate authority.\nC:H - memset(buf,0,buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR is an out-of-bounds write from a near-NULL kernel address; per kernel guidance any such memory corruption can be leveraged for information disclosure even though the immediate operation writes zeros.\nI:H - The worker performs a large out-of-bounds write via memset on the bogus buffer pointer, and the pre-fix sizing logic can also overrun a too-small allocation when stats_nch exceeds max_nch after detach/resume, enabling arbitrary kernel write primitives.\nA:H - The memset on ZERO_SIZE_PTR faults at address 0x10 causing a kernel oops or panic, reliably denying availability of Azure/Hyper-V guests using CONFIG_PCI_HYPERV_INTERFACE mlx5 NICs whenever the hypervisor enables stats reporting."
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        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50"
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01"
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        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17"
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      "title": "net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation",
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-72343",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-15T05:55:49.067Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-09T03:40:39.920Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:43:01.870Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-72343\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-08-15T06:22:07.650\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-08-17T06:18:38.163\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nnet/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation\\n\\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),\\nbefore mlx5e_open(). At that point priv-\u003estats_nch is still zero,\\nbecause it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(),\\nwhich is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().\\n\\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and\\nkvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather\\nthan NULL. The \\\"if (!buf)\\\" guard does not catch this, and\\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes \\\"successfully\\\" with\\npriv-\u003estats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.\\n\\nOnce channels are opened (priv-\u003estats_nch \u003e 0) and the hypervisor\\nenables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes\\nbuf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls\\nmemset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.\\n\\nAllocate the buffer based on priv-\u003emax_nch, which is set in\\nmlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:\\n\\n  - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that\\n    returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and\\n    use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().\\n  - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on\\n    stats_nch) for the worker\u0027s active payload size, so the wire\\n    format (block-\u003erings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled\\n    by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.\\n\\nThe max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where\\nmlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a\\ndetach/resume cycle while priv-\u003estats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev\\ndoes not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when\\nthe netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute\\nbuf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based\\non the reduced max_nch.\\n\\nAllocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in\\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns\\nearly without (re)creating the agent. Clear\\npriv-\u003estats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after\\nfreeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a\\nsubsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left\\nfrom a previous enable/disable cycle.\\n\\nThis mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of\\nsize max_nch (e.g. priv-\u003echannel_stats) and lazily populating\\nentries up to stats_nch on demand.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"programFiles\":[\"drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/hv_vhca_stats.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518\",\"lessThan\":\"3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518\",\"lessThan\":\"5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518\",\"lessThan\":\"22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518\",\"lessThan\":\"420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518\",\"lessThan\":\"abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518\",\"lessThan\":\"25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"affected\",\"programFiles\":[\"drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/hv_vhca_stats.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"5.17\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"5.17\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.1.178\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.1.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.6.145\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.6.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.12.97\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.12.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.18.40\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.18.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.1.5\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"7.1.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.2\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"original_commit_for_fix\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":8.4,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":2.5,\"impactScore\":5.9}]},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}",
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-08-19T17:08:13+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-72343",
      "id": "CVE-2026-72343",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-08-15T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "246",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "28",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-72343.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.