FKIE_CVE-2026-72343

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 06:22 - Updated: 2026-10-16 19:17
Severity
8.4 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(), before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv->stats_nch is still zero, because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(), which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel(). mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather than NULL. The "if (!buf)" guard does not catch this, and mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes "successfully" with priv->stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Once channels are opened (priv->stats_nch > 0) and the hypervisor enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10. Allocate the buffer based on priv->max_nch, which is set in mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch: - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create(). - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on stats_nch) for the worker's active payload size, so the wire format (block->rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged. The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where mlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a detach/resume cycle while priv->stats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev does not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when the netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute buf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based on the reduced max_nch. Allocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns early without (re)creating the agent. Clear priv->stats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after freeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a subsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left from a previous enable/disable cycle. This mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of size max_nch (e.g. priv->channel_stats) and lazily populating entries up to stats_nch on demand.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/hv_vhca_stats.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/hv_vhca_stats.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.17"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.17",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.178",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.145",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.97",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.40",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation\n\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),\nbefore mlx5e_open(). At that point priv-\u003estats_nch is still zero,\nbecause it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(),\nwhich is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().\n\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and\nkvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather\nthan NULL. The \"if (!buf)\" guard does not catch this, and\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes \"successfully\" with\npriv-\u003estats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.\n\nOnce channels are opened (priv-\u003estats_nch \u003e 0) and the hypervisor\nenables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes\nbuf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls\nmemset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.\n\nAllocate the buffer based on priv-\u003emax_nch, which is set in\nmlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:\n\n  - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that\n    returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and\n    use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().\n  - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on\n    stats_nch) for the worker\u0027s active payload size, so the wire\n    format (block-\u003erings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled\n    by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.\n\nThe max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where\nmlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a\ndetach/resume cycle while priv-\u003estats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev\ndoes not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when\nthe netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute\nbuf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based\non the reduced max_nch.\n\nAllocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns\nearly without (re)creating the agent. Clear\npriv-\u003estats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after\nfreeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a\nsubsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left\nfrom a previous enable/disable cycle.\n\nThis mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of\nsize max_nch (e.g. priv-\u003echannel_stats) and lazily populating\nentries up to stats_nch on demand."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-72343",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-16T19:17:24.280",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.4,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.5,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-72343",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-16T18:47:27.911356Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:22:07.650",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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